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Abstract
America's Vietnam War had profound ramifications beyond its immediate effect 
on Southeast Asia and the United States. This dissertation utilizes the debate over 
Vietnam between the United States and its major European allies, Britain, France, and 
West Germany, as an analytical framework to examine inter-allied relations. The 
“Vietnam problem” strained the trans-Atlantic alliance and revealed the respective self- 
interest o f the four member nations. The British, French, and West Germans had serious 
misgivings about the American strategy in Vietnam, based on a differing view o f the 
nature o f the conflict and a pessimistic assessment o f American chances for success in 
South Vietnam. Equally important, the Europeans feared that Washington might 
disengage from Europe and that the fighting in Southeast Asia might develop into a 
major, perhaps even world war. European security hence might be dangerously 
undermined by further American escalation in Vietnam. According to the European 
powers, the Cold War should be primarily fought in Europe. Although London, Paris, and 
Bonn were deeply apprehensive about the American engagement in Vietnam they failed 
to develop a unified policy to affect American decision-making because they were unable 
to transcend their nationalistic agendas. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson unsuccessfully 
attempted to win substantial European support for America’s role in Vietnam. To the 
United States, Vietnam was a prune domino that could not be allowed to fall and 
Washington viewed European concerns as parochial and counter-productive. The 
essentially unilateral approach o f the United States in Vietnam led to tragic failure. 
Subsequent o f the Vietnam experience, Washington realized that it could not fulfill all its 
global obligations without the backing o f its European allies. The lack o f a cohesive 
European policy toward America’s engagement in Vietnam revealed inherent 
shortcomings o f the European nation-states which were still guided by a nationalistic 
approach in foreign policy-making. Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States 
painfully recognized that in order to successfully meet global challenges they needed to 
listen more closely to each other and develop a mutuaiistic policy that would better serve 
their shared interests as allies and Mends.
he
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The United States has notfatty learned that the political advice or criticism o f less 
powerful friends who share a common heritage does not necessarily denote 
hostility or envy or malice - or even bad judgem ent
George Ball, The Discipline o f Power, 1968
Introduction
The American involvement in and subsequent escalation o f the conflict in South 
Vietnam has been intensely researched and documented. Most historiography on the 
subject is limited to examining American and Vietnamese policies and actions.‘Only a 
few historians have adopted a broader approach that investigates the global ramifications 
and significance o f America’s Vietnam War.2 Recent scholarship acknowledges the need 
to better understand the American past within the framework o f international politics. 
Currently, historians are taking a fresh look at the American experience ranging from a 
reinterpretation o f the Colonial period based on an Atlantic perspective to inclusive
'For an overview of the varying interpretations o f American scholars on the Vietnam War see two articles 
by George Herring, “America and Vietnam: The Debate Continues,” in: American Historical Review. 92, 
(April, 1987) and “The War in Vietnam,” in Robert A. Devine (ed.), Exploring the Johnson Years. (Austin, 
1981), hi addition to historians’ analysis o f the Vietnam War, the interested reader can find a plethora o f 
autobiographical accounts ranging from Ambassador Frederick Nolting’s, From Trust to Tragedy. (Hew 
York, 1988) to Mark Baker’s, Ham: The Vietnam War m the Words o f the Soldiers Who Fought There. 
(Hew York, 1981) and Truong Nhu Tang's, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War 
and Its Aftermath. (Hew York, 1985). Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McHamara, and Dean Rusk also address 
Vietnam and its implication m them autobiographies. Journalist like Stanley Kamow and David Halberstam 
provide yet another angle to the complex American experience hr Vietnam.
1 The standard was set by Ralph Bernhard Smith’s three volume work: An International History o f the 
Vietnam War. (New York. 1983, VoLH, 1985, and VoL HI, 1991). Smith discusses American, 
Vietnamese, Soviet, Chinese perspectives, and also the British role m finding a diplomatic settlement, from 
1955 to 1966. Ilya V. Gaiduk’s book The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. (Chicago. 1996), uses newly 
available Soviet documents to demonstrate that for Moscow the conflict in Vietnam was also less than 
welcome and that the Soviets struggled to please their allies without creating “showdowns” with their 
rivals. Fredrik Logevail incorporates French and British points o f view m his recent book Choosing Wan 
The Lost Chance for Peace and die Escalation o f War in Vietnam. (University o f California Press, 1999).
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2studies on Cold War history.3 Given the global obligations, challenges, and opportunities 
that have influenced and still affect the United States, an international approach in 
researching America7s past is important.
This dissertation examines America’s Vietnam policy in a  global context by 
focusing on the United States’ relationship with its Cold War partners Great Britain, 
France, and West Germany. The European response to America’s Vietnam policy 
provides an analytical framework to assess this important chapter in recent American 
history within the wider perspective o f international relations. Equally significant, the 
respective approaches to the “Vietnam question” by the Europeans and Americans reveal 
the on-going challenge for nation-states o f transcending narrowly defined state-centered 
policies for a global perspective pursuant o f common goals among the trans-Atlantic 
allies.
During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations Great Britain, France, and West 
Germany perceived the growing American military involvement in South Vietnam as 
misguided, dangerous, and unwanted. Did European “criticism” o f America’s role in 
Vietnam, to use Ball’s phrase quoted above, “denote hostility, or envy or malice?” While 
some envy o f America’s super-power status affected all three European powers, their 
anxiety over U.S. policy in Vietnam first and foremost resulted from both a concern for 
their respective national self-interest and a pragmatic, realistic assessment o f the situation 
m Southeast Asia. European leadership feared that the crisis in Asia portended a
1 For Colonial and Revolutionary history see for example the recent American Historical Review, February
2000, which discusses Revolutions in the Americas. Cold War Studies proceed along similar lines by
employing newly accessible archives in the Soviet Union and recently released documents o f America*s
European allies. The German documents on foreign relations for the 1960’s, which have been recently
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decreasing American interest in European affairs, and a possible reduction o f American 
troops which, might leave Western Europe more vulnerable to potential Soviet 
encroachments. The Europeans also worried that the conflict in Vietnam might escalate 
into a major Asian and perhaps even world war, thereby endangering the security of 
Western Europe.
In light o f these profound concerns, the failure o f Britain, France, and West 
Germany to significantly influence American policy-making is intriguing and of 
historical importance. Disregarding European concerns, the United States unilaterally 
embarked on a strategy o f escalation in South Vietnam. Had Washington listened closer 
to European advice, the American quagmire in Vietnam might have been averted. In 
addition, the United States was forced to fight in Vietnam without its European allies. 
Whether European troops might have improved the military situation in South Vietnam 
cannot be assessed, but European assistance certainly would have reinforced America’s 
Vietnam policy both in the court of world opinion and within the United States. A joint 
Western position proved essential to secure the independence o f South Korea during 1950 
to 1953, but ten years later American leaders were unable to form a similar alliance with 
the West Europeans to defeat Communism in South Vietnam.
Why, then, was a mutualistic trans-Atlantic approach to the Vietnam question 
unattainable? First, the Europeans missed the opportunity to develop a joint, well 
coordinated critical response to America’s policy in Vietnam. The Europeans were 
hampered by a centuries old paradigm o f state-interest which precluded any unified
published, have been extremely helpful to this author to interpret U.S.-German relations and the Vietnam 
question.
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strategy aimed at affecting U.S. decision-making. Reliance upon “nationalistic” 
ideologies prevented the British, French, and Germans from moving beyond them 
individual agendas to come to an understanding with each other regarding the American 
role in Vietnam. The “Vietnam question” became a lesson for the Europeans about the 
limitations o f their impact on global politics. Second, unilateral advice and expressed 
misgivings from the Europeans were ignored by Washington. All three European powers 
had a  grander imperialist past but were reduced to secondary rank in global affairs 
following the Second World War. Britain and France, especially, had profound 
experience in the affairs o f Asia which led to the conviction that American policy in 
South Vietnam was mistaken and portended little chance o f success. While some o f their 
advice may have been valid, their behavior still exhibited the patterns o f a  bygone era. 
The United States was less inclined to follow suggestions of Europeans states which, 
until recently, had exploited Third World nations for their self-interest. Britain, France, 
and even more so West Germany were in fact “less powerful friends.” In light of the 
world-wide obligations o f the United States, to Washington the European voices appeared 
parochial and detrimental to America’s efforts in South Vietnam. Washington was even 
more dismayed by the fact that European misgivings over the “Vietnam question” left the 
United States fighting alone in Southeast Asia without the direct support o f its principal 
European allies.
A  closer analysis o f the motives and approaches taken by London, Paris, and 
Bonn is necessary in order to define the respective “national” agenda o f each country. 
What were the forces and factors that brought about such an ineffective European 
response to Washington’s Vietnam policy? It was neither “hostility”  toward the United
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States nor “bad judgement,”  but rather self-interest. All three powers had to adapt to the 
bi-polar world while trying to restore influence with the superpowers and thus enhance 
their international status. Also, policy-makers in London, Paris, and Bonn faced a 
domestic audience that was reluctant to endorse the American policy in Vietnam. While 
most Europeans appreciated American military protection and were grateful for American 
economic aid after the Second World War, the American escalation in Vietnam led to 
concern and criticism o f the United States.
Great Britain, apprehensive o f losing its role as “special ally” to the United States, 
was painfully aware o f the need for American military protection. But the crisis in 
Southeast Asia ran counter to British goals and realities. During the 1960’s, London was 
overseeing the demise o f its colonial empire but still hoped to play a  global role as leader 
o f the Commonwealth. British forces were strained already by commitments in Malaysia, 
Aden, Cyprus, and the turmoil in Rhodesia. Economic difficulties within the United 
Kingdom further precluded additional British military engagements elsewhere. Britain 
neither desired to pardcipate in a  doomed effort in Southeast Asia nor wished to risk its 
own security in Europe. In addition, British leaders were apprehensive about negative 
reactions within the Commonwealth to AmericaTs role in Vietnam. Hence London 
attempted to find a peaceful political solution o f the Vietnam problem through quiet but 
solid diplomatic initiatives. By doing so, Harold Macm illan, Alec Douglas-Home, and 
Harold Wilson aspired to remain a “special ally” to the United States while carefully 
balancing British economic limitations with the country’s political obligations toward its 
Commonwealth partners.
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France analyzed America’s policy on Vietnam through the prism o f its own long, 
disastrous experience in Indochina. Charles de Gaulle endeavored to convey France’s 
hard-learned lessons in Asia to Washington by urging U.S. leaders not to become bogged 
down in the jungles o f Vietnam. When his warnings went unheeded, de Gaulle used the 
increasing difficulties o f the United States in Southeast Asia as an opportunity to enhance 
the role o f France in global affairs. The French president sought closer relations with 
Third World countries, particularly those o f the former French empire. Toward these 
nations de Gaulle depicted his country as a trustworthy Mend genuinely interested in 
promoting their well-being. De Gaulle’s rhetoric presented France as an alternative to 
what he characterized as the ideologically driven interference o f the Soviet Union and the 
United States. By pursuing this foreign policy de Gaulle hoped to restore France once 
more to a position o f grandeur in the world - replacing Cold War ideology with one o f 
French nationalism. French “envy” o f the United States was certainly a factor in de 
Gaulle’s foreign policy. But de Gaulle could not afford to pursue an outwardly hostile 
policy toward the United States and genuinely tried to save the Americans from 
undertaking a doomed Vietnam policy. Despite a decade o f tensions with the United 
States, de Gaulle provided good judgement on Vietnam.
The West Germans had far more immediate concerns to deal with than a  struggle 
o f distant people in Southeast Asia. The necessity o f American military protection, the 
unity o f Berlin, and the issue o f German reunification topped the agenda of West German 
foreign policy-making. Berlin suffered division in 1961 and reunification was postponed 
partly as a  consequence o f the crisis in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the Vietnam 
conflict became a major policy dilemma for Bonn. I f  Washington continued to be
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7distracted by events in Southeast Asia, what would happen to the German agenda? Yet, 
open opposition to the widening American role in Vietnam was impossible because West 
Germany - still not a fully sovereign state at the time -  relied on Washington's good-will 
for survival and for possible German reunification in the future.
Obviously, the basis and aims of foreign policy-making differed among the three 
European powers. Nevertheless, their approach to global issues and the U.S. Vietnam 
policy in particular was rather similar. British, French, and German foreign policy 
decision-making was founded on an ideology o f nationalism, the notion that the nation’s 
best interest was paramount. The divergent Europeans’ view on the Vietnam problem was 
due to their interpretation of Communism. Harold Macmillan keenly remarked on the 
Soviet-Sino split that so-called “Communist” countries demonstrated similar political and 
ideological debates that marked Europe’s history. Charles de Gaulle always referred to 
“la Russie” refusing to use the term Soviet Union because to him ideologies were 
temporary while nations were not. Konrad Adenauer believed that the Soviet Union 
would ultimately have to relinquish its hold on the East Germans because the reality o f 
freedom and prosperity in the West would prove far more desirable than a rigid planned 
economy. The Soviet Union was threatening in the eyes o f Western Europeans because it 
represented a totalitarian system, taking the guise o f Marxist idealism, and bent on 
extending its influence further into Western Europe. Soviet goals vis-a-vis Western 
Europe were not new historically. Ever since the days o f Tsar Peter the Great Russian 
interest lay toward the West.
American policy-making was also driven by self-interest, but its objectives 
differed profoundly from those o f the Western Europeans. Propelled into the role o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8leader o f the Western world by the Second World War, it became America's self­
assumed duty and burden to defend the freedom o f its allies against the Communist 
threat John. F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were guided by the demands o f domestic 
politics and by a different ideological view on global affairs than were the Europeans. 
While the Europeans pursued agendas o f national self-interest aimed at retaining or 
enhancing their roles in global affairs, the cold-war dogma o f the Free World versus 
Communist oppression pervaded the mind-set o f Americans and foreign-policy advisors. 
After the “loss” o f China in 1949, stalemate in Korea in 1953, and a dissatisfactory 
political settlement for Laos in 1962, for Washington Vietnam became the front-line in 
the continuing Cold War struggle. According to the American doctrine o f containment, 
South Vietnam simply could not be abandoned because its fall might open the flood-gates 
to Communist expansion in the entire region. A lack o f American determination in 
Southeast Asia might also backfire politically at home. Republicans as well as “hawks” 
within the Democratic Party insisted that the United States had to stand up to any 
Communist encroachment. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were unwilling to risk 
potential political defeat at home. Therefore, they chose to expand America’s 
commitment against Communism in South Vietnam.
hi retrospect, Paris and London arrived at a  more realistic assessment o f the 
Vietnam situation than Washington and, based on their own history o f empire, believed 
that nothing good could come out o f the deployment o f American forces to the region. 
West German policy-makers also privately shared French and British reservations on the 
conflict in Vietnam. Yet, the three European countries failed in their efforts to affect 
American policy-decisions on Vietnam. Britain, France, and West Germany were miles
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
apart from accepting a mutual agenda because then: self-centered perspectives remained 
paramount. Internal differences among the Europeans were prevalent throughout the 
1960’s. Britain applied for membership in the European Economic Community but was 
twice rejected by de Gaulle’s veto. De Gaulle worked toward French leadership in Europe 
but ultimately failed because other Europeans rejected French, dominance. Erhard looked 
to Washington, Paris, and London for support o f German unification. His strategy was a 
failure as well. A divided, contained Germany would not challenge the status quo in 
Europe and to the United States, Great Britain, and France was preferable to a unified, 
potentially powerful “greater” Germany.
The consequences o f the failed trans-Atlantic dialogue over U.S. policy in 
Vietnam were twofold: Presidents Kennedy and Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam 
despite European advice to the contrary and by doing so found itself fighting 
Communism without its European allies’ support. The United States lost more than 
58,000 Americans in this tragic chapter o f American history and ultimately also failed to 
secure the independence o f South Vietnam. Secondly, the American refusal to listen 
closer to European concerns led to a profound strain in trans-Atlantic relations. In the end 
the conflict in Vietnam did not escalate into a major Asian or even Third World War. But 
America’s effort to gain European support by means ranging from friendly coercion to 
outright pressure left deep scars in U.S.- European relations. Instead of desired support, 
the United States faced a  Europe critical o f the American role in Vietnam which further 
undermined the American claim that Western liberty had to be defended in Vietnam. For 
Washington the lack o f European support in Vietnam not only resulted in a set-back for 
American goals in South-East Asia but caused a  fissure in trans-Atlantic relations.
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The fall-out from the Vietnam conflict allowed the Europeans allies to assert their 
agendas with varying degree o f success. But it was also obvious that these short-term 
achievements of national self-interest could not reap greater benefits in a multi-polar 
world. On the one hand, for Britain, France, and West Germany, the “Vietnam question” 
served as a lesson that their foreign policy-making was constructed under severe 
limitations. None o f the European powers could succeed in the global framework on its 
own. On the other hand, if  the Europeans pursued a more mutualistic policy in the future, 
these limitations might be overcome. On the other side o f the Atlantic, the Americans 
experienced the inherent limitations o f a unilateral strategy to arrive at a  solution o f the 
Vietnam conflict and also realized the need to understand and consider the concerns and 
thinking of its Cold War partners. Despite its military-economic might, the United States 
could not dictate policy to the Europeans and, conversely, neither could the Europeans 
tell Washington how to proceed in Vietnam.
The transatlantic debate over the “Vietnam question” served as a difficult and 
painful lesson that neither the Europeans nor the Americans would benefit by pursuing a 
state-centered policy. This learning process led to greater appreciation o f their respective 
views and initiated a more profound and genuine conversation over common goals of all 
four allies. The strengthened trans-Atlantic dialogue between the United States and its 
European allies allowed for a more mutualistic approach to problems facing the alliance 
during the following decades. AH four powers realized that “political advice or even 
criticism” had little to do with envy or bad judgement, as Ball put it, but facilitated “good 
judgement” among the trans-Atlantic friends in order to secure a  safe future based on an 
commitment to freedom and democracy.
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Part One:
The Reluctant Ally:
Great Britain and the Search for a Negotiated Settlement
in Vietnam
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12
The elements that will enter our understanding with America can only be assessed in the 
light o f particular British policies. These must be brought together and talked over as a 
whole with USA-with a coherent and understood give and take.. .  We must back US in 
SE Asia - though working slowly for a solution by leaving things to people o f the area.
Patrick Gordon Walker, Thoughts on Foreign Policy, August 1964
Great Britain experienced a  taste o f the difficulties in Vietnam first-hand in 1945. 
British troops under General Douglas Gracey cleared out Japanese soldiers from the 
southern part o f Vietnam and helped restore French colonial rule. As a colonial power, 
London did not question the legitimacy of French imperialism, since Britain, too, had a 
strong interest in maintaining its own dominions.4By 1948, Britain also faced a 
Communist insurgency in Malaya. During the early 1950’s Winston Churchill shared 
American beliefs about the threat o f a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia. Soon, 
Churchill reevaluated the British policy on Southeast Asia. He distanced himself from the 
French struggle in Indochina because he believed that the French effort was both a 
quixotic endeavor to reestablish French colonial rule and a dangerous path risking war 
with the People’s Republic o f China (PRC).
Britain was in the middle o f dissolving its colonial empire and not willing to 
engage itself further in Southeast Asia to save French colonial rule. The Churchill 
ministry supported a diplomatic solution and rejected an American proposal to intervene 
jointly in Vietnam. Britain co-chaired the Geneva Conference in 1954 with the Soviet
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Union, resulting in international guarantees to adhere to the neutralization o f Vietnam. 
Churchill agreed to join the American sponsored defense community for Southeast Asia 
(SEATO), designed to forestall further Communist aggression in  the region.5
Churchill’s policy during the First Indochina War set the pattern for his 
successors o f how to respond to the growing American role in Indochina. While Britain 
refused to intervene in Southeast Asia, no British leader felt at liberty to openly challenge 
the U. S. policy in Vietnam. The United Kingdom relied on American military protection 
for its security but this safety net might be weakened if Washington engaged in a major 
war in Southeast Asia. London discerned a twofold scenario in case tensions intensified 
in the Far East. First, U.S. primary interest would shift from Europe to Asia, leaving 
Europe more vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. Second, the American commitment to 
defending Southeast Asia could explode into a major, perhaps even world war. These 
prospects were dismal but London also had to consider maintaining its “special 
relationship” with the United States. The partnership with Washington became even more 
important after Great Britain was denied entry into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) by France’s president Charles de Gaulle in 1963. Britain had to find a policy that 
accommodated its own self-interest without alienating the United States. In addition, 
British prime ministers from Harold Macmillan to Harold Wilson faced intensifying
* See for the discussion of British involvement m Vietnam: George Rosie, The British fa Vietnam: How the 
Twentv-Five Year War Began. (London, 1970).
s On British policy during the Fust Indochina War see: Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f 
Anthony Eden. (Boston, I960), and Kevin Ruane^ . Refusing the Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and 
the Pursuit o f Victory in Vietnam. 1952-1954, English Historical Review. (Feb. 1995); see also: Richard 
Lamb. The Macmillan Years. 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth. (London. 1996), pp. 377-381: while 
Churchill and his foreign minister Anthony Eden admitted that a French defeat would have serious 
consequences for Southeast Asia, they ultimately decided that a  British intervention would not serve the
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domestic opposition, to the American policy in Vietnam. The growing U.S. engagement 
in Vietnam proved to be a  serious test for British leaders to walk the tight rope o f staying 
out o f an unwanted conflict in Vietnam, appeasing domestic opponents, and continuing 
good relations with the United States.
I. The Tory Approach: Harold Macmillan (1961 to October 1963)
During the early 1960Ts Prime Minister Harold Macmillan followed the 
framework set for Vietnam by Churchill. Admittedly, Communism threatened Southeast 
Asia, but in the final assessment, it was neither in the best interest o f the United Kingdom 
nor o f the United States to pursue a policy of greater involvement. Subsequently 
Macmillan tried to discourage John F. Kennedy from a  greater commitment in Southeast 
Asia. Macmillan, bom in 1894, had been in government service since 1939. He became 
Prime Minister in January 1957, after the Suez Crisis. The conservative leader enjoyed a 
very cordial relationship, even friendship with President Eisenhower and he was 
somewhat concerned whether this mutual understanding would continue with Kennedy - 
a man a generation younger than himself. Soon these doubts were dispersed and both 
leaders developed good personal relations, although each espoused a different approach 
toward Southeast Asia.6
best interest o f the United Kingdom. Eden adamantly resisted American pressure to intervene m favor of 
the French.
* Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan: VoL H. 1957-1986. (New York, 1989), p. 281; Arthur Schlesmger, Jr., 
A Thousand Davs: John F. Kennedy m the White House. (Boston, 1965). p. 375; Harold M acm illan, At the 
End of the Day. 1961-1963. (London, 1973), p. 517; Macmillan's understanding and support after 
Kennedy’s dreary encounter with Krushchev m Vienna set the pattern for Macmillan’s relations with 
Kennedy: “I was sort o f the son to Ike. and it was the other way around with Kennedy”. When M acm illan
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Macmillan strongly favored a political solution for Indochina. In February 1961 
he sent David Ormsby-Gore to the newly inaugurated John F. Kennedy to convey British 
concern about the American role in Southeast Asia in general, and the current crisis over 
Laos in particular. The English ambassador openly criticized the American role in Laos 
and accused the United States o f backing a  corrupt government, a policy, the ambassador 
warned, could lead to serious consequences for the Kennedy administration in the future.7 
Less blunt, but in essence not that different, was the advice o f Macmillan when he met 
Kennedy a month later. Macmillan indicated that America’s allies were unwilling to 
support any major American intervention in Laos. Britain also could not subscribe to an 
“unlimited commitment” to the region.8
The Prime Minister looked at Indochina not in terms of Cold War ideology but 
based on a pragmatic, state-centered assessment. The once solid Communist alliance had 
been breaking apart since the late 1940’s when Marshall Tito had sought his own 
independent version o f Communism in Yugoslavia. More importantly, in the early I960’s 
Moscow and Beijing were at odds both over the interpretation of Marxism and how to 
proceed internationally. The Soviet-Sino split demonstrated that, although both the Soviet 
Union and the PRC adhered to Communist ideology, they also acted according to self- 
interest, which led to the cessation o f diplomatic relations between both countries in late 
1961. Macmillan concluded:
resigned from office because of bad health, JFK send a  “touching" letter, expressing his affection and
respect forthe Prime Minister.
7 Ormsby-Gore was an old friend of JFK, dating back to Joseph P. Kennedy’s term as ambassador in Great 
Britain. JFK trusted his advice; see: Schiesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 335; for a more detailed discussion 
o f the American role m Laos, see chapter four.
* Lamb, The Macmillan Years,, p. 386; JFK asked Macmillan repeatedly whether Great Britain would “join 
m” to save Laos, but the PM refused to give any firm support.
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These developments made it clear to me even at the time that the old lessons of history 
were once again proving true. Ideological agreement Ted no more on the Communist side 
to automatic cooperation than it did among the nations of Europe in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century.9
Macmillan blamed poor French colonial rule for the conflict in Indochina. Britain, 
according to the Prime Minister, had done far better in India and Pakistan by providing “a 
legacy of efficient local, provincial and central administration.”10 In Indochina, the 
situation was clearly different. Although granted formal but not actual independence, the 
new states o f Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam experienced “confusion and internal 
weakness, coupled with the unrelenting pressure under Communist direction.”11 British 
foreign minister Anthony Eden had worked “tirelessly”  to end the conflict in 1954, 
because British interests were not served by war in Southeast Asia.12 Macmillan 
conveniently overlooked the “tireless” French effort to end the debacle in Indochina with 
an acceptable and face-saving settlement.
British hopes for a permanent peace in Southeast Asia proved elusive. French 
influence was soon replaced with that o f the United States. In 1960, when the civil war in 
Laos became a  focal point of the Eisenhower administration, Macmillan grew anxious 
about a potential American intervention. He feared that American involvement might lead 
to a  wider conflict, eventually including the PRC and the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
London urged a cease-fire and was strongly opposed to any direct Western interference. 
Macmillan and his cabinet were also uncertain about American aims hi Laos and feared
9 Macmillan, End o f the Day, p. 223.
10 IbfcL. p. 236; the British legacy allowed India under Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's leaders Muhammad 
All Jamah and Liaqut Alt Khan to maintain law and order and make a  “good start”.
tr Ibfd.
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that Britain could be dragged into an open-ended conflict- Like Churchill, Macmillan was 
unwilling to get involved in Southeast Asia.
In his first meeting with Kennedy in March 1961 in Key West, the British leader 
expressed his concern about Indochina, and Laos in particular, and warned Kennedy of 
“the danger o f being sucked into these inhospitable areas without a base, without any 
clear political or strategic aims and without any effective system of deploying armed 
forces or controlling local adimmstration.”l3MacmilIan did not want to engage Britain in 
a widening conflict in Southeast Asia. But as a SEATO member London might still face 
the decision to follow the American lead and send British troops. He had to convince 
Kennedy that a major military operation in landlocked Laos was futile.
Macmillan discerned three options for the Americans in Laos. First, they could set 
up a puppet regime, which “would be useless and corrupt,” eventually forcing the United 
States to get more deeply involved in Laotian politics. Second, the United States could 
intervene directly, with “bigger and bigger” armies. Third, the Americans could stay out. 
To Kennedy, the first option was too close to imperialism and hence not feasible. The 
other two possibilities required more deliberation. Macmillan felt however that Kennedy 
was not keen on intensifying the American role and neither leader wanted to proceed in 
Laos unilaterally. t4Kennedy, in turn, pressured Macmillan to agree that it might be 
politically necessary “to do something” in Laos, before the West lost more ground to the
12 Ibid. p. 237; Macm illan deplored the fact that the United States did not sign the Geneva Agreement and 
quickly undermined the settlement by backing Ngo Dinh Diem and South Vietnamese independence.
D Macmillan, End o f the Day, pp. 238-239; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 385..
Home, Macmillan, p. 293. Macmillan was briefed by his minister o f Defense, Harold Watkmson, that 
“military intervention m Laos has always been nonsense” and that Britain could not risk “being drawn into 
a major war”; Macmillan asked JFK whether “the thing was worth doing all”; see: Lamb, The Macmillan 
Years,pp. 386-87.
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Soviet Union. Yet, Macmillan also made it clear that his government was not willing to 
do more than “join in the appearance o f resistance” and emphasized that the geography 
and conditions m Laos made it a dangerous place to fight.15
In a  letter to Queen Elizabeth II in September 1961, Macmillan addressed his 
misgivings and concern about the American course in Laos. He deplored particularly the 
attempt o f some members o f the U.S. State Department, including Americans stationed in 
Laos, to sabotage negotiations seeking to neutralize the country. The American officials 
favored a military solution to the Southeast Asia “problem” involving SEATO. 
Macmillan told the Queen that if  he promised support to Washington, the United 
Kingdom might be asked to intervene militarily, if  a limited intervention became 
necessary. The British leader was relieved to learn that President Kennedy decided 
against the use of force soon after their Key West meeting.16
The situation in Laos demonstrated the dangers o f the Cold War world, especially 
the possibility o f the use o f nuclear weapons. Britain would seriously undermine its self- 
interest by endorsing or even contributing militarily to an unnecessary show-down in 
Southeast Asia. Already, by the summer o f 1961 Macmillan reconsidered his promised 
support to the United States in case o f a  SEATO intervention. He regarded his approval 
given to Kennedy at Key West as “lapsed” and looked upon the entire operation as “more
“  Home, Macmillan., p.293; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 386.
16 Macmillan, End ofthe Day, p. 239; Schlesmger, A Thousand Days, p. 334; Macmillan explained to the 
Queen that on Laos “ the dualism of American policy is much worse than it is in Europe”. He perceived a 
profound split between Kennedy and Rusk on the one hand and lesser ranks o f the State Department and 
members o f the U.S. military on the other hand who urged intervention m Laos, which included SEATO 
members. The British military strongly advised against such commitment. Macmillan concluded his report: 
“We are thus threatened with the possibility o f being asked to intervene militarily m the Far East, just at the 
tune the European crisis is deepening [Lee Berlin].”
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and more unreal.” 17 It was obviously far better for London to end conflicts in Southeast 
Asia through diplomacy and negotiations. London’s insistence that Laos was not worth 
risking a major war contributed to the American decision in favor o f a negotiated 
settlement.
The Laotian crisis made clear that Great Britain was hesitant to commit any 
military forces to fight in the jungles o f Southeast Asia. Foreign Secretary, Lord Alec 
Frederick Douglas Home - Macmillan’s successor in office in 1963 - expressed the 
profound relief o f the British government over the peaceful solution in Laos in a  speech 
before the United Nations. Lord Home pointed out that the other alternative might have 
been warfare between the great powers. He added that both sides realized the difficulty of 
containing a military face-off and fortunately chose to talk, instead o f escalating the 
conflict. War would have devastated Southeast Asia and perhaps the rest o f the world.18 
Negotiation, not armed contest, was the key to solve the problems o f that region and best 
served Britain’s interest.
Yet, the possibility o f renewed conflict in Southeast Asia worried British leaders. 
Kennedy demanded British financial contributions to rebuild Laos. Reluctantly, London 
provided more than one million pounds. While pleased that Britain had regained its 
traditionally good understanding with the United States, Macmillan understood that the 
special relationship was not without hazard. Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home 
noted:
17 Lamb, The Macmillan Years,, p. 391; Home was more willing than Macmillan to send a token force to
Laos m case the Geneva Conference failed because Anglo-American relations were at stake and Britain 
could not “back out.”
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I think that our policy o f  close co-operation w ith the Americans in South-East Asia has 
been the right one. It is more likely we should have been faced w ith a  local w ar in the 
area in I960 or 1961 if  we bad not been able to  persuade the Americans to take the right 
line. The risk o f a  disaster in Vietnam, Laos, o r even Cambodia is still considerable.19
Home was partly correct. Washington and London were in close contact over 
Laos and British objections had some impact on American thinking. But Home certainly 
overestimated British influence on American foreign policy decisions. The growing 
American involvement in South Vietnam soon revealed the limits o f British impact in 
Washington. Kennedy and later Lyndon B. Johnson refused to make the “right” 
decisions, decisions which reflected British self-interest Hoping to avoid disaster in 
Indochina and, as importantly, keep Britain out o f another war in Southeast Asia while 
retaining good relations with the United States, London continued the role o f honest 
advisor and peace-maker.
Prime Minister Macmillan was increasingly troubled about the American 
involvement m South Vietnam. In December 1961, Washington deployed helicopters, 
planes, and four hundred additional men to Saigon to assist the South Vietnamese 
military in the struggle against the Viet Cong. At the tune Macmillan did not foresee “any 
more grave developments,” but admitted in hindsight that this arrangement was the first 
step leading to a “long and inextricable entanglement” of the United States in Southeast 
Asia.20 The Prime Minister also believed that American military operations were 
inadequate “to deal with this kind o f infiltration” by Vietnamese Communists.
*  John F. Kennedy National Security Files: Western Europe; Country Files: Great Britain; October 12, 
1962; copy of Lord Home’s speech o f September27,1962.
w Lamb, The Macmillan Tears, p. 394; Home urged Macmillan to financially contribute to Laos, despite 
the objections o f the British treasury; good relations with W ashington were more important than fiscal 
concerns.
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Macmillan relied on Britain’s own experience with Communist insurgents in 
Malaya. The British combined political and military actions to crush the Communist 
opposition. Macmillan maintained that the situation in Vietnam was different because the 
United States neither had efficient control over the South Vietnamese government nor 
offered a political alternative to those opposed to Diem. Unless the great m ajority  o f local 
population could be engaged in the struggle the Americans had no real basis on which to 
build a successful policy.21 The Prime Minister was right in that the situation in Vietnam 
differed from Malaya. However, it was not only British skills but different conditions that 
facilitated British success in Malaya. There, insurgents were ethnic Chinese who found 
little support among the indigenous population. The Malayans simply regarded British 
rule as the lesser o f two evils. A more appropriate comparison should be the British 
experience in India. After decades of doing too little too late, Britain quit and handed the 
“crown jewel” back to the Indians. Perhaps this would have been the better analogy for 
Americans to study but too painful a memory for the British leader.
In February 1962, the United States sent four thousand additional troops to 
Vietnam. Macmillan deplored that move because additional American aid could not cure 
the failures o f Diem. But Britain’s concern over the consequences o f an expanded 
American commitment to Vietnam required an open exchange with the United States 
administration. Macmillan chose to express his apprehension privately to Kennedy,
30 Macmillan, End o f the Day, p. 240.
21 Ibid. p .246; The msurgence at Malaya consisted mainly o f ethnic Chinese, supported by Beijing. 
Macmillan points out that the English had established strategic hamlets to protect non-violent Chinese and 
Malayan peasants and also offered political outlets for their grievances. Opposing Chinese were deported 
to the PRC; all measures allowed Britain to gain the upper hand
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refusing to publicly challenge American policy. The Prime Minister’s strategy soon 
encountered domestic opposition in Parliament
Parliamentary debates on the “Vietnam problem” revealed not only profound 
differences between Tory and Labour MPs but exemplified the ambiguity o f how to react 
to both Washington and the perplexing situation in Southeast Asia. Most Tory 
representatives endorsed the American policy in Vietnam. Labour was more critical, 
voicing concerns that were shared in private by Macmillan. For most members o f the 
Conservative Party allegiance to the United States was the overriding concern. Regarding 
Vietnam, Tories generally subscribed to the American assessment that South Vietnam 
was threatened by Communist insurgents sponsored by Hanoi and its allies. The Labour 
view was more complex. The conflict in Vietnam was a civil war and also a struggle 
against foreign interference. The United States had violated the Geneva agreement and its 
growing aid to Saigon made things only worse. These divisions outlasted changes in 
British government. The same Labour MPs who attacked Macmillan did so again when 
their Prime Minister Harold Wilson refused to adopt them point o f view.
In March 1962, the House addressed the recent increase in American personnel, 
the role o f American pilots in bombing raids, and the threat o f further escalation in South 
Vietnam. MPs also questioned the legality o f the American involvement, and inquired 
about the British position toward Vietnam and the government’s willingness to end the 
fighting through diplomatic means. Peter Thomas, Joint Under Secretary o f State for 
Foreign Affairs, defended his government’s policy and rejected charges that Washington
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was responsible for the “inflam m atory development in Southeast Asia.22 The 
Undersecretary emphasized that the “threat to peace in Vietnam” was not a  result o f 
American activities, but aggression from the North Vietnamese government, which was 
encouraging and supporting an “insurrectionary movement” in the South.23
But Thomas agreed that the situation in Vietnam was serious. His government 
awaited further information from the International Control Commission (ICC) before 
Britain decided on any political action. Labour MP Harold Wilson was not satisfied with 
the government’s position. He could not comprehend why Britain did not take responsive 
action as co-chair o f the Geneva Conference. Wilson argued that the appropriate policy 
was to put “pressure on all concerned” and that the Geneva Agreement had to be adhered 
to.24 Two years later, as Prime Minister, Wilson would face similar questions and 
criticism from his Labour MPs, who repeatedly reminded him o f his statements as 
opposition leader.
Later in March 1962, Undersecretary Thomas again defended his government 
policy on Vietnam from attacks by members of Parliament Britain’s role as Geneva co- 
chairman and influence on Washington were the prime issues.25 MPs Brockway, Davies, 
and Mayhew worried how the conflict affected British obligations to SEATO, perhaps 
even leading to a  British military engagement Moreover, they inquired whether the 
British government was discussing with Washington its military aid to South Vietnam,
— Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, (London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office), 14 March 1962, 
p. 1318. William Warbey accused the U.S. of “military intervention in a civil war which the Americans 
themselves have provoked by their sabotage ofthe Geneva. Agreement.”
3  Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 14 March. 1962, p. 1318. 
z*Ibi(L.p. 1319.
3  Ibid. 26 March 1962, pp. 836-837; several MPs were concerned about Anglo-Soviet differences
impeding a joint approach to work for a  negotiated settlement on Vietnam.
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hoping that London urged the United States “not to go beyond operational military
training” of South Vietnamese troops.
Thomas made clear that the United Kingdom had no responsibility to Saigon but
was less certain how the present situation affected British obligations within SEATO.
Labour MP Konni ZHliacus summed up his colleagues’ concerns and demanded definite
assurances that Great Britain would not be drawn into the Vietnam conflict or even a war
with China because o f the continuous American assistance to Diem:
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that American armed intervention in Southern Vietnam, 
whatever may be the allegations concerning North Vietnam help or otherwise to 
Southern Vietnam, is contrary to the Charter and might involve us in war? W ill the hon. 
Gentleman at least give the same warning that M r. Eden, as he then was, gave to Mr. 
Dulles over Dienbien-phu, that, if  American m ilitary action in Vietnam results in war 
with China, we will dissociated ourselves from such a  war and will refuse to be involved 
in it?26
Secretary Thomas was unable to give such guarantees, citing the need to await the ICC 
report first before deciding on further action. His response reflected the position o f the 
Macmillan government. While Macmillan was doubtful about American policy in 
Vietnam, he was unwilling to openly pressure Washington to change course. Any 
understanding with the Soviets or a  unilateral British initiative in the U.N. council urging 
negotiations might endanger Anglo-American friendship.
The ICC report arrived in the summer o f 1962 and recommended the immediate 
withdrawal o f all American personnel and the a id  to any American weapon shipments to 
South Vietnam. The Soviet Union sent a  note to Macmillan asking him to condone the 
findings o f the commission.zrSome MPs backed the Soviet suggestions hut Edward
26 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 26 March 1962, p. 839.
27 The Soviet note to Her Majesty's Government is printed in: Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 
23 M y, 1962, pp. 114-116; Moscow accused Washington and Saigon o f preventing national elections to
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Heath, speaking for the government, firmly rejected the Soviet point o f view. Heath 
regarded North Vietnam as solely responsible for the present dangerous situation in 
Vietnam. According to Heath, not Washington but Hanoi violated the 1954 Accords in its 
attempt to overthrow the Saigon government.2*
The discussions in Parliament illuminated domestic concern about events in 
Vietnam. Like Macmillan, members o f  Parliament were deeply anxious about further 
military escalation, particularly a war with the PRC. Consistent with British policy since 
the I950’s, they believed that Britain could not and should not support any policy leading 
to war in Indochina. Several Members o f Parliament attacked the U.S. engagement which 
they charged violated the Geneva Agreement and risked a  major war. In their view, 
Britain should bring the issue before the UN . Security Council and dissociate itself from 
the dangerous American policy. Parliament was increasingly divided between supporters 
and critics of the American policy. Consequently, Macmillan and his successors 
confronted the difficult task o f how to stand up to critics at home and at the same time 
counsel Washington against further escalation in Vietnam - how to stay out o f Vietnam 
without alienating the United States.
Prime Minister Macmillan expressed his doubts o f the American strategy 
repeatedly in consultations with American leaders during the Kennedy presidency. He 
hoped that solid advice and also Britain’s own experience in the Far East might influence 
American thinking and allow a reevaluation o f the engagement in South Vietnam.
unify Vietnam. Moscow also pointed to previous communications with London in which the Soviets had 
urged Britain to support the demand for an immediate American withdrawal from South Vietnam. London 
refused to do so and in Soviet eyes only encouraged the United States in its aggressive course in South 
Vietnam.
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Macmillan rejected any British troop deployments to Vietnam and favored a negotiated 
settlement following the example o f Laos. In addition, British global security interests 
drained Britain’s resources. British troops were stationed in West Germany, Kenya, 
Southern Arabia, and the Far East. In 1963, the United Kingdom spent almost two billion 
pounds on defense, about a tenth o f the gross national product.29Britain simply could not 
afford another war. Unlike the French, who openly attacked the American intervention in 
Vietnam, Britain’s leaders Macmillan, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and even Labour Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, believed that solid diplomatic work might bring all involved 
countries to the conference table and that an all-out attack on the American policy would 
only hurt British interest.
Tories Again: Sir Alec Douglas-Home (October 1963 to October 19641
After seven years at the helm, Macmillan resigned as Prime Minister in October, 
1963 due to health problems. His last days in office saw a decline o f general support for 
his Conservative Party. Foreign secretary Lord Alec Frederick Douglas-Home, heir to an 
old and distinguished Scottish family, was invited by Queen Elizabeth II to form a new 
government on October 18, 1963. Bom in 1903, Home had served in the British 
government since 1951 and became Foreign minister in I960.30
Home represented the ambiguities o f Britain after 1945. Britain had to come to 
terms with its loss of empire and global status. Home supported the British decision to
3  Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 23 July 1962, p. 116-117.
29 Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History. 194S-I989. (Oxford, UK, 1990), pp. 217-218.
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build its own nuclear force and favored an independent course toward the two super­
powers. Communism was an obvious threat to Western security but Britain also had to 
play an autonomous role in global affairs, albeit within the framework o f the North 
Atlantic aIIiance.3IHome accepted the limits o f British global power but insisted that the 
United Kingdom continue to be a special partner, though with lessened influence, o f the 
United States. Britain faced the dilemma to fulfill its military commitments while it 
barely had the resources to do so. London could no longer maintain its prestige by 
military might but had to resort to diplomacy in maintaining prestige throughout the 
world.32 Home held firm in his belief that the United Kingdom should not become 
engaged in South Vietnam. As foreign minister, Home expressed this conviction to 
Kennedy on several occasions, pointing to the British commitment in Malaya and 
Singapore. Britain did not have sufficient forces to intervene in Vietnam but even if  it had 
Home maintained that the “country would swallow up almost any army, as indeed it 
swallowed the French and then the American.” Moreover, public opinion in Britain was 
against British intervention or outright endorsement o f the American role in Vietnam.33
As Prime Minister Home had a rocky start. Rumors persisted that he was hand- 
picked by Macmillan and not really up to the job. His status as peer was also seen as an 
impediment. How could a Scottish aristocrat understand the problems o f the poor and
30 See passim: Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. (London, 1970), pp. 80-122.
Jt Young, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 103-105; Home stressed that Britain could not feave “everything to the 
United States and the Soviet Union" because otherwise Britain would lose her “national soul" and would 
be unable to preserve peace.
32 Ibid.. pp. 123-124; Home remained suspicious of Soviet policy but also was anxious about American
design, which was obvious m Laos. He felt that the American interference m Southeast Asia was 
misguided and dangerous for Britain. He was relieved when Washington agreed to a  diplomatic settlement, 
removing another obstacle m Anglo-American relations. 
g  IbicLp. 146.
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underprivileged in Britain? Labour leader Harold Wilson even labeled Home the “scion 
o f effete establishment.” The Prime Minister responded by disclaiming his peerage, 
leaving it to his son, and from Earl o f Home transformed himself into Sir Alec.34 Yet, 
problems persisted and the British economy was clearly in decline while the pound was 
losing in value. Home underestimated the economic difficulties in Great Britain which 
aided in the Labour victory m 1964. In foreign policy, the prime minister faced crises 
ranging from Cyprus, Rhodesia, to once again Malaya which further strained British 
finances. Economics and self-interest clearly dictated that Britain could not embark on 
any major foreign policy operation in Southeast Asia.3SBoth Cyprus and Southeast Asia 
complicated Anglo-American relations and despite attempts to conceal their differences 
defense planners were at odds on how to proceed.36
Home’s first visit to the United States as Prime Minister was the sad occasion of 
John F. Kennedy’s funeral in late November 1963. Three months later he returned to 
meet with Lyndon Johnson. The Prime Minister received a warm welcome and Johnson 
reaffirmed the close relations between both countries despite recent differences in 
opinion. Home emphasized that Britain and the United States shared the same goal of 
worldwide peace. Regardless o f sometimes contrary approaches - British sale o f buses to 
Cuba being one - Home maintained that it was his sincere desire to “keep as close as we
34 Morgan, The People's Peace, pp. 226-227.
35 In Cyprus, conflict between the British and Greek radicals, seeking a union with Greek proper dated back
to the mfd-I950’s; adding to the problem, were claims by the Turkish population of Cyprus. In Rhodesia, 
the southern half o f the country gamed independence as the state o f Zambia, while in the north, white 
supremacists led by Tan Smith tried to establish their independence. Malaysia, now a  member o f the British 
Commonwealth suffered horn guerrilla activity sponsored by its neighbor Indonesia.
34 The Tunes, London, February 1 ,1964, p. 8; Young, Alec Douglas Home, pp. 197-198; Robert M. 
Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relation since World War Ilf Boston, 1990), p. 88;
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can” to the United States as partners and as allies since the “peace o f the world” depended
on their understanding.37!!! his conversation with Johnson the main topics were Vietnam
and Malaysia- The meeting resulted in a  compromise; both sides agreed that they were
facing similar problems in Southeast Asia. While the United States recognized the British
position to maintain the independence o f Malaya against encroachment from Indonesia,
Home announced his support for the American policy in  Vietnam.38
The Prime Minister also agreed to explore the French position on Vietnam and to
discuss with President Charles de Gaulle the French proposal calling for the
neutralization o f both Vietnams. Home was interested in the American progress in
Vietnam but received the bad news that the situation was not improving. Johnson
emphasized that it was crucial that the United States and Britain concurred on Southeast
Asia in adopting a policy that offered both the “olive branch and arrows,” instead o f the
vague and counterproductive French, neutralization proposaI.39Both leaders agreed on the
need to assist the free nations in that area in maintaining their independence and
reaffirmed their defense commitment to the region:
The Prime Minister and the President gave special consideration to South-east Asian 
matters and to the problem of assisting free states in the area to maintain their 
independence. . .  The Prime Minister reemphasized the United Kingdom’s support for 
the United States policy in South Vietnam. The President reaffirmed the support for the 
peaceful national independence of Malaysia. Both expressed their sincere hope that the 
leaders of the independent countries m the region would by mutual friendship and 
cooperation establish an area o f prosperity and stability.. .  Both Governments reaffirm 
that in all these fields [i.e. Southeast Asia and Latin America] then aim remains solely to
Anglo-American, misgivings surfaced with a  visit by Robert Kennedy to London. The attorney general 
accused the British o f colonialism m Malaysia, to which Home strongly objected.
17 The Times, February 13,1964, p. 12.
11FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, February 
12,1964, p. 69.
39 De Gaulle suggested the neutralization ofboth Vietnams following the withdrawal o f all foreign forces. 
See below, chapter two.
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achieve and safeguard the integrity and stability o f  the countries o f the free world on the
basis o f full independence.40
To Home the visit was a success. Washington, finally accepted the British, position 
on Malayan security and the American role in Southeast Asia was defined solely in terms 
o f assistance. Home also hoped that in the future Britain would be closely consulted by 
Washington on ail global issues.” Like France, Britain was not willing to be dominated 
by the United States and wherever possible expressed its independence and sovereignty. 
Johnson, however, was angered by Home’s insistence to send non-military machinery to 
Cuba in defiance o f the American embargo, and henceforth distrusted British leaders.
The events in the Tonkin Gulf in early August 1964 surprised Home in the middle 
o f his summer holidays. The first news was not too worrisome since Washington 
described the attack on the Maddox as an “isolated incident” Though the United States 
increased naval patrols in the Gulf, along with a  protest note to the United Nations, the 
situation did not appear serious.42 A second attack two days later led to retaliatory air- 
strikes against North Vietnam and a Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia. On 
August 4, 1964 Johnson informed Home o f the attack and the retaliatory air raids. The 
American president expressed his determination to “take all measures necessary to 
prevent such attacks and protect our forces.” Johnson assured Home that the American 
goal in Southeast Asia remained unchanged and focused on maintaining peace and 
security. Johnson promised to stay in close contact and continuously inform the Prune
40 FRUS, Vietnam,1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum o f Conversation, February,12,1964, pp. 69-70; 
Quote: The Times, February 14,1964, p. 8.
41 The Times, February 14,1964, p. 10; Britain also insisted on retaining its own nuclear deterrent despite
American efforts o f nuclear disarmament. Home strongly rejected an American proposal to transform  
British forces into a  conscript military. To him this ran counter British tradition and was completely 
unnecessary because UK forces did then job efficiently.
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Minister o f future developments.43 Home and his foreign secretary, R. A. Butler
expressed then full support for Johnson’s actions:
A s regards to the North Vietnamese attacks on U nited States naval forces, H M . 
Government made their position clear in the Security Council when they supported the 
action taken by the United States Government, in accordance with the inherent right o f  
se lf defence recognized by Article 51 o f  the charter o f the United Nations. They share 
the desire o f the President o f  the United States to avoid risk spreading the conflict.44
Britain was not alone in its support of the American reaction to the Tonkin Gulf 
attack. Bonn showed “full understanding,” New Zealand and Australia also responded 
favorably. In Canada and France approval was mixed with caution. However, not all 
British papers endorsed the American course in Vietnam. The Manchester Guardian 
actually went so far as to question the circumstances o f the attack on the Maddox and 
accused Washington o f having manufactured the entire crisis so that it could implement 
air-strikes planned months earlier.45 The Times commentary on the events also expressed 
some concern while it dismissed the “furious responses” o f Beijing and Hanoi to 
American airstrikes. Danger could arise if  either Beijing and Hanoi claimed the Tonkin 
Gulf as territorial waters or if  Washington changed its strategy:
I f  President Johnson had announced that he was henceforth carrying the w ar by land, sea, 
and air into North Vietnam, or even was going on with air raids indefinitely, then more 
o f the allied peoples would have qualms and doubts. It is true that some Americans 
would like to broaden the w ar in that w a y . . .  yet the answ er is not to let American o r
41 The Tones, August4, 1964, p. 8.
43 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Message from President Johnson to Prune Minister Macmillan [the
editors o f the FRUS obviously missed that Macmillan resigned in October 1963], W ashington, August 4, 
1964, pp. 622-623.
44 The Tones, August 7,1964, p. 10.
45 see: The Times August 7,1964, p. 8, Wide Support fo r U.S Action against N. Vietnam; Hathaway, Great 
Britain and the United States, p. 89.
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any other foreign servicemen invade o r bomb North. Vietnam indefinitely. Such, an 
action, in China’s doorstep would alm ost certainly bring more havoc than profit.46
Times editorialists argued that the best course for saving South Vietnam was to expand 
on the current approach, which included military aid and training, economic support, as 
well as confidence building measures for the Vietnamese people. Without such help 
South Vietnam would be lo st Military escalation by either Washington, which seemed 
unlikely for the time being, or the Chinese would only make matters worse. The place to 
settle the tensions in Southeast Asia was the U.N. Security council and not the 
battlefield.47 The Times summed up the thinking of many British citizens and their 
government when editorialists held that the American response to the attack in the Tonkin 
Gulf was justified, but any further escalation had to be prevented.
II. The Labour approach; Harold Wilson
In October 1964, after thirteen years o f Tory rule, the Labour Party won the 
majority in Parliament, by the very slim margin of three seats. Harold Wilson was invited 
by the Queen to form the new government. Wilson, bom 1916 in Yorkshire, studied 
economics at Oxford and entered government as minister for trade during the Labour 
cabinet o f Clement Attlee from 1947 to 1951. In 1963 Wilson was elected leader of the 
Labour party and restored party discipline to exploit the Tory weaknesses and oust the 
Conservative party.48 In terms o f British foreign policy, particularly toward the United
46 The Timesr August 7, 1964,p. I I , Saving South Vietnam.
47 IbfcL. p. II.
■“Morgan, The People’s  Peace* p. 239, 243-244.
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States, Wilson’s election did not represent a departure from the attitudes o f his Tory 
predecessors. Although Wilson as opposition leader urged for a more independent policy 
from Washington, as Prime Minister he too placed great emphasis on close Anglo- 
American relations.
The serious economic crisis o f the mid and late 1960’s revealed that Britain was
far over-extended in its international commitments and could no longer play great power
policies. Britain depended on American economic support and Wilson realized that
political autonomy could not be achieved without economic strength.49 Patrick Gordon
Walker, Wilson’s first foreign minister, outlined Labour foreign policy shortly before the
1964 election victory. The United Kingdom could not afford a  “full nuclear armoury” and
instead had to rely on the United States for protection, which meant that Britain needed to
base its policy on the alliance with Washington. Generally, Walker argued:
The basis of British foreign policy must be to re-think the US alliance and coordinate it. 
Almost every British policy will react in one way or another upon relations with the US. 
We must try to co-ordinate them and build a coherent whole out of them. If we are 
dependent upon the US for ultimate nuclear protection we must so arrange our relations 
with US that our share in the pattern of this alliance is as indispensable as we can make it 
. . .  In some matters we must adapt our views to theirs - in exchange for similar 
concessions by US in matters which greatly concern us.50
Britain had to retain its independence but needed to approach foreign policy based 
on the obvious limitations as a  global power. Accordingly, Walker advocated a  more 
active role in Europe and closer ties with West Germany. France would always be a 
difficult partner but Britain should work out a  “common analysis o f Latin America and
49 Chris Wrigley, Mow you see itr now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s  Foreign Policy 1964-I970~r 
m: Richard Coopey, Steven Fieldmg. and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments. 1964-1970. 
(London, 1993, p. 128.
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SE Asian policies” with Paris. Walker recommended consulting with Washington on the 
Sino-Soviet split and find a joint position on the “nature o f Communism in the new 
context.”  He was determined to support the United States in Southeast Asia but suggested 
that Britain bring about a solution that allowed for American disengagement by leaving a 
settlement up to the peoples o f the region.slUndoubtedly, Britain was dependent on the 
United States’ nuclear shield and therefore had to devise foreign policy skillfully to 
pursue its best interest without causing strains in Anglo-American relations.
The major concern for Wilson was the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Lyndon 
Johnson remained angry about Alec Douglas-Home’s refusal to abide by the American 
embargo against Cuba. In spring 1964 Johnson told Wilson, then still opposition leader, 
that he would never again trust a British Prime Minister.^Wilson faced a rather complex 
challenge. He had to strengthen the special relationship and then try to influence 
American decision-making on Vietnam. But he could and would not commit British 
forces to the conflict in Southeast Asia despite the British need for continuous American 
military protection in Europe.
The Prime Minister also had to fend o ff domestic criticism, mostly from the ranks 
of his own Labour party, on British support for Washington in Vietnam, along with 
possible complications with members o f the Commonwealth who sympathized with the 
Communist-Nationalist forces in Vietnam. Wflson’s solution was to play the role o f
50 Patrick Gordon Walker, Political Diaries. 1932-1971. Edited with an introduction by Robert Pearce, 
(London, 1991), pp. 298-299; Wrigley, Harold Wilson and Labour'sforeign policy, p. 127.
51 Walker, Political Diaries, pp. 299-302.
52 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government. 1964-1970: A Personal Record. (London, 1971), p. 46; 
Stemmger, Grossbritannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p. 591; Wrigley, Labour’sforeign polity, 1964-70, pp. 
123-125,128; Wrigley main ta in s that Wilson was determined to maintain a  voice in world affairs and tried 
to master crisis with multifaceted initiatives.
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mediator and work for a political settlement. The British co-chairmanship in the 1954 
Geneva conference gave Wilson the political framework in which he could operate. 
Wilson’s goal was to prevent further escalation in Southeast Asia, and protect British 
security hi Europe by maintaining close ties with the United States.
The British assessment of Vietnam (1964)
In October 1964, American Secretary o f State Dean Rusk emphasized to British 
Foreign Minister Walker that the United States had no intentions o f withdrawing from 
Vietnam, and instead might even expand its commitment. Shortly afterwards, Walker 
received an assessment o f the conditions in South Vietnam from his Ambassador in 
Saigon, Sir Gordon Etherington-Smith. The ambassador criticized the uncoordinated and 
often misguided American economic aid to Vietnam. The general population saw little o f 
the millions and millions o f dollars pouring into the country while South Vietnamese 
leaders indulged in costly pet projects such as a four lane highway leading nowhere. 
Overall, the situation was not hopeless. What was required was a  more effective 
American contribution to the development o f South Vietnam, particularly in the country­
side.53
The Southeast Asia experts in London disagreed with Etherington-Smith by 
pointing to the lack o f over-all analysis in the ambassador’s report. The problem was not 
only whether economic aid reached Vietnamese farmers, but if  the American effort was 
sufficient to defeat the Viet Cong. Moreover, the overriding concern in the Foreign
51G. Etherington Smith to PJLPeck (Foreign Office), October 10,1964, Public Records Office; in:
Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vietnamkrieg, pp. 593-594.
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Ministry focused on possible escalation o f the war by the Americans if  their current 
policy proved futile. London generally regarded the chances o f an American victory 
against the Vietnamese Communists as rather slim.
The Wilson government hoped that the United States might against the greater 
odds still turn the tide and prevail against the insurgents in South Vietnam. If  the effort 
failed, however, British interest would not be severely harmed by the loss o f South 
Vietnam. London had already been very pessimistic about the survival o f South Vietnam 
in 1954 and despite the dire predictions the country actually still survived. In 1964, no 
one could foresee how long Saigon might be able to prevail. I f  Saigon fell and the West 
had to withdraw to its major defense line in Thailand, this would not result in a major 
catastrophe, at least in the assessment o f Whitehall. Nevertheless, it would be detrimental 
for the West if  American international prestige was severely damaged by failure to save 
South Vietnam.54Ambassador Etherington-Smith challenged this judgement; he saw the 
dominoes falling in Southeast Asia and even favored the deployment of American combat 
troops. But he could not with certainty predict future developments in Vietnam that might 
undermine the American effort. In light o f the unstable situation in Vietnam, the 
ambassador agreed that it was necessary to prepare Washington for the worst case 
scenario.55
To gather a more detailed estimate about American prospects in Vietnam, London 
turned to Robert Thompson, head o f the British Advisory Mission in Saigon (BRIAM) -
54 Memorandum LE. Cable (Foreign Office), October30,1964; E£L Peck (Foreign Office) to Ambassador 
Etherington-Smith, PRO; in: Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vtetnamhrieg, pp. 594-59S; London was 
also concerned that failure m South Vietnam would affect the neutrality o f Cambodia and Laos.
55 Ibid.. Etherington-Smith. to Peck, November II , 1965, p. 595.
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the English counterpart to CIA expert Edward Lansdale. Thompson was the most 
seasoned British expert on the region and guerrilla warfare. He had served in Southeast 
Asia, particularly Malaysia since the 1950Ts. His estimate was similar to the briefings 
Johnson received from his advisors but Thompson’s conclusions clearly differed from 
these o f his American colleagues. Thompson discerned three options for the United 
States: Continue the war along the current lines, or bomb North Vietnam and its supply 
lines to the South, or last, withdraw and lose South Vietnam.S6Options A and B were not 
very promising. The present course had led only to further deterioration of the situation in 
South Vietnam and bombing would not end North Vietnamese aggression either. Attacks 
on the North might increasingly undermine the will o f the South to stand up to 
aggression, seeing outsiders killing their own people. Moreover, bombings ultimately 
would not prevent Northern infiltration o f supplies and men to the South and posed the 
danger o f Chinese and Soviet involvement.57 Withdrawal was not a  pleasant alternative, 
but Thompson argued that it was “better to accept the consequences o f defeat and try to 
ameliorate the situation than making everything worse” in escalating the conflict. In 
conclusion, the best solution for Washington was to negotiate with the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), withdraw American forces, and reach a political settlement with 
Hanoi. Thompson also maintained that, whatever decision made by Washington, Vietnam
36 Thompson to Peck, November25,1964, PRO; m: Stemmger, Grossbritarmien und der Vietnamkrieg., pp. 
595-597; for more detail on Thompson see his book: Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam- Updated 
Edition, (New York, 1970); Thompson argues that generally the United States misunderstood the nature o f 
the conflict and Vietnamese conditions. Instead o f responding to indigenous problems the United States 
perceived the conflict solely m terms of the containment o f Communism and was step by step drawn into 
an undefined commitment.
57 Stemmger, Grossbritarmien und der Vietnamkrieg, p. 596. See also, Thompson, No Batfrom  Vietnam, p. 
120; Thompson held that the U.S. should have stuck to their limited commitment even after Diem’s  fill
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would eventually be united under Communist rule. Yet, this prospect was not as dreadful 
as many in the West thought because the prime motive o f the North Vietnamese was 
reunification. This nationalist agenda, in  addition to the centuries old enmity with China 
precluded Vietnam from ever becoming a  mere satellite o f Beijing.5*
The Foreign Office agreed with Thompson’s analysis. The task now was to 
develop a  strategy to convince Washington that negotiations were the best choice, and to 
prevent further escalation o f the conflict. A peaceful settlement in the near future was 
recommendable before events in Vietnam might destroy any chances for an American 
way out. London was not so much concerned about the fate o f Saigon rather than 
maintaining Western influence in Southeast Asia, where Britain was worried about the 
safety o f Malaysia as well as Singapore. London believed that it was important to convey 
its position to Washington as soon as possible. Wilson did not want to cause Anglo- 
American tensions over Vietnam and repeat the mistakes of Anthony Eden’s vacillating 
course in 1954, which signaled first support for a united action on Dienbienphu and then 
changed policy.59
Another military coup in Saigon made the Wilson mission more difficult. The 
Americans were deeply angered by the violent infighting among the Vietnamese military 
and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor expressed his frustration in no uncertain terms to the 
new South Vietnamese leader, General Khanh. Further Viet Cong attacks on American 
installations gave the hawks in Washington more ammunition to call for air-strikes
instead o f assuming full responsibility for the outcome ofthe war. The former approach would have placed 
the blame for failure on the South Vietnamese, allowing Washington an honorable way out.
51 Stemmger, Grassbriiannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p .597. 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
against North Vietnam- In light of the recent events in Vietnam, Wilson believed It 
unwise to propose negotiations to Jobnson dining his visit to Washington.
Wilson’s first visit to Washington in early December 1964 went better than 
expected. Johnson opened the conversation by restating that he would never trust a 
British Prime Minister again, perhaps Johnson’s way of checking out what his 
counterpart was made off. Wilson remembered the President’s earlier remark, but was 
determined to hold his ground. The Prime Minister expressed his understanding of 
American concerns about British allegiance and promised complete confidentiality of any 
talks with Johnson. Johnson set the tone o f the discussions by complaining that he was 
fired o f being constantly told that it was the United States’ “business to solve all the 
world’s problems and do so mainly alone.” Obviously, the president was not so much 
interested in British advice but action.60
The American desire for a more active British role in Southeast Asia was also 
apparent in Wilson’s conversation with Rusk. The American Foreign Secretary asked 
Wilson for British cooperation in Vietnam, even on a token basis. The United States 
contacted a number o f allied states for assistance “both for its practical effect as well as 
for the political impact” to demonstrate “free world solidarity” to North Vietnam and 
China. Washington hoped that Britain would deploy both civilians and military advisors 
to the country-side where support was needed the m ost Wilson refused to enter such a  
commitment because Great Britain, as co-chairman o f the Geneva conference, was
40 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 47; FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Memorandum for the 
Record, Washington, December7,1964, p. 137. LBJ emphasized that he did not want to become bogged 
down as FDR was in 1937when totalitarianism was on the rise and the American people and Congress 
were opposed to an active foreign policy.
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obligated to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. In addition, Britain was already deeply 
engaged in Malaysia with fifty-four thousand troops and could not spare any more for 
Vietnam.61
In fact, Wilson not only opposed any British commitment in Vietnam, but any 
further escalation o f the conflict, with or without his government. In his opinion, any 
Western effort in South Vietnam  would prove futile and additional military engagement 
by the United States potentially endangered world peace. A larger conflict with the PRC 
and even perhaps the Soviet Union did directly affect Britain’s own self-interest both in 
terms o f its Asian interests and security in Europe. Britain, like France and West 
Germany, was strongly against such a perilous course.
Members o f Parliament were concerned about the events in Vietnam as well. 
They were appalled by the cruelty o f the conflict, including the torture o f prisoners o f war 
by all sides involved. They desired better information on the conflict and a British 
initiative to “call attention to the universal horror and disgust and grief caused to all 
civilised men” by the current practice o f torture in Vietnam. MP Derek Page asked 
whether Britain, as co-chair o f the Geneva conference, was bent on inviting all powers 
concerned to the conference table as soon as possible to prevent further escalation.62
These questions put Wilson between a rock and a hard place. He did not agree 
with the potentially dangerous American strategy in Vietnam, but he also did not desire to 
alienate his major ally. It was his government’s policy to “support the Republic o f 
Vietnam in them effort to put an end to the Communist insurrection” which, was aided by
6t FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum o f Conversation, Washington December 8,1964, pp.
985-987; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 48.
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Hanoi in  direct violation o f the 1954 agreement61 Hence the Wilson government 
recognized the effort o f the United States to aid the South Vietnamese. Labour MP Konni 
ZQIiacus did not agree with the British government's view and accused the United States 
o f breaking the Geneva agreement and Wilson of further abetting the American 
transgression:
Does not m y hon. Friend recognise that the American policy in Southern Vietnam is in 
violation o f  the 1954 Treaties, to which we are a party, that the Government which they 
are supporting is a  puppet Government which they themselves have imposed, that public 
opinion will be shocked a t the revelation that we are following the policy o f the Tories in 
this m atter and that, apart from being a crime, this policy is a  blunder because it w ill 
make our name stink throughout the Far East, and that this policy is bound to fail 
anyway?64
These strong and divisive words impacted Wilson. As opposition leader, he had 
taken a similar stand but as Prime Minister he needed to diffuse Labour criticism to stay 
in power. If he endorsed the view of radical Labour on Vietnam he would cause a crisis in 
Anglo-American relations. If  he favored American strategy in Vietnam, he might lose his 
slim parliamentary majority. The Prime Minister needed to find a course that silenced his 
Labour opponents without creating tensions with Washington.65
Under pressure at home, Wilson was determined to urge Washington to consider 
negotiations and withdrawal from South Vietnam. At the end o f December 1964 he 
consulted with Foreign Secretary Walker about British strategy in Washington. Walker 
recommended against  any initiatives for the time being since Wilson had given his
a  Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 14 December 1964, pp. 7-8.
“  Ibid.. pp. 7-10.
“ Ibid- p. 10.
65 Ibid.. 22 December, 1964, pp. 1049-1050; Zilliacus reminded Wilson ofhis previous statements on 
Vietnam as opposition leader. Wilson affirmed what he had said but an outright attack on U.S. Vietnam 
policy was no longer an option for a  sitting Prune Minister.
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addition, Wilson had to appreciate the pressures facing Johnson at home. To abruptly 
change course, Walker argued, might lead to American accusations o f British disloyalty. 
London could clearly not become the scape-goat for any failure in Washington. In order 
to avoid possible tensions with the Americans, it was preferable that Johnson make the 
first move to initiate a  political settlement. In case Johnson desired British assistance, he 
would probably not be shy to ask for itJ^Britain obviously did not want to step right in 
the middle o f the firing line; and though peace in Vietnam was a major goal, amiable 
Anglo-American relations were o f equal importance. Wilson agreed with Walker. He was 
not willing to risk trans-Atlantic misunderstanding over Vietnam even though it created 
considerable difficulties in Parliament. Surely, it had been easier for him  to attack 
government policy than making it. Like his predecessors Wilson chose amicable relations 
with Washington instead o f Anglo-American confrontation over the Vietnam question.
Wilson’s effort to prevent escalation: February- March 1965
Wilson decided to wait for a more opportune moment to present his views to 
Washington. But the conflict in Vietnam again developed its own momentum. General 
Khanh resigned and a  civilian government was formed in January 1965, yet within days 
was purged by Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Chanh Thi. For the 
Americans the coup presented a “real mess.”  As a result o f widespread Buddhist revolts,
66 Memorandum of Patrick Gordon Walker for Harold Wilson, December29,1964, PRO, in: Stemmger, 
Grossbritannien und der VTetnamkrieg, p. 600; British ambassador to Washington, Lord Harlech agreed
with Walker. Nobody m Washington was willing to talk about retreat and Britain had to be very cautious m 
proposing negotiations.
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attacking both, the Saigon government and the American presence in the country, the
South Vietnamese military finally agreed to cooperate with the civilian government.
Conspiracy rumors persisted and Washington feared that a new government might be
willing to negotiate with the Viet Cong and advocate an American withdrawal. In
Washington the supporters o f greater military involvement gained the upper hand,
waiting only for another incident that justified further intensifying the air-war and
possible troop deployments. The attack on U.S. army barracks in Pleiku on February 6,
1965 gave Washington the reason to strike back forcefully at North Vietnam.67
Wilson endorsed the immediate American retaliation against North Vietnam after
the attack on Pleiku and so did his new foreign secretary, Michael Stewart.6*
Understandably, it was impossible for the Americans not to respond to the sustained
violence against their personnel. Moreover, following strict interpretation, Washington
actually could not be accused of breaking the Geneva agreement, because it was not a
party to the settlement, and North Vietnam had repeatedly disobeyed the stipulations of
1954. The British government hoped - against all odds - that the Viet Cong would cease
then* guerrilla attacks and leave the South Vietnamese in peace. London then would have
the opportunity to work for negotiations:
The British government would be glad to  see negotiations fo r a  new settlement begin, 
but until a  basis for reasonable negotiations has been achieved, suggestions that a new 
Geneva conference should be convened are regarded as premature.0
w George C. Herring, America's Longest Wan The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975. Second 
Edition, (New York, 1986), pp. 127-131.
“  Gordon Walker bad Tost bis seat m Parliament and was forced to resign bis position as Foreign Secretary.
69 The Times, “Britain Supports America”', February 9,1965, p. 9.
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Pleiku and the subsequent attack on Americans at Qui Nhon, profoundly disturbed 
Wilson because he feared that Johnson might give in to the demand o f his hard-liners and 
escalate the war in Vietnam.70 Wilson, once more under pressure from Parliament about 
the implications o f American air-strikes, tried to establish contact with Johnson. Late in 
the evening o f February 10, the Prime Minister met with Stewart after receiving the news 
o f the assault on Qui Nhon. Wilson believed it was urgent to have a personal encounter 
with the American president to better express British concerns. After several attempts 
Wilson reached Johnson by phone.71 It turned out to be a very unpleasant conversation. 
Johnson admonished the British leader not to get overexcited and when Wilson replied 
that his cabinet suggested he fly to Washington perhaps the next day, Johnson cut him off 
and harshly rejected the idea:
I think a trip, Mr. Prime Minister, on this situation would be very misunderstood and I 
don't think any good would flow from it. If one of us jumps across the Atlantic every 
time there is a critical situation next week I shall be flying over when Soekamo jumps on 
you and I will be giving you advice. . .  As far as my problem in Vietnam we have asked 
everyone to share with us. They were willing to share advice and not responsibility.. .  I 
won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam. . .  If you 
want to help us in Vietnam send us some men and send us some folk to deal with these 
guerrillas. And announce to the press that you are going to help us.72
Wilson was baffled and asked what he could tell the House o f Commons and
Johnson snapped back that it was actually Wilson who called him. Wilson responded that
70 On February 10,1965 a bomb killed twenty-three Americans at the coastal city o f Qui Nhon, wounding 
thirty mom FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL Q, Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
(Bruce), Washington, February 10,1964, p. 213; Bruce reported that Johnson was by now clearly obsessed 
with events m Vietnam.
n  Wilson felt the situation was comparable to 1950 when the U.S. considered the use o f nuclear weapons in 
Korea. Then PM Clement Atfee flew immediately to Washington to consult with Truman. Wilson’s effort 
m 1965 turned out to be far more quixotic. His ambassador Harlech reached Bundy on the phone, who 
rejected Wilson's travel plans. So did LBJ, but Johnson finally accepted Wilson’s phone tall, see: 
Steinmger, Grossbritaniert ttnd der VTetnamkrieg, p. 602.
72 Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 79-80.
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he had to say something to his constituency and suggested a conference on Vietnam. 
Johnson was clearly not in the mood to consider a  political settlement. Instead, he argued 
in terms o f self defense; when the Communists attacked in the middle o f the night and 
killed his people there was only one immediate and appropriate response. I f  Wilson ever 
faced a similar challenge Johnson would expect the same straightforward forceful 
response and back him up “one hundred percent.”73
Johnson’s outburst definitely ended the prospect for a  peace conference for the 
time being. Instead the president preferred to see the Union Jack flying in the Vietnamese 
country side. But the Prime Minister was not ready to back down either. Despite the 
negative signals coming from Washington, Wilson was determined to initiate 
negotiations on Vietnam. Whether or not successful, the Prime Minister could only gain 
both internationally and domestically. By playing the role o f peace-maker Wilson could 
neutralize his own Labour opponents in Parliament. After consultations with Washington, 
Wilson sent a note to Moscow on February 20, 1965 to contact the governments o f the 
Geneva conference to seek then: view “on the circumstances in which a peaceful 
settlement” might be obtained.74 London urged Washington to delay further attacks on 
North Vietnam to allow the Soviets sufficient time to consider the proposal and contact 
Hanoi. Secretary Rusk concurred but would not delay reprisals against  North Vietnam 
much longer. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington were not interested in the British 
conference proposal and Soviet leaders responded to Wilson’s proposal by denouncing
71 Stemmger, Grossbritannien vmd der Vtetrtamhieg, pp. 601-603. 
7* Wilson, Labour Government^  pp. 80-8.
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the United States’ policy in Vietnam and demanding the withdrawal o f all American 
forces and equipment.75
Even before Moscow replied to the British proposal, on March 2, 1965 
Washington started operation Rolling Thunder - the air-campaign against North Vietnam 
and deployed 3500 Mamies to South Vietnam. Washington had made its decision to 
resolve the conflict in Vietnam by military means. Negotiations were relegated to 
secondary importance and could only take place from an American position o f strength. 
To placate Wilson, Washington continued to signal its eagerness for a peaceful solution. 
Former Foreign Minister Walker met with Rusk on March 6, 1965, and the American 
assured Walker that Johnson indeed appreciated the British initiative on Vietnam. Rusk 
considered two possibilities: a  follow-up conference on Laos where Vietnam would be 
informally discussed or direct negotiations with the Soviet Union.76Rusk had also 
contacted the Soviets and hoped for a productive dialogue on the Vietnam question. Even 
if  the Soviets did not cooperate, Britain should pursue its role as Geneva co-chairman and 
approach various governments to hear then opinion on possible venues for a  settlement.
Walker had sufficient experience to realize that Rusk’s overtures were little more 
than a smoke screen. When Rusk suggested that Johnson was willing to risk war against 
Indonesia to show loyalty to the British support o f Malaysia it was evident that 
Washington aimed at British military contributions to Vietnam. Walker remained non­
committal on Vietnam but expressed the willingness o f his government to work for a 
genuine settlement for Vietnam. He emphasized that Britain did not desire the role o f a
75 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II, Memorandum o f Conversation, Washington, February 21,1965,
pp. 543-345; Stemmger, Grossbritcumien undder Vietnamkriegy pp. 604-608.
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neutral negotiator between Russia and the United States. However, American willingness 
to settle in Vietnam would strengthen Wilson’s control over Labour in Parliament.77 
Britain neither wanted a war over Malaysia nor to be forced to intervene in Vietnam. In 
order to maintain his narrow majority in Parliament, Wilson needed negotiations not 
escalation in Vietnam.
Wilson under Fire at Home
Wilson’s domestic difficulties increased after the Pleiku attack. In several 
parliamentary debates during March 1965 the Tories generally supported the American 
strategy in Vietnam and labeled the Prime Minister’s peace initiatives as an attempt in 
“appeasement.” Politically more dangerous to Wilson was Labour opposition to the 
American engagement in Vietnam. Labour MPs demanded greater British pressure on 
Johnson to accept negotiations and even suggested a joint British-French initiative 
leading to the neutralization o f Vietnam. Wilson had no intentions to team up with de 
Gaulle and defended American air-strikes. The culprit was not Washington but Hanoi.7* 
Wilson’s solution to the complex “Vietnam question” and his domestic problems was 
negotiations. The British leader hoped to quiet radical Labour MPs and critical 
Conservatives by playing the role o f constructive peace-maker. This approach would also
75 Walker, Political Diaries, pp. 302-303.
77 Ibid. pp. 303-304; Walker quickly got the Impression, that Rusk's readiness to negotiate was far from 
being decided policy. Hence, he refused to commit Britain to either Vietnam or a  futile role of intermediary 
between Washington and Moscow.
71 Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 22 February 1965, pp. 4-6; and March 1,1965, pp. 166- 
168; 9 March, 1965, pp. 236-241; MPs wondered whether Britain was willing to reconvene the Geneva 
conference m achieving the peaceful reunification and neutralization ofVietnam or et least work to 
convene any type of high level conference in an “attempt to stop the war m Vietnam.”; ZBIiacus favored de
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allow continuous good relations with the United States. Wilson argued that Parliament
should endorse his policy of a negotiated settlement and refrain from destructive narrow
minded accusations of both his government and the United States:
In the past few weeks I have made our position quite clear about the situation in 
Vietnam. I have said that we are pursuing these matters through diplomatic channels. I 
am more concerned with getting the right answer than with getting the right 
declaration.75
Years before a large number of Congress members began to question the 
American commitment in Vietnam, British MPs voiced pertinent concerns about the 
conflict in Vietnam. Certainly many MPs stood by the United States but others, refusing 
to follow the containment theory, squarely blamed Washington for intensifying a  civil 
war and endangering world peace. They demanded that Wilson take action to bring about 
a peaceful settlement. Even less so were these politicians willing to send a single British 
soldier to Vietnam.
Former Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, well aware o f Wilson’s 
dilemma, endorsed the Prime Minister’s course and favored support o f the United States, 
at least for the time being. Once again, Wilson encountered more understanding for his 
effort to seek negotiations, without alienating the United States, from the Tories rather 
than his own Labour Party. Regardless o f the debate in the House o f Commons about the
Gaulle's plan o f neutralization, but Wilson obviously preferred his own approach o f international 
diplomacy. See also: Wilson, Labour Government, p . 8?
79 Parliamentary Records, 16 March, 1965, pp. 1069-1070 and 9 March 1965, pp. 239-241. Wilson fought 
a valiant battle mainly against bis own party. He admonished his colleagues to out aside then: self- 
righteousness which made his job even more difficult. Wilson also had to answer to charges by Labour 
Sydney Silverman that American action m Vietnam was an "act o f plain, naked war”
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means to restore peace m V ietnam , Wilson was convinced that his way of diplomatic 
initiatives was the “only way.”80
The Soviet refusal to cooperate with London in reconvening the Geneva 
conference was a  set-back but did not discourage Wilson. But his chances to convene an 
international conference on the Vietnam problem became increasingly remote. A visit by 
Soviet foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko to London in March 1965 did not produce any 
results on Vietnam. Gromyko indicated that Moscow was no longer interested in 
reconvening the Geneva Conference and supported Hanoi’s demand of an immediate 
American withdrawal from Vietnam . Wilson refused to concede failure. While Moscow 
stalled on reconvening the Geneva conference it might change its mind in the future. 
Consequently, it was important to m aintain contact with the Soviet Union while Britain 
also needed to explore further venues to influence Washington. Wilson realized that the 
climate, wherein both Washington and Moscow put the blame on each other, was not 
conducive to create an atmosphere o f trust, yet there was no other way than to keep 
trying to find a  political solution.81 Washington disagreed and hoped for military success 
to turn things around in Vietnam.
The Stewart M ission to Washington
“Time is running out swiftly in Vietnam and temporizing or expedient measures 
will not suffice” summed up a report to President Johnson in March 1965. Before any
50 Parliamentary Records, 16 March, 1965, p. 1071.
w Wilson, Labour Government, p. 85; RJ5. Smith, An International History o f the Vietnam War. Volnme
III: The Making of a Limited War. 1965-1966. OTewr YoriL 1991), p. 59; Moscow faced strong pressure by
Hanoi and Beijing. Hanoi demanded more support while Beijing accused Moscow o f doing too little.
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negotiations could begin, Washington insisted on a program o f “graduated reprisals” 
against  Hanoi.*2 On March. 22, 1965 American ambassador to Saigon, Maxwell Taylor, 
suggested that the U.S. might further expand the war in Vietnam. On the same day, the 
Pentagon admitted that American troops were using a “variety o f gas” in Vietnam. 
Wilson’s Labour Party was enraged and the British public was shocked. In Parliament 
Wilson was asked to end his “unconditional” support o f the United States and dissociate 
himself from American actions by pronouncing the “horror and indignation” felt in 
Britain.
In this charged atmosphere, British foreign secretary Stewart arrived in 
Washington to explore whether the Johnson administration was either willing to work for 
apolitical settlement or force Hanoi into submission. Several members o f Parliament, led 
by Labour MPs Michael Foot and Philip Noel-Baker, sent a telegram to Stewart en route 
to Washington which made it clear that they found the recent escalation simply appalling. 
In a letter to Wilson they added to these complaints by pointing out that the ideals of the 
Labour Party were at risk if  London condoned Washington’s course in V ietnam  Both the 
Labour party and Wilson’s government would face a  severe crisis unless London issued a 
strong protest.83 Vietnam was increasingly threatening the unity o f the Labour Party. 
While Stewart empathized with the American effort in Vietnam, he was determined to 
confront Rusk and President Johnson to calm the brewing storm at home.
c  FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-L968, VoL II, Johnson Report Outline, March 14,1965, p. 438; and Memorandum 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary o f Defense, McNamara, March 15,1965, pp. 440-441; 
Washington EnsCstedthat Hanoiend its infiltration to South Vietnam before any talks could commence.
“  Wilson, Labour Government, p. 85; Stemmger, Grossbritannien undder Vietnamkrieg, pp. 6II-6I2.
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The Americans were prepared for the British charge. A memorandum from 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to Johnson revealed that Washington was 
fully aware o f the domestic pressure on Wilson. The British leader needed some 
cooperation from Johnson to get out o f an increasingly untenable situation at home. The 
question for Washington was whether it was willing to help Wilson out of his d ilem m a, 
but Bundy decided not to.M Ultimately, Wilson was responsible for the troubles he was in 
and everyone in England was rather misstating the Vietnam situation. Obviously, the 
Prime Minister was more interested in saving his own neck than helping the United 
States. Given his “outrageous phone call” to the president in February it was tempting to 
let him struggle with his own problems. In the long run, however, Bundy believed it was 
not wise to “fall out with Prime Ministers” since the blame usually ended up in 
Washington. Moreover, a  strong rebuttal from Washington would probably induce 
Wilson to “make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and the 
natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen.”85
In the context o f the obstinate French attitude on Vietnam it was not prudent for 
Washington to alienate another Western ally and reap more dam aging  criticism for its 
policy in Southeast Asia. What then was the best way out for Washington? In the end, it 
was some give and take from both sides. Washington would publicly announce that it was 
in close contact and folly exchanged views with London on Vietnam, saving some o f 
Wilson’s reputation and making the British feel significant. Bundy added:
54 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964—1968, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, Washington, March 22, 1965, p. 468. U.S. ambassadorto GB, David 
Brace fully related the criticism Wilson faced from within the Labour party.
"  Ibid.
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Then we can put on some parsley about how glad w e are to have Mr. Stewart and how 
much w e look forward to the Prune M inisters v isit [planned for April]. In return, the 
British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their existing 
announced approval o f our present course o f  action. They should Innit themselves to  the 
expression o f hope that a  path to a  peaceful settlem ent w ill come, plus expression o f  
alertness, as Co-Chairman o f the Geneva conference, to any opportunities for peaceful 
settlem ent which may develop in the future.86
Wilson would not be exhilarated about the American position, but according to 
his ambassador an expression o f kind words and mutual understanding was preferable to 
an open split with the United States. As with de Gaulle’s insistence on neutralization o f 
both Vietnams and lack of efficient support by West Germany, Washington was not 
concerned about the motives of Britain m suggesting negotiations, but only the impact a 
divergent European views had on Washington’s own success in Vietnam. The British 
position was another nuisance that might affect European, and perhaps world opinion, 
undermining the effort to subdue the Communists in Vietnam. To pre-empt the 
accusations o f spraying lethal gas in Vietnam, Bundy sent another memo to the President, 
explaining that no poison was used but that it was simply “riot-control gas” that police 
forces all over the world employed.87
Both sides, ready for the diplomatic battle, met on March 23, 1965. Rusk took 
some wind out o f Stewart’s sails by addressing possible diplomatic channels for a 
settlement. Stewart interrupted and addressed the use o f “poison-gas” which Rusk denied. 
Stewart was not finished and maintained that the use o f gas as well as napalm led to 
inappropriate suffering o f civilians and produced only limited military gains. Rusk 
strongly disagreed and emphasized that napalm was o f great value for military progress. 
He contended that the United States limited the deployment o f napalm to attacks on
“  FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson. March 23,1965, p. 469.
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military targets and stressed that Britain had previously used napalm as well. He added 
that this war “was not a  Sunday- school party” but was a “rough business.”88Rusk was not 
against British initiatives to explore a diplomatic solution o f the conflict as Co-chair o f 
the Geneva conference but he was opposed to any British role as arbiter or intermediary 
on Vietnam.
President Johnson, too, deflected Steward’s complaints about employing 
“barbarous and horrible weapons” by explaining that poison gas was in fact never used, 
yet admitted that London should have been better informed. Then Johnson worked hard 
to win British sympathy. For an hour he told Stewart about his own hopes and fears, as 
well as the fierce domestic pressure he had to face. He did impress Stewart and suddenly 
changed gear. Johnson favored negotiations “if one could offer a reasonable prospect o f 
their succeeding.”89^  the meantime, he had to pursue a policy a “appropriate and 
measured response” to aggression in Vietnam. Nobody could expect that the United 
States would abandon South Vietnam and American withdrawal would lead to the fall o f 
Southeast Asia, perhaps even India. Ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce 
described Johnson’s performance as “grand theatre” with the president as forceful as 
“Niagara Falls.” Johnson told Bruce after the meeting that Stewart had offered not a
”  re tlS , Vietnam, 1964-1968, Memorandum Bundy to Johnson, March 22,1965, p .470.
“  M. Stewart to Harold Wilson, Secret Record ofa Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and M r. 
Dean Rusk, Washington March 23,1965, PRO; mr Steininger, Grossbritarmiert undder Vtetnamkrteg, p. 
612.
89 FRUS, Vietnam, VoL U, Diary Entry fay the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce), Washington, 
March23,1965, pp.471-472; Johnson explained that some Americans wanted to quit the war while others 
demanded that he bomb China and destroy HanoL
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“single practical or helpful suggestion”.90 Like the French, the British complained a  great
deal but did not provide Johnson with what he really wanted - an unequivocal
endorsement o f the American policy in Vietnam.
Although Wilson failed to change Johnson’s mind on negotiations, the Prime
Minister claimed the Stewart visit was a  success. His foreign minister had voiced
profound concern and opposition to the American policy in Vietnam. He was pleased
with his secretary’s comments after the meeting with Johnson, issuing a statement
intended to reflect the Labour government position and also appease Wilson’s critics at
home. Stewart told the National Press Club in Washington:
In the choice o f measures everyone responsible should consider not only what is 
militarily appropriate for the job in hand but the effect on people around the world. W hat 
I am, in fact, asking the United States to display is what your Declaration o f 
Independence called ‘a  decent respect for the opinions o f mankind.’91
De Gaulle used the same argument in his Phnom Phenh speech a year later in 
September 1966. On neither occasion did European opinion make a profound impact on 
Washington. De Gaulle’s persistent criticism, though, was far more irritating than British 
statements, by influencing opinions in Southeast Asia, and in the Third World in general. 
Wilson felt he scored a point with Stewart’s visit, but Johnson saw things otherwise and 
complained bitterly over the lack o f European support. The president was determ ined  to 
pursue the commitment o f his predecessors and respond to North Vietnamese aggression 
until it erased. He thought it was “insulting” that all these politicians from Europe came 
over to see him to use these meetings for solely domestic purposes although they had no
90 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II; Bruce remarked that LBJ “is power sublimated” and served the 
British “oratorical sandwiches, with layers ofgravity and levity” Stewart probably would never forget 
these ninety minutes with LBJ.
91 Wilson, Labour Government,  pp. 85-86.
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“practicable solutions to offer for American probIems.”92On the same day o f the Stewart 
visit, Johnson emphasized that he was not willing to negotiate and believed his message 
was “getting through” to both the Europeans and Hanoi. He added: “I don’t wanna go to 
Hanoi. I was a hell of a long time getting into this. But I like it.”93
The American view was not encouraging to Wilson, coming shortly after the 
Soviet refusal to reconvene the Geneva conference. But in face of his rebellious party 
members in the Commons, he remained determined that his peace initiatives would lead 
to a initial first step, some kind of response by any side, however minor, but nevertheless 
better than further military escalation. Wilson eagerly awaited a memorandum by Rusk 
explaining the American policy in Vietnam, which Rusk had promised to Stewart. The 
British leader hoped he could use a more detailed and encouraging statement by 
Washington to deflect domestic criticism in Parliament The position paper never arrived 
and Wilson once more took the initiative, publicly reaffirmin g  the British proposal of 
February 1965 to convene a conference.9* Since Washington was not responding to 
British suggestions, Wilson’s conference idea was the only face-saving measure le ft
In early April Wilson met with de Gaulle in Paris and discussed the crisis in 
Vietnam. The French President was openly anti-American and unwilling to modify his
92 FRUS, Vietnam, Vol. II, Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce), Washington, 
March 23,1965, p. 472.
” National Security Files, Files ofMcGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, VoL I, March 23, 
1965, LBJ library; the issue of gas warfare almost led to an open, skirmish between Washington and 
London. Stewart condemned the American use o f gas m Vietnam m his Washington press conference. LBJ 
was enraged and was ready to send a  note o f protest to Wilson, but decided otherwise. McNamara charged 
that Britain had used gas m Cyprus and was one o f the leading manufacturers m tear gas. Now the British 
felt insulted, see: FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL B, pp.481-482.
** Stemmger, Grossbritanniert und der Vtetnamkrieg, pp. 614-615.
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neutralization proposal for Vietnam.95WiIson defended the United States but could not 
overcome the intransigence o f de Gaulle on Vietnam. Wilson explained to de Gaulle the 
British peace initiative and the overall difficulty to precisely assess the intentions of 
Hanoi and Beijing. The North Vietnamese demand o f an American withdrawal, and the 
American precondition o f an end o f North Vietnamese infiltration made any negotiations 
impossible.96
Anglo-French differences in the approach to Vietnam were even more obvious in 
the meeting between Stewart and Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign 
minister. Murville reiterated that the conflict in Vietnam was essentially a civil war in 
which the United States had no right to interfere. The American engagement was only 
aggravating an already bad situation. Stewart strongly disagreed. He regarded an 
American withdrawal from South Vietnam as an open invitation to Beijing to intervene 
directly. Ultimately, negotiations were the only possible way to end the conflict and 
Britain was willing to take the lead in organizing a  conference. Murville replied that 
France had only recently probed the chances for negotiations after the Soviets suggested a 
conference based on the cessation of American air attacks on North Vietnam. It was 
obvious that the Communists were willing to negotiate, while the United States refused to 
stop its attacks on North Vietnam, which diminished the possibility o f a political
*  Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 92-93.
96 Record o f Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President ofFrance, April 2,1965; PRO; in: 
Stemmger, Grossbritanien undder VTetnamkrieg, p. 615.
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solution.97 The entice exchange reflected the inability o f both London and Paris to set 
aside past differences in Anglo-French relations and pursue common goals.
Sim ilar conversations over V ietnam  took place between the French and the West 
Germ ans and, on a  few occasions, between the British and the West Germans. The French 
were increasingly outspoken in their criticism o f the United States and also held that the 
chances for a  negotiated settlement faded with every American bomb dropped on North 
Vietnam. Obviously, Wilson and German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard shared the French 
skepticism about the possibilities of American success in Vietnam. All three European 
countries were deeply troubled about further escalation in Vietnam and a potential larger 
war with the PRC. A larger conflict might result in American troop reductions in Western 
Europe, which would obviously affect European security. However, Wilson as well as 
Erhard were unwilling to join the French position because neither was ready to follow the 
French lead and risk complications with the United States.98
Wilson valued the good relations with Washington higher than causing further 
tensions by adopting a common position with de Gaulle. Certainly de Gaulle’s own 
leadership ambitions in Europe played a significant role in Wilson’s analysis and Britain 
would not and could not renounce its own voice in global affairs in favor of Paris. The 
need for American military protection, therefore, outweighed the possibility o f a closer 
alliance with France. While a  unified policy by Britain, France, and West Germany 
regarding the American engagement in Vietnam might have had a greater impact on 
Washington, a  common strategy was never considered by all three countries. Wilson
97 Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Monsieur Couve de Murville, the French
Foreign Minister, April 2, 1965, PRO; in: Steininger, Grossbritanien und der VietnamkriegT p. 616.
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decided to continue his course and work for negotiations* while refraining from publicly 
condemning the American role in Vietnam.
Second Wilson Visit to W ashington; Separate Functions but Common Course?
In mid-April 1965, Wilson was back in Washington, fully prepared to hold his 
own on the issue o f Vietnam. A few days before his arrival Johnson had finally publicly 
outlined his goals for Vietnam at John Hopkins University, where he announced his 
readiness to enter negotiations with Hanoi without preconditions. Wilson regarded the 
speech as a promising sign and hoped he could facilitate the process by offering British 
help. At lunch with the Prime Minister, Johnson was clearly in a better mood than during 
their phone conversation in February.99 George Ball prepared Johnson for the meeting by 
pointing out that British support for the American policy in Vietnam “has been stronger 
than that of our major allies” and that Wilson, despite increasing domestic opposition to 
the war, “stoutfastly” remained on course. Johnson should express his appreciation for 
British loyalty.100 The president followed Ball’s advice and Wilson found the discussion 
on Vietnam far more constructive than during previous encounters. However, Johnson 
was still reluctant to address negotiations and instead stressed the three “D’s”, 
determination, development, and discussion. He asked again for a  British military 
contribution which Wilson politely declined. Johnson then expounded on what he 
understood by discussions, which reassured Wilson that the Americans were at least
91 The French and German position on Vietnam is discussed in detail below.
99 Wilson, Labour Government* pp. 94-95.
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contemplating a  political settlement. The Prime Minister pledged his full support in
urging the Soviet Union to revive the Geneva process and “build on this new American
willingness to secure a settlement round the conference tabIe.”10IUndoubtedly, Wilson
was pleased with the new attitude in Washington and the appreciation o f his efforts for a
political solution for Vietnam. He interpreted Johnson’s remarks as a division o f function
between both countries:
The American government would not be deflected from its military task; but equally he 
[Johnson] would give his full backing to any British initiative which had any chance of 
getting peac e-talks on the move.102
Wilson started his initiative even before he met with Johnson by sending former 
foreign secretary Walker on a  tour o f Southeast Asia as Ms personal emissary to discuss 
Vietnam. Walker produced some “useful” reports but was not admitted to meet with 
leaders in Hanoi and Beijing.103 This setback did not discourage Wilson. He hoped to 
employ a  conference proposal by Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, to open discussion 
on all the issues troubling Indochina. The Soviets agreed to a conference over Cambodia 
and Beijing also signaled its willingness to participate. Everything depended now on the 
American position. Wilson discussed the idea with Rusk on April 15 and interpreted the 
favorable response from Moscow as a sign that both Hanoi and Beijing might actually 
consider talks. Rusk remained skeptical and wanted more details. Any conference had to 
be well planned to evade a “total disaster.” Washington needed more time to evaluate the
100 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL II, p. 557.
101 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 95.
IbtidL p. 96.
m  IhfdL: and Walker, Political Diaries, p. 302; Walker was m the region from April 14 to May 4 and 
visited Saigon, Phnom Penh, Tokyo, and Delhi; Smith, International History ofthe Vietnam War, p. 61.
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proposal, but in general terms the United States was interested in the Soviet offer for a 
conference.10*
Soon after Wilson’s visit to Washington Foreign Secretary Stewart received a  
reply from the Americans which again indicated that Washington required additional tune 
to decide on a  conference, and for the tune being could only endorse Walker’s fact­
finding mission in Southeast Asia. Stewart was disconcerted by the American response. 
He simply could not understand the reluctance o f Washington to embark on a political 
initiative, which in fact had been outlined and promoted by Johnson in the Johns Hopkins 
speech. Stewart argued that American failure to act on any conference proposal probably 
would be interpreted as lack o f sincerity to reach a negotiated solution for Vietnam. The 
Foreign Secretary urged his ambassador to Washington, Sir Patrick Dean, to do 
everything possible to obtain a quick American response.l0SWashington did not comply. 
Rusk was waiting for an assessment o f the top brass in Honolulu. He further argued that 
the South Vietnamese could not be forced to accept a  conference. London was not 
impressed and regarded American hesitation as a  calculated policy to prevent a 
conference. London felt that time was an issue and the longer Washington waited to agree 
to talks the slimmer the chances were for any diplomatic success.106
,w Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 617-619; Smith, International History o f the 
Vietnam War, pp. 61-62,108-109. China was interested m the conference to increase its own role in 
Southeast Asia and curb North Vietnamese growing influence in Laos and Cambodia. Washington did not 
want to reject a conference on Cambodia outrightly, fearful that Sihanouk might completely break relations 
with the U.S. and drift toward the Communist side.
105 Stewart to Embassy in Washington, 18 April 1965, PRO; in: Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der 
Vietnamkrieg, p. 619.
106 Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 619-620; both administrations also disagreed 
about the conference format. London hoped for extended discussion to give Hanoi and Beijing tone to 
accept serious talks, Washington insisted on a  detailed agenda on which a  conference would put a stamp of 
approval.
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Again Wilson met with disappointment. Prince Sihanouk distanced himself from 
his own conference proposal and the Honolulu meeting o f American policy makers 
recommended a further increase in U.S. troops and continuous aerial attacks on North 
Vietnam. The division of functions that Wilson had envisioned after his visit to Johnson 
was far from becoming reality. In fact, Washington fulfilled its part by solely focusing on 
the m ilitary side o f the conflict but it was not willing to allow Britain to play the role o f 
peace-maker. Partly Washington’s intransigence resulted from Hanoi’s unwillingness to 
accept negotiations without preconditions. Hanoi insisted on an American withdrawal and 
cessation o f air-attacks, no foreign interference, recognition o f the NLF by Saigon, and 
“peaceful unification” of Vietnam. Only after these conditions were met would Hanoi be 
interested in a  Geneva type conference.107
W ashing ton  stressed that the basis for a settlement must be the independence o f 
South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Undersecretary George Ball argued that Washington 
should seek some common ground with North Vietnam. He felt that a peaceful 
reunification o f Vietnam could be achieved, provided that it was based on free elections, 
expressing truly the will of the Vietnamese peopIe.t08Johnson gave the Ball proposal a try 
and ordered a short bombing halt in May 1965. hi addition, he was willing to explore the 
diplomatic angle and send Foy Kohler to present a  note to the North Vietnamese embassy
m  FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Vol. II, Intelligence Memorandum horn the Deputy Director of the Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research (Danney) to the Secretary of State Rusk, April 15,1965, pp. 558-559; Smith, 
International History o f the Vietnam War, pp. I09-110; Sihanouk demanded that Saigon not be represented 
at the conference, knowing that this request would be unacceptable to the U.S.; Sihanouk was primarily 
interested in settled issues on Cambodia. In addition, the prince was angry over a Newsweek articles 
insulting his wife and the incidental bombing of a  Cambodian village by the Americans.
I0* FRUS, Vietnam. 1964-1968, Vol. I f . Memorandum from the Under Secretary o f State (Ball) to 
President Johnson, pp. 586-589. Ball early on criticized the growing American involvement m Vietnam
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in Moscow. The North Vietnamese refused to accept any communication and the effort to 
deliver an oral message through Soviet channels also failed.109
Wilson, after the disappointment over his Cambodia initiative, was elated by the 
bombing pause and the American effort to establish a direct contact with Hanoi. Once 
again, he saw an opportunity to act as peacemaker and silence growing criticism at home. 
This bubble burst due to Hanoi’s intransigence to respond to Kohler and the subsequent 
American resumption o f aerial attacks. The Soviets also refused to consider a conference 
after these recent set-backs.noThe Prime Minister was “extremely concerned about the 
worsening Vietnam situation” and his cabinet feared a  widening o f the war which would 
inextricably draw Great Britain into the fighting. Also, Wilson’s failure on the diplomatic 
front did not ease any o f his domestic problems. Adding to Wilson’s quagmire was the 
issue of British credibility in the Commonwealth.
Wilson wondered how the Vietnam problem might affect the upcoming 
Commonwealth conference in June 1965. It was obvious that the Asian and African 
members o f the Commonwealth would take a strong anti-American line, complicating 
proceeding within the Commonwealth, and adding further fodder to his domestic 
crMcs.mWiIson worked hard to find a way out o f the dilemma he faced in the
and eventually gamed the position o f“deviTs advocate” during the Johnson, administration. Ball position is 
discussed below.
109 FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, May 13,1965, pp. 651-652. In June 1965, Johnson again asked for 
international pressure to bring Hanoi to the conference table, see also: Smith, International History o f the 
Vietnam War, p. 154.
no Record o f a Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Gromyko, at the Imperial Hotel, Vienna, 15 May 1965, PRO; m Stemmger, p. 623. Gromyko rejected any 
conference for the time being and was “singularly negative; even by his own standards?* on any prospect in 
Vietnam.
m Wilson, Labour Government, p. 108.
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Commonwealth and in Parliament, and to obtain additional leverage on Washington. The 
result was the Commonwealth peace initiative. The Commonwealth represented about a 
sixth o f the U.N. members and its political views ranged from strongly pro-American, as 
in Australia and New Zealand, to neutral or non-aligned, to anti-American. I f  all o f them 
agreed on a common policy, it would obviously give Wilson a stronger backing vis-a-vis 
Washington, keep the Commonwealth from disunity, and score valuable points in 
Parliament
As soon as the Commonwealth leaders arrived in London, Wilson made his 
rounds and won the endorsement o f most o f them. The Commonwealth leaders proposed 
both an end to American bombing o f North Vietnam and infiltration by North 
Vietnamese troops to the South. The next step would be a cease-fire and an international 
conference, leading to the withdrawal o f all foreign troops from South Vietnam. Vietnam 
eventually should become a neutral country and an international force was to guarantee 
peace. Washington also gave its “warm support” and Wilson promised Johnson to go 
“into battle” and win endorsement o f the Commonwealth."2
Domestically, too, Wilson’s initiative brought the desired rewards. Both Douglas 
Home for the Tories, and Jo Grimond for the radical wing o f Labour endorsed the Prime 
Minister’s strategy. The press applauded the Commonwealth initiative calling it a  “bold 
and imaginative stroke.” Johnson responded favorably and so did the government o f
IC Wilson, Labour Government, pp. IOS-t 10; Stemmger, Grossbritanien undder Vietnamkrieg, p. 625;
Smith, [nternational History o fthe Vietnam War, p. 154; Julius Nyerere of Tanzania proved the greatest
obstacle to the Commonwealth initiative. He was strongly anti-American and also very much concerned 
about his image as an independent African leader m an up-coming African Third World Conference in 
Algiers. In the end Nyerere was forced to accept the majority view o f the Commonwealth countries.
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Saigon. By June 23,1965 four Commonwealth ambassadors delivered a joint message to 
Soviet Premier Kosygin asking for his backing.113
But Wilson experienced disappointment once again. Washington did not agree to 
a bombing pause for the duration o f the Commonwealth initiative unless North Vietnam 
ceased its own aggression in the South. The reactions in Moscow, Beijing, and Hanoi 
turned out discouragingly as well. Beijing even accused London o f supporting American 
aggression in Vietnam. Hanoi flatly rejected the proposal and restated that peace would 
be restored only after an American withdrawal and cessation o f their “aggressive 
war.”114A last stance effort to personally deliver the peace proposal by British MP Harold 
Davies, who had maintained good connections with Hanoi, did not succeed.115 Wilson 
had tried and failed again. Domestically he had to suffer through Tory advice that he 
should not try anything “unless you are sure that it will succeed.” But given the domestic 
and international constraints on Wilson the question remains, what else could be done?
Britain did not want the war in Vietnam to threaten its own security interests. As a 
SEATO member, though, London still faced the possibility to be forced to deploy British 
soldiers.ns Wilson would face even more opposition from his Labour Party and might 
lose his slight majority in Parliament. Given the overextension o f British forces, any 
intervention in Vietnam was for too costly. It would also be too costly in terms o f British 
security interest in Europe. The role o f peacemaker was the only alternative left But any
tu Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 111-l 13.
IW IbftL pp. 121-122; Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vietnamkrieg, pp. 625-626; Smith, International 
History o f the Vietnam Warr p. 154.
115 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 122; Davies met an adamant Ho Chi Minh and returned to London 
empty-handed.
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opportunity to reach a  negotiated settlement was evaporating quickly with the increasing 
number o f G i/s  arriving in South Vietnam.
La July 1965 McNamara admitted to Walker that the chances of success in 
Vietnam were rather small. Joint South Vietnamese and American forces were far from 
gaining the upper hand. Even additional American troops were unlikely to succeed in a 
limited war such as in Vietnam, McNamara hoped the Soviet Union would still apply 
pressure on Hanoi to reach a negotiated settlement. At the same time he prepared a 
memorandum asking for a substantial increase o f American troops in Vietnam. Three 
weeks later, Johnson announced that he would do precisely what McNamara suggested 
and increase the number o f American soldiers “by a number which may equal or exceed 
the 80,000” already in Vietnam.117
Against growing odds and rising numbers o f U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, Wilson 
still hoped for a negotiated settlement. In December 1965, he met again with President 
Johnson and once more Vietnam topped the agenda. Arriving in Washington, Wilson 
received a telegram from sixty-eight Labour MPs who demanded that the United States 
cease its bombing raids on North Vietnam. The MPs were appalled that American bombs 
hit increasingly close to population centers such as Haiphong. They also were 
apprehensive of a recent McNamara statement alluding to the “near certainty o f war with 
China.” Wilson urged Johnson to suspend aerial attacks in order to assess recent hints that 
Hanoi was in fact willing to begin negotiations. A t least, Johnson did not outrightly reject
tls Smith, International History o fthe Vietnam War, pp. 154-155; Britain stated that the defense of 
Malaysia already strained its resources and hence could not commit combat forces to Vietnam. Yet, 
Commonwealth members Australia and New Zealand were willing to do so, however as allies to the U.S.
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the British request and both leaders discussed possible venues for negotiations with North 
Vietnam. Wilson made it clear that in case U.S. planes directly attacked Hanoi and 
Haiphong he would be forced to publicly denounce any such attack.118 Later that day, 
Johnson publicly affirm ed that he regarded Britain’s role as Geneva co-chair essential in 
bringing all sides to the conference table. Furthermore, Johnson promised to support any 
British initiative leading to negotiation on Vietnam. The British media responded 
favorably to Wilson’s visit. Most importantly, Johnson had not insisted on British troops 
bound for Vietnam. Also the American president was welcoming Wilson’s approach to a 
conference on Vietnam.119
The failure to urge “Common Sense”
Wilson’s success in Washington was another pyrrhic victory. By the time he 
visited Johnson, more than 180.000 American troops were stationed in Vietnam and their 
numbers were increasing. The exchange of pleasantries with the American leaders could 
not disguise the fact that they were not seriously interested m. any negotiations. Wilson, 
while genuinely trying, could not prevent further escalation in Vietnam. His foreign 
office was equally pessimistic. Even before the Prime Minister went to the States, his 
advisors at Whitehall regarded any chance o f a  negotiated settlement as bleak. For the 
present, negotiations “would achieve precisely nothing.”t20But Wilson could not simply 
abandon his policy o f reaching a negotiated settlement. Facing a rising number of Labour
117 Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vtetnamkrieg, p. 628. see also: Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: 
The Tragedy and Lessons o f Vietnam. (New York, 1995), pp. 192-200.
"* Wilson, Labour Government, p. 187.
119 Ibid.. p. 188.
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MPs protesting the American policy in Vietnam, domestic challenges added to London’s 
apprehension about the international implications o f American escalation in Vietnam. 
With the extension o f the Christmas bombing halt o f late 1965, Wilson hoped that 
another round o f diplomatic initiatives might finally bring results. Yet, in late January 
1966 Johnson ordered the resumption o f air attacks on North Vietnam. The Foreign office 
issued, a press statement supporting Johnson’s decision before it was cleared with Wilson. 
The result was a major crisis within the Labour Party over Vietnam.121
In Parliament, Wilson defended his effort to seek negotiations but also expressed 
understanding for Washington’s position. Hanoi and Beijing had not demonstrated any 
desire to embark on a peaceful solution. Wilson deplored that his colleagues, while 
strongly criticizing the Americans, had shown less enthusiasm in urging both Hanoi and 
Beijing to come to the conference table.122 But domestic, particular Labour opposition 
could not be denied and Wilson had to devise an approach that would both reunite the 
Labour Party and promise results on Vietnam Again, diplomatic initiatives seemed the 
best way, since outright criticism o f American policy appeared selfdefeating.
In Parliament, Wilson pleaded with Labour and Tories alike to consider the 
consequences o f the war in Vietnam both for Britain and the United States. Surely, the 
conflict was a tragedy for the Vietnamese people. But even more threatening was the 
possibility o f escalation “to the scale o f a major land war in Asia.” Lastly, the fighting in 
Vietnam prevented a lessening o f tensions between East and West. Wilson therefore had
120 Stemmger, Grossbritanien und der Vtetnamkrieg, p. 628.
Kt Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 204-205.
121 Wilson. Labour Government, pp. 205-206; Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 8 February
1966, pp. 253-257.
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no other choice but to work for a political solution, pursuing British self-interest. Yet, he
reminded his colleagues that unilateral withdrawal by the United States was a double-
edged sword. American allies might question Washington’s word. But an American
withdrawal could only be seen as “a humiliating defeat” which most likely would drive
the United States into a  position of “intransigent isolation.”l23Once again, Wilson walked
the tight rope balancing immediate domestic concerns with the long-term interest of Great
Britain. To the British leader the only possible approach to settle the thorny Vietnam
issue was in rinding a diplomatic solution.
In February, 1966 Wilson visited the Soviet Union but got nowhere on Vietnam.
However, Wilson managed to establish private contacts with Hanoi. Soon, too, this
prospect evaporated into thin air.124 Neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese were
receptive to Wilson’s efforts. Wilson agreed with Moscow during the official press
conference that “there can be no military solution in the interests o f the people o f
Vietnam.” He hastened to assure his allegiance to the United States by explaining that his
foremost loyalty was to British allies and friends. Despite the East-West divide both sides
should work to settle the Vietnam issue.125
Members o f Parliament were not satisfied. In June 1966 Wilson was urged to
meet with President Johnson and demand an end to the war in Vietnam. MP Winnick
pressured Wilson to express the view o f many British to Lyndon Johnson:
Is the Prime M inister aware that there are many people in this country who would like 
him to do precisely what A ttlee did m 1956 -  to urge common sense on the Americans?
135 Parliamentary Records, House o f Commons, 8 February 1966, pp. 250-252.
a* Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 213-214.
“  Ibid, p. 214.
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W ill the Prune M inister inform President Johnson that the m ajority o f the British people 
have no stomach for this colonial w ar that the Americans are engaged in?126
A remarkable statement for a former colonial power. It summarized the ambiguities o f 
Britain’s past and present. Chastened by the loss o f empire, Britain could only advise 
against its own former mistakes. This advice was certainly not unbiased and reflected 
British self-interest. Wilson rejected the comparison to the Attlee mission on Korea in 
1950. Unlike 1950, Britain did not have troops on the battlefield in Vietnam. Wilson had 
time and again explained British views on Vietnam to the Americans. He related his 
effort to encourage the Soviet Union to participate in the process o f finding a peaceful 
settlement. But neither Moscow nor Beijing proved receptive to British initiatives.
Wilson, in an almost quixotic endeavor, held fast to the approach adopted by his 
predecessors. Unwilling and unable to commit Britain to the futile war in Vietnam he 
tried repeatedly to initiate a negotiated settlement. In early 1967, Wilson was again 
certain that the United States was earnestly interested in an initiative to end the war in 
Vietnam. Johnson sent his personal envoy Chester Cooper to London to express the 
genuine desire to establish contacts with. Hanoi. Accordingly, Washington offered to 
suspend the bombing o f North Vietnam. Hanoi then would reduce its troops in the South, 
leading to gradual de-escalation. Wilson was asked to convince the Soviets that 
Washington was sincere in the newest initiative. Hopefully, the Soviets would pressure 
Hanoi to seriously consider negotiations-127
06 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 21 June 1966, p. 282.
127 Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 245-346.
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Wilson, complied. In fact, Soviet Premier Kosygin proved interested as well when 
he visited Britain in February 1967. Wilson conveyed the so-called Phase AI  Phase B 
plan to Kosygin and hoped that the Soviets could impress Hanoi, leading to negotiations. 
Kosygin was receptive and suggested that it should be the task o f the two Geneva 
chairm en  “to advise and assist the US and DRV to meet and discuss then problems at the 
negotiating table "^Immediately, Wilson phoned U.S. ambassador Bruce and Chester 
Cooper while Kosygin contacted Hanoi. Wilson handed a copy o f the American proposal 
to Kosygin, after the Prime Minister had cleared the exact wording with Washington. 
American Ambassador Bruce was elated that Kosygin not only took the proposal 
seriously but expressed hope that Hanoi might accept the American plan. Bruce told the 
Prune Minister: “I think you’ve made it. This is going to be the biggest diplomatic coup 
of the century.”129
It turned out otherwise. Hours later Wilson was informed that Washington had 
changed the proposal. Johnson now insisted that Hanoi stop infiltration to the South 
immediately as a precondition for any negotiations. Only when Washington was assured 
that infiltration had ceased would the Americans halt in bombing North Vietnam. Wilson 
fumed but to no avail. For Wilson Washington’s actions were a “total reversal o f policy” 
and it “had been deliberately taken” just when there was a real chance for a settlement. 
An angry Wilson could still not believe that the White House had taken him and Kosygin 
“for a ride.” Even profound confusion in Washington could not explain this stab-in-the-
m  Wilson, Labour Government, pp., 347-348; see also: Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars. 1945-1990. 
(New York, 1991), p. 181; and Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. (Chicago, 1996), 
pp. 102-103; Soviet contacts with Hanoi indicated some North Vietnamese willingness to talk; Moscow 
was clearly interested m establishing contacts between the U S. and North Vietnam.
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back. Instead, Wilson deduced correctly, that hawks had won the day and changed 
Johnson’s mind. Washington neglected to consider that its reversal put the Prime Minister 
in “a hell o f a situation” for his remaining talks with Kosygin.130
Wilson was determined to salvage the honor o f his government and decided to go 
it alone. Henceforth, he was presenting the views o f the British government and insisted 
on the original two phase proposal. But Wilson remained in constant contact with 
Washington, hoping that Johnson would fall in line. Ultimately, the American response 
lay in between both proposals, insisting that Hanoi respond within hours. Kosygin proved 
understanding to the British dilemma and forwarded the new American offer to Hanoi. 
Nothing came out of it and within days the United States resumed the bombing o f North 
Vietnam.131
To Wilson another “historic opportunity” had been missed by a “disastrous” 
decision in Washington and his diplomatic approach was in shambles. As his 
predecessors in office, Wilson chose behind the scenes diplomacy to urge common sense 
on the Americans. His approach was based on what he perceived as Britain’s self-interest. 
Wilson, Douglas-Home, and Macmillan shared the initial assessment that a  war and 
escalation in Vietnam run counter British goals. The United Kingdom feared that conflict 
in Southeast Asia might not only demand British military intervention, which the country 
could ill afford, but endangered security in Europe by increasing East-West tensions and 
a lessening American ability to honor all its global commitments. From Churchill to
Wilson, Labour Government, p. 356.
130 IhftL. pp. 357-359; Young, Vietnam Wars, pp. 181-182; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and Vietnam, pp.
103-106; Kosygin was as disappointed as Wilson. He felt that Washington destroyed a  real chance to open 
negotiations.
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Wilson, British leaders did not share the American assessment that South Vietnam had to 
be held at all costs. British dependence on American military protection and Londonrs 
desire to remain the “special ally” precluded outright criticism o f American policy in 
Vietnam. As reluctant hut loyal ally, London chose to initiate diplomatic solutions of the 
Vietnam conflict and failed in this effort The “special relationship” also ruled out a joint 
European initiative. After de Gaulle’s veto on the British entry into the Common market 
in 1963, London depended even more so on a  close relationship with the United States. 
Like Paris and Bonn, London remained limited by its own perceived self-interest and 
hence lacked the leverage to change American policy-making on Vietnam.
British leaders from Macmillan to Wilson painfully learned the lesson that they 
could not change American policy-making on Vietnam. On Laos, it seemed that British 
opposition actually impacted the Kennedy administration. But Kennedy’s decision was 
mainly based on his astute assessment o f the military and geographical conditions of that 
landlocked country. While Kennedy at least proved willing to listen his successor 
Johnson was not inclined to do so. Johnson hoped to convert the British to his point of 
view and when they failed to follow his lead, gave time and again the impression - 
contrary to his strategy in Vietnam - that he was considering negotiations.
In March 1968, Johnson finally did what Wilson had hoped for during the past 
three years. Johnson announced an unconditional bombing halt north o f the demilitarized 
zone and offered open peace talks to Hanoi. Wilson was elated and probably not too sorry 
to see Johnson fade from leadership. The new administration o f Richard Nixon paid 
more attention to European and British concerns, giving hope that London still had a
ot Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 363-365.
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voice in Washington. De Gaulle left the scene in 1969, removing the major obstacle to 
British membership in the European Economic Community. In 1973, London bridged the 
gap over the Channel and entered the EEC. The “Vietnam question’5 was both a lesson in 
failure but also one of opportunities. As a result o f cooling relations with Washington 
over Vietnam, British leaders increasingly turned toward Europe. Today, Britain still 
prides itself in the role of “special ally” to the United States - the legacy o f Margaret 
Thatcher and the Gulf War, but the United Kingdom’s international influence is at least 
equally grounded in Europe. Like France and Germany, Britain is realizing that its 
potential in global affairs has to be based on both the Europe pillar and mutual 
understanding with the United States.
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The Defiant Ally:
France, Grandeur, and Neutralization of Vietnam
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You w ill fin d  tha t intervention in th is area w ill be an endless entanglem ent. . . We 
French have had experience o f i t  You Am ericans want to  take our place. I  pred ict that 
you w ill sink step by step into a  bottom less m ilitary and politica l quagm ire, however 
much you  spend in  men and money:
Charles de Gaulle to John F. Kennedy on the 
prospect in Vietnam, May 1961
On August 31, 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle strongly criticized the 
American War in Vietnam in a speech to a supportive crowd in Pnomh Penh, Cambodia. 
He accused the United States o f outright aggression in Vietnam and urged the withdrawal 
o f all American forces to allow for a negotiated settlement o f the conflict While leaders 
in Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany also had misgivings and doubts 
about America’s involvement in Vietnam, neither dared to challenge Washington as 
openly and publicly as France. Why then, did de Gaulle?
Obviously, France had extensive and painful experiences in Vietnam, as the 
colony gained its independence in a bloody and costly war. Based on French experience 
in Indochina, beginning in 1960 de Gaulle urged Washington against extending its 
commitment to the region. His advice went unheeded by both President John F. Kennedy 
and Lyndon B. Johnson. Again, the question is why? Two related factors contributed to 
divergent French and American views. First, de Gaulle approached foreign policy based 
on an ideology o f superiority which depended for its maintenance on the restoration 
French “grandeur”, a larger international role and voice for France. Washington placed 
far greater emphasis on Cold War ideology and regarded the Vietnam conflict first and 
foremost m terms o f the struggle against Communism. Second, de Gaulle steadfastly 
insisted on an independent policy for France in Europe and globally in  directly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
challenging American leadership o f the Western alliance. Washington was obviously 
bewildered by the mixed signals coming from Paris and was therefore less inclined to 
seriously consider de Gaulle’s advice concerning Vietnam.
Charles de Gaulle’s character and upbringing shaped his policy. He was bom in 
November 1890 into a patriotic family and grew up cherishing the images o f France’s 
past. In 1909 he joined the French, military and graduated from St. Cyr a lieutenant in 
1912. Wounded twice during the First World War he was rewarded with the legion of 
honor medal. After the war, he moved up ranks only slowly. His superiors certainly 
acknowledged his intelligence but his egotistical behavior did impede smooth, promotion 
and he only made colonel in 1937. De Gaulle observed the rise o f Hitler with growing 
concern and recommended an augmented defense strategy against the increasingly 
aggressive Germany but his advice was discarded by his superiors. His fears became 
reality when Hitler attacked France in the summer of 1940. In London at the time o f the 
French surrender, de Gaulle found himself cast in the role o f leader o f the French 
resistance.132
Years spent as the leader o f the Free French left a profound mark on de Gaulle 
and laid the foundation o f his policy toward Great Britain and the United States during 
the I960’s. Although supported by Britain and the United States, de Gaulle was excluded 
from most major decisions during the war and feared that French interests were not
02 Don Cook, Charles de Gaulle: A Biography. (New York, 1983), pp. 28-79; Herbert Lathy, “De Gaulle: 
Pose and Policy”, m: Hamilton Fish Armstrong (etL), Fifty Years o f Foreign Affairs. (New York, 1972), 
pp. 356-357; Luthy stressed that de Gaulle family “abhorred” the Third Republic and instead relished m the 
images ofFrance’s former giory, the days o f Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. This upbringing instilled 
m de Gaulle the “sublime idea” ofFrance, that she would again play a major role in world politics.
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sufficiently  acknowledged.133 The general interpreted the “haughty” Anglo-American 
attitude during the war as insults on French honor. De Gaulle was determined more than 
ever to restore France to great power status. His first effort toward this goal was short­
lived. With the establishment o f the Fourth Republic in January 1946, de Gaulle resigned 
from office and left a  burdensome legacy in Indochina to his successors.
During the Second World War de Gaulle was unwilling to grant Indochina 
independence and quickly reaffirmed French sovereignty there in 1945. He regarded 
possession o f colonies as an important element o f French prestige. After French 
humiliation dining the Second World War, it was o f prime importance to de Gaulle to 
restore the French colonial empire. The general postulated that neither the British nor the 
Americans should be permitted to expropriate parts o f the French Empire. l34To continue 
French rule in Southeast Asia, de Gaulle conceded limited autonomy to the people o f 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which became members of the French Union.
In Vietnam the French faced fierce resistance from Ho Chi Minh, who aspired 
toward the complete independence of his country. Negotiations between Ho and the 
French government failed due to French intransigence, leading to the Fust Indochina 
War. Despite increasing American support, the French lost the war and agreed to the
ra Gordon Wright, France m Modem Times. (New York, 1987), Fourth Edition, pp. 396-400; Robert 
Dallek, “■ Roosevelt and de Gaulle”, uu Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, (eds.), De Gaulle and the United 
States: A Centennial Reappraisal. (Oxford, UK, 1994), pp. 49-60; De Gaulle suspected that Britain 
intended to take over the French colonial empire. Churchill had no such attentions but colonial questions 
did trouble Anglo-Franco understanding. Even more humiliating to de Gaulle was the fact that FDR. 
questioned the general’s claim to represent all French. It took three months after the Normandy invasion 
for Washington to recognize de Gaulle as the head to the new government m France.
w Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs ofHone: Renewal and Endeavor, translated by Terence Kflmartm, (New 
York, 1971),p. 12; de Gaulle strongly justified his decision to offer only limited autonomy to Indochina; as 
associated states these countries would better be prepared for eventual independence. He did admit that this 
course would be difficult, but with “determination” these problems could be overcome, see also: Jean 
Lacoutre, De Gaulle: The Ruler. 1945-1970. (New York, 1991), pp. 157-158; Cook, de Gaulle, p. 315.
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neutralization o f the country in the Geneva Accord o f 1954.ns By then, de Gaulle 
regarded the colonial question as being a burden to France. Conflicts within the empire 
drained the strength o f the French military in distant wars while its main purpose, to 
secure France proper, was undermined. Moreover, France could not possibly became a 
major power player in Europe or globally as long as she was distracted and weakened in 
the colonies. In Vietnam, it was evident that France was unable to maintain her influence 
by force and, for de Gaulle, it was more important to focus on Europe first. Only from a 
solid base in Europe could France then expand her role in global politics through 
diplomatic and economic support o f her former colonies and other Third World countries.
In 1958, de Gaulle was back at the helm o f French politics. He replaced the 
bankrupt Fourth Republic with his own creation - the Fifth Republic. A new constitution 
gave wide powers to the president, particularly in foreign policy. Taking advantage o f his 
increased mandate, de Gaulle ended French intervention in Algeria and facilitated 
Algerian independence in 1962. Domestically, de Gaulle restored stability, ending the 
rapid succession o f cabinets that marked the Fourth Republic. The Fifth Republic gave de 
Gaulle the basis to continue the policy he envisioned for France during his first years in 
power: independence and grandeur. The major obstacle to his grand design was what de 
Gaulle defined as “Anglo-Saxon dominance” - the policies o f Great Britain and the
as Lacoutre; De Gaulle, pp. 85-88; Anthony Clayton, The Wars ofFrench Decolonization. (London, 1991), 
pp. 16-21,41-43; De Gaulle rejected the decision o f the Potsdam conference to divide Vietnam temporarily 
and sent his own representative General Jean Leclerc and Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu m August 1945 to 
restore French sovereignty over Indochina. While Leclerc did negotiate with Ho Chi Mmh, d’Argenlieu 
dismissed all claims to Vietnamese independence.
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United States. Regarding the Soviet Union, de Gaulle desired a policy of cooperation and 
reaffirmation o f historical ties between both countries.13*
The growing conflict in Vietnam revealed to de Gaulle potential shortcomings in 
American leadership o f the Western Alliance. The American commitment in Vietnam 
also offered de Gaulle an opportunity to assert his country’s role in world affairs. France 
could assume the part o f champion o f the non-aligned world. By supporting the 
independence o f Third World countries politically and economically, de Gaulle hoped to 
provide an alternative to these new nations, “freeing” them from the Cold War contest 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.137 Greater influence around the globe 
might allow France to become a third force, while not quite a  superpower. Once again the 
base for France’s greater role was Europe. De Gaulle preferred a multi-polar over the bi­
polar world and hoped that France and Europe as well as the People’s Republic o f China 
would create a  new balanced power system going beyond the nuclear stalemate between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.138
From 1961 until his resignation from office in March 1969, Charles de Gaulle 
steadfastly reiterated his conviction that the Vietnam conflict could only be ended
u& Maurice Couve de Murville, Aussenpolitik. 1958-1969. translated into German by Herman Kusterer, 
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battle-cry o f  Com m unism  the United States supervised the policies of Western European countries which 
were, according to Murville reduced to a  subservient status. Obviously, this situation was unacceptable to 
de Gaulle. See also: W.W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the Worfd: The Foreign Policy o f the Fifth French 
Republic. (Syracuse, NY, 1966), pp.25-27; Stanley Hoffman, Decline or Renewal? France Since the 
1930’s. (New York,1974), pp. 283-290; Hoffman provides an excellent analysis o f de Gaulle’s overall 
foreign policy goals in the context o f France's international limitations.
07 De Gaulle, Memoirs o f Hope, p. 38; de Gaulle admitted that nationalism drove the resistance in both 
Indochina and Algeria. Most o f the indigenous leaders had been educated in the West and adopted Western 
principles o f human rights and liberty. Ultimately, imperialism was a  policy of the past, but France could 
still play a  global role by actually fostering the independence o f its former colonies.
Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal, pp.285-286.
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through a  negotiated settlement providing for the withdrawal o f all foreign forces and the 
neutralisation o f the entire country. He argued strongly against further escalation o f the 
conflict by increasing the American presence and directly engaging North Vietnam. 
Initially, de Gaulle attempted to influence American policy-making on Southeast Asia 
through confidential advice. When this approach failed, he went public in criticizing the 
United States. Although de Gaulle addressed concerns shared by Great Britain and West 
Germany, neither country endorsed his view.
French refusal to sanction American policy on Vietnam led to crisis and a  turning 
point for the trans-Atlantic alliance. Britain and West Germany were cautious not to 
alienate the United States. But de Gaulle did challenge the United States on Vietnam and 
skillfully utilized the Vietnam controversy to question American predominance in the 
Western alliance. His withdrawal from NATO command in 1966 exemplified the rift 
between France and the United States.139
De Gaulle’s policy o f independence certainly dismayed Washington. He 
dismissed the Cold War framework o f American policy-makers and questioned American 
leadership in the alliance. As a consequence he failed to change American policy on 
Vietnam but left Washington fighting in Southeast Asia without his country’s support 
The United States eventually learned that de Gaulle’s assessment on Vietnam was 
correct Even more importantly, subsequent American administrations realized that the
m  Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 62; Membership in NATO accordingly might engulf France m an unwanted 
and dangerous war in Southeast Asia. NATO membership also undermined French sovereignty and de 
Gaulle insisted, on developing his own nuclear force to free his country from American control of the 
nuclear trigger.
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United States needed the support o f its European allies as much as the European, needed 
American protection.
The situation in Indochina in 1960 offered France the opportunity to embark on 
the role of honest broker. In Laos, to the dismay of the Eisenhower administration, France 
supported the neutralists led by Prince Souvanna Phouma. A year later France refused to 
participate in any intervention by SEATO forces. I40For Vietnam, de Gaulle soon adopted 
the same policy o f advocating neutralization, coupled with the demand of withdrawal of 
all foreign forces, for Vietnam.
I. De Gaulle’s diplomatic Approach: 1961-1964
The election o f John F. Kennedy gave de Gaulle new hope that he might influence 
American foreign-policy making. Eisenhower had increased the American commitment 
to Indochina, but conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam nevertheless intensified. Perhaps 
Kennedy was more amenable to de Gaulle’s suggestion o f a political settlement for the 
entire region. In March 1961, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, president o f the National 
Assembly, was scheduled to visit the United States. Before leaving, he received 
instructions from de Gaulle, who asked Chaban-Delmas to report what impression 
President Kennedy made. De Gaulle added: “See him and tell him not to get caught up in 
the Vietnam affair. The United States could lose its forces, but also its soul.”141
M0 Marianna P. Sullivan, France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations. ( Westport, C t, 
1978), pp. 62-65.
Mt Lacoutre, De Gaulle: The Ruler, p. 371.
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Kennedy listened and agreed in principle to the political settlement in Laos, but
rejected a similar solution for V ietnam . De Gaulle was concerned about the growing
crisis in South Vietnam and he repeated his advice during Kennedy’s visit to France in
May I96L Kennedy indicated that Western intervention in Southeast Asia might be
necessary to stop further advances o f the Communist forces. De Gaulle refused to directly
interfere in South Vietnam and rejected Kennedy’s plan to establish a  barrier against the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) in Indochina. The general
argued that military intervention was a hopeless endeavor that ultimately would do more
to strengthen the Communist than destroy them. He warned Kennedy:
You will find that intervention in this area will be an endless entanglement. Once a 
Nation has been aroused no foreign power, however strong, can impose its will upon it. 
You will discover this for yourself. For even if you find local leaders who in their own 
interest are prepared to obey you, the people will not agree to it, and indeed not want it. 
The ideology which you invoke will make no difference. Indeed, in the eyes of the 
masses, it will become identified with your power. That is why the more you become 
involved out there against Communists, the more the Communists will appear as 
champions of national independence, and the more support they will receive, if only 
from despair. We French have had experience of it. You Americans want to take our 
place. I predict that you will sink step by step into a bottomless military and political 
quagmire, however much you spent in men and money. What you, we and others ought 
to do for unhappy Asia is not to take over the running of these states ourselves, but to 
provide them with the means to escape the misery and humiliation which, there as 
elsewhere, are the causes of totalitarian regimes.142
Hindsight validates de Gaulle’s prediction. He correctly assessed the appeal of 
nationalism in Southeast Asia, having experienced its power both in  Europe and within 
the former French colonial empire. As de Gaulle noted, ideologies were temporal and
x  De Gaulle, Memoirs o f Hope, p. 256.
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simply another tool to justify a nation’s self-interest and self-determination.143 Based on 
this realistic assessment, the only successful way for the West to influence events in 
Southeast Asia was an indirect approach through economic aid and political support. 
Obviously, de Gaulle did not want to see the Communists succeed in Southeast Asia, but 
military intervention was undoubtedly the wrong way to defeat the Communist 
insurgents. Also, de Gaulle was not willing to relinquish the French role in her former 
colony, and the best way to maintain ties was through economic aid to help improve the 
viability o f South Vietnam.
Kennedy, however, could or would not perceive the turmoil in South Vietnam 
within de Gaulle’s framework. In fact, Kennedy regarded the conflict in Vietnam 
primarily m terms of the ideological battle o f the Cold War. Although the United States 
already provided ample economic and military aid, Kennedy hoped that a concerted 
Western policy might further prevent Communist successes. Western support o f 
American strategy in Vietnam would further justify Kennedy’s policy and score some 
points in Congress. In Asia, it was necessary to realize the dangers o f a North Vietnamese 
thrust into Laos and South Vietnam, an operation which in American eyes was backed by 
Moscow. In addition, Beijing might also become involved in Indochina, further 
encouraging Communist insurgents in South Vietnam. To meet the Communist  
challenge, the West had to adopt a joint strategy for the up-coming conference on Laos 
and, in case the conference faded, a contingency plan for Indochina. Washington believed
141 De Gaulle's conception of the only relative importance o f ideologies is even more apparent m his 
approach to the Soviet Union. He insisted m  using the term Russia and regarded Communism as only 
another chapter m the quest for great power politics that went back to the days of Peter the Great.
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that an “increased understanding from the international community” would actually 
accelerate a settlement in Vietnam.1"
Washington did appreciate the considerable role France still played in South 
Vietnam- National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy suggested the formation o f joint 
U.S.-French committees to find solutions for the complex problems in South Vietnam. 
More importantly, Washington hoped to “eliminate past cross purposes in Southeast 
Asia” and obtain an “urgent high-level effort to concert UK-French-US position on 
Vietnam.”t45De Gaulle was receptive to these suggestions, favoring closer consultations 
as well.146 But de Gaulle expected Washington to recognize the French position on 
Indochina as a prerequisite for any French support o f America’s policy in Vietnam. He 
rejected Western intervention and favored the neutralization o f the region. The French 
president was unwilling to give up his own policy on Indochina simply to placate the 
Americans.
For Kennedy to accept de Gaulle’s position but continue American policy in 
Vietnam was virtually impossible. Kennedy remained confident that an honest debate on 
American goals in South Vietnam could win the general’s endorsement In his encounters 
with Chaban-Delmas and de Gaulle, Kennedy outlined his approach but was ultimately 
unsuccessful in altering French perceptions. De Gaulle was convinced that Kennedy’s 
policy on Vietnam would only lead to further escalation and possibly stalemate. It was
M* Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, De Gaulle, Africa* and Southeast Asia, May 13,1961; John. F. 
Kennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963, France, Box 70.
MS Memorandum for Bundy, May 13,1961; and Memorandum: What we want from  Paris, May30,1961, 
both m: National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963, Box 70, JFKL.
146 Record o f Conversation, February I?, 1961, and Memorandum o f Conversation, May 6,1961, both m: 
JFK, NSF, Western Europe, 1961-1963, Box 70. De Gaulle expressed his desire for consultations within
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not in France’s best interest to either support such policy or become entangled in the 
American struggle.147 The general’s position was difficult for Washington to comprehend 
or to accept since it ran counter to American perceptions. Over Laos, at least, a political 
settlement could be reached, with both the United States and the Soviet Union as 
guarantors o f that country’s neutrality. Yet, the issue o f Vietnam proved more thorny and 
ultimately more divisive in future French-American relations. De Gaulle insisted on 
complete neutrality for both Vietnams, allowing for closer ties between North and South, 
and eventually leading to the peaceful unification of the country.
In 1962 President Kennedy was not ready to acquiesce to de Gaulle’s policy o f 
neutralizing Vietnam. The State Department duly noted de Gaulle’s “distaste” for Diem 
and worried over French support o f Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk, who pursued a neutral 
course between East and West. In November 1962, presidential advisor Walt Rostow met 
with Jean-CIaude Winkler, special envoy to de Gaulle, to devise a strategy to convince 
the French president of the validity o f the American approach in South Vietnam. A recent 
attack by the PRC on India served as an pertinent example o f overall Communist 
aggression. According to Rostow, the incident in the Himalayas should make it more than 
obvious to de Gaulle that “the containment o f China can be conducted along the lines 
similar to the containment o f Russia in Europe.”148 Washington was certain its policy o f
weeks o f Kennedy's inauguration. French. Ambassador Herve Alphand restated de Gaulle’s intentions in a 
meeting with Paul NItze m May 1961.
,4T De Gaulle, Memoirs o f Hoper pp. 204-205.
I4* Memorandum of Conversation, Walt Rostow and Jean-CIaude Winkler, Nov. 29,1962, NSF: France, 
Box, 72, JFKL.
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stem m ing the tide against  Communism, in Vietnam would lead to positive results and 
hoped to gain de Gaulle’s support.149
Again the general refused to join ranks. Washington, in turn, was unwilling to 
accept French obstinacy to a concerted Western policy in Southeast Asia. While both 
sides agreed that South Vietnam should not fall into the hands o f the Communists, their 
respective approaches to prevent the loss o f South Vietnam differed profoundly. A 
possible understanding was further complicated by a strong conviction - both in Paris and 
Washington - that their policies exclusively promised success. Kennedy reiterated his 
view that only Western support could save Vietnam in a meeting with French foreign 
secretary Maurice Couve de Murville in May 1963. The president, deeply concerned 
about the nuclear ambitions o f China, reiterated his obligation to preserve the 
independence of South Vietnam to guarantee the freedom of the entire region. Murville 
believed that China did not intend to take over Southeast Asia and only desired to 
establish a  “buffer region” to protect itself from the United States. I f  the French view 
proved correct, the best recourse was to “achieve a  political solution to the problems in 
the area.”150
In private with Kennedy, and then publicly in the Summer o f 1963, de Gaulle 
expressed his misgivings about the American involvement in Vietnam. In a press 
conference on August 29, 1963 the French leader maintained that only the Vietnamese 
people could determine their future and choose the path to independence as well as
149 Memorandum of Conversation, Rostow—Winkler, Nov. 29,1962, NSF: France. Boz 73, JFKL.
150 Memorandum of Conversation, Kenned/ and Couve de Murville^ May25,1963, NSF: France, Box 73, 
JFKL.
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fntemal peace and harmony. France was willing to do everything within its power to
facilitate the Vietnamese struggle for domestic stability and peace:
The French Government is  following with attention and emotion the grave events 
occurring in Vietnam. The task accomplished in the past by France in Cochin China, 
Annam and Tonkin, the ties she has maintained w ith the country as a  whole, and the 
interest she takes in the development explains w hy she understands so well and shares so 
sincerely in the trials o f  the Vietnamese people. In  addition, France’s  knowledge o f the 
m erits o f  this people m akes her appreciate the ro le they would be capable o f playing in 
the current situation in A sia for then own progress and to further international 
understanding, once they go ahead with th e n  activities independently o f  the outside, in 
internal peace and unity and harmony with their neighbor. Today more than ever, this is 
w hat France wishes for Vietnam as a  whole.151
For de Gaulle the best way to achieve peace m Vietnam was the neutralization of 
the country in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreement and the solution for Laos 
reached in 1962. The French leader instructed his ambassador in Saigon, Roger 
Laloulette, to convey de Gaulle’s vision of a peaceful settlement to Diem and his brother 
Nhu who, facing mounting pressure from the United States, were receptive to the French 
proposal o f negotiations with the Viet Cong and even Hanoi.132
Washington was disturbed by de Gaulle’s comments and was anxious to leam 
what the general’s long term policy for Vietnam entailed. The Americans were also 
concerned about possible contacts between Nhu and North Vietnamese leaders as well as 
French knowledge of or acquiescence to such talks.153 While Kennedy was well aware o f 
de Gaulle’s position ever since their 1961 summit, he still did not “understand just how
I5t Statement an Vietnam by President Charles de Gaulle on August 29,1963', m: Major Addresses. 
Statements and Press Conferences o f General Charles de Gaulle. Mav 19.1958 -  January 31.1964. French. 
Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, p. 241.
151 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 94-95; Fredrik Logevall, “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and the American
Involvement nt Vietnam, 1963-1964,”  in: Pacific Historical Review. VoL LXI, Feb. 1992, No. I , pp. 79- 
80.
153 Outgoing Telegram: Department o f State, George Ball, September23,1963, NSF, France: Box 73, 
JFKL.
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General de Gaulle envisages the development o f a  unified and neutral Vietnam without 
the successful development o f a  strong non-Communist society” in South Vietnam.ts*The 
American president m aintained that South Vietnam still needed “external support and 
cooperation” to establish a viable non-Communist society. Further he could not conceive 
of how, “ in the face of Com m unist subversion,” a withdrawal by the West would lead to 
any acceptable solution. Washington was certain that de Gaulle’s  plan of neutralization 
would have no “other result than the abandonment o f Vietnam to the Communists.”155 If 
de Gaulle perceived other venues of solving the crisis in South Vietnam, Washington was 
willing to listen. Bundy recommended “private conversations” between American 
officials and the French president to prevent further misunderstandings and 
counterproductive public statements by de Gaulle on Vietnam.
Actually, Washington was less willing to listen than to convey its point o f view or 
at least stop de Gaulle from meddling in the affairs of Vietnam. Not surprisingly, de 
Gaulle continued to pursue a  policy he regarded as proper. He reaffirmed the right o f self- 
determination of Thud World countries in a late September 1963 speech. To Washington, 
de Gaulle’s policy remained unpredictable in terms of how he would next proceed on 
Vietnam.156
By October 1963, Kennedy received reports that de Gaulle was “exploring 
possible deals with Communist China and North Vietnam” and also considered 
diplomatic recognition o f the PRC. A CIA report conceded that Paris might be discussing
154 Telegram from McGeorge Bundy to Embassy in Paris, September25,1963, NSF, France: Box 73,
JFKL.
“ Ibid.
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terms o f a  negotiated settlement in Beijing and Hanoi. The CIA regarded the chances o f 
success for such a diplomatic solution as slim and doubted that de Gaulle had a “grand 
design” for the Far East.157 Even, if  de Gaulle lacked a  “grand design” his opposition to 
the American commitment might diminish the chances o f success in South Vietnam. The 
French leader was little impressed by American concerns and adamantly contended that 
the American approach would only lead to a military quagmire and defeat.158
By the fall o f 1963, Washington and Paris were deeply entrenched in their 
respective positions on Vietnam. The United States believed it had to defend the Free 
world from Com m unist  encroachment in South Vietnam. De Gaulle regarded the conflict 
in Vietnam both as a struggle for self-determination as well as domestic opposition 
against the corrupt Saigon regime. Foreign intervention would only make things worse. 
Therefore, it was advisable to reach a political solution as quickly as possible. The 
general also worried about the possible increase of East-West tensions as a consequence 
o f a deepening American engagement in Vietnam. He obviously could not envision a 
victory should the United States become bogged down in the jungles o f Southeast Asia. 
In addition, de Gaulle’s opposition to Washington’s Vietnam strategy gave him the 
opportunity to pursue an independent foreign policy and enhance France’s image in the 
Third World. A  greater role in international affairs would also improve France’s position 
in Europe. Both to the Western Europeans as well as to Moscow and its allies France 
again demonstrated leadership and national independence.
156 Memorandum for the President; Murville’s Meeting with the Secretary o f Statev Oct. 7,1963, NSF, 
France: Box 73, JFKL.
157 Telegram from Ambassador Charles Bohlen, Oct. 16,1963; Central Intelligence Agency, Office o f
National Estimates, Sherman Kent, both nu NSF, France: Box 73, JFKL.
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The widening gap: De Gaulle and Johnson
From 1961 to 1963, Paris and Washington developed different approaches to the 
increasing problems in South Vietnam based on then* respective foreign policy 
paradigms. Each side tried to convince the other of the validity o f its view toward ending 
the conflict in Southeast Asia. Although Kennedy deployed a growing number of 
personnel and military equipment to South Vietnam, he remained reluctant to folly 
commit the United States in the struggle against the Communist insurgents. Kennedy’s 
refusal to send American ground troops left the door still open for de Gaulle’s concept of 
a negotiated settlement. Diem’s overthrow in early November 1963 ended the possibility 
o f an internal Vietnamese settlement for the time being. Three weeks later Kennedy was 
assassinated and Lyndon Johnson became president. During 1964 the situation in 
Vietnam further deteriorated and the Johnson administration gradually expanded the 
American commitment to Vietnam, resulting in the deployment of ground forces in 
March 1965.
De Gaulle refused to reconsider his initial assessment on Vietnam. Consequently, 
both Washington and Paris grew more intransigent in their approaches to solve the 
problems o f the region. De Gaulle’s opposition to the American course in Vietnam 
became more outspoken and damaging to Washington. The Johnson administration tried 
to contain the potential fall-out o f French policy  both in Southeast Asia and within the 
Western alliance by continuing to persuade de Gaulle o f the effectiveness o f the
l5x MurviUe. Aussenpolitik.r pp. 94-98.
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American strategy in Vietnam. De Gaulle remained unconvinced and persistently insisted 
on apolitical settlement and the neutralization o f that country.
To the French leadership Lyndon Johnson appeared reserved and inscrutable - in 
essence quite the contrary to John F. Kennedy, who was always willing to engage in open 
discussion. French foreign secretary Murville described Johnson as an “cunning 
politician” from the South, who had made his name in Congress, but was virtually 
unknown outside o f the United States. Accordingly, Johnson assumed office unprepared 
but with the determination to lead his country and control its policy.159
Johnson had misgivings about de Gaulle as well. The French leader had privately 
complained that the United States had entered both World Wars rather late and wondered 
whether the Americans would be reluctant to support freedom in Europe in the future. 
Johnson, understandably, was apprehensive to meet the French president following 
Kennedy’s funeral in November 1961. While both leaders generally agreed on overall 
policies their encounter was dampened by a  minor diplomatic spat over the planned de 
Gaulle visit to the United States in May o f 1964.160 De Gaulle’s proclaimed confidence in 
American support in case of Soviet aggression sounded hollow to Johnson. French desire 
o f a closer organization o f Europe, first economically and then politically, worried
Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 99; Rusk described LBJ as “intelligent, authoritarian, and extremely 
sensitive” to his French colleague. Rusk left no doubt that Johnson was determined to take the reins o f 
power.
160 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History. 1929-1969. (New York, 1973), pp. 504-505; Cook, de Gaulle, 
pp. 366-367; De Gaulle regarded the previous invitation invalidated by Kennedy's death and expected 
Johnson to go through protocol procedure again. Johnson believed the visit was a done deal and told so to 
reporters. De Gaulle, as the statesman already in power, felt slighted by Johnson's comments. Though the 
entire episode appears silly and was based on a  misunderstanding, it revealed again de Gaulle's insistence 
on grandeur even m protocol procedure, which was probably quite difficult to follow by Lyndon Johnson, 
who liked to take his state guest to his ranch and take them on a fast car trip through the Texas country 
side. Johnson and de Gaulle would meet m person only once more -a t the funeral of Konrad Adenauer m 
April 1967.
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Washington even more. To Johnson, it was unclear what the French president intended to
do in Europe.161 Johnson later expressed his ambiguous feelings about de Gaulle which
were overshadowed by the Vietnam controversy:
In the years that followed, when de Gaulle's criticism of our role in Vietnam became 
intense, I had many occasions to remember that conversation. The French leader doubted 
- in private, at least -  the will of the United States to live up to its commitments. He 
did not believe we would honor our NATO obligations, yet he criticized us for honoring 
a commitment elsewhere in the world. If  we had taken his advice to abandon Vietnam,
I suspect he might have cited that as “proof” of what he had been saying all along: that 
the United States could not be counted on in times of trouble.162
The missed opportunity o f a good personal rapport between both leaders was not 
only caused by the character and style of the new American president, but according to 
the French assessment, by Johnson's insufficient interest in the affairs of Europe. With 
the mounting difficulties in Vietnam, Johnson's foreign policy focus shifted almost 
exclusively to Southeast Asia. Murville was not completely surprised by Johnson's lack 
of concern about Western Europe. Kennedy had repeatedly complained about the narrow, 
self-centered view o f the Europeans. In addition, Johnson faced a multitude o f domestic 
problems, which became even more urgent from 1965 onward, when civil rights, racial 
tensions, and domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam increasingly challenged and 
undermined Johnson's “Great Society.”
Johnson displayed an interesting mixture o f distrust and respect for de Gaulle. He 
described their peculiar relationship in very American terms, that o f baseball. He saw 
himself “as the power hitter” whose rival, de Gaulle, was trying to outplay him, yet
I6t Lloyd Gardner, “Johnson and de Gaulle^ ’'  m: Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl (eds.) De Gaulle and the 
United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. (Oxford, UK, 1994), p. 258.
Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the Presidency. 1963-1969. (New York, 
1971), p. 23.
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Johnson “would just lean back and let the ball go in the catcher’s mitt.”1® Despite 
increasing tensions with France because of de Gaulle’s  contradictory policies and 
American escalation in Vietnam, Johnson rejected a more forceful approach in 
counteracting French policy. He admonished his administration to abstain from any 
public criticism o f de Gaulle in the hope that Johnson could outlast the old general and 
prevent further damage in the Western alliance.16*
The Vietnam conflict did not allow Johnson to neutralize the general. Since 
Johnson was unwilling to change course over Vietnam de Gaulle had to find other means 
to pursue French interests in Southeast Asia and increase French status in the world. 
Consequently, de Gaulle explored new venues to facilitate a political setdement for 
Vietnam. The obvious solution was a rapprochement with the People’s Republic o f China 
(PRC). France did not recognize the PRC in 1949 because o f its own Indochina war. In 
1963 global conditions had changed while war was still ravaging Vietnam. China was a 
major force in Asia and de Gaulle postulated that no political solution could be found for 
Vietnam without including Beijing. China proved receptive to French overtures during 
the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-62. In late October 1963 de Gaulle sent China 
expert Edgar Faure to Beijing to investigate the prospect o f diplomatic relations. 
Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou En-Iai were openly pleased with the idea and
,6J Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 99-100; LogevaQ, De Gaulte, the U.S. and Vietnam, p. 79; George Ball, The 
Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. (New York, 1982), p. 336. The respective views ofMurville and 
Johnson regarding the de Gaulle/Johnson relation are in itself interesting evidence in the different 
perspectives o f each leader; de Gaulle would probably been quite pleased to make such a “good” 
impression on his American counterpart. Ball noted the enormous patience LBJ had with de Gaulle - quite 
against LBJ’s character -  but it was obvious that LBJ respected the French leader because o f“his 
presumption, cunning and imperial style.”
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negotiations finally led to full diplomatic recognition of the PRC by France in January 
1964.165
Paris was folly aware that the French decision would perturb Washington, but de 
Gaulle remained firm. It was a mistake for the United States to continue a policy o f non­
recognition o f the PRC. While Mao’s regime was totalitarian and despicable, China’s 
increasing role in Asia could simply not be discounted. French recognition o f Beijing 
served two purposes; one affected Europe, the other might bring new initiatives to the 
conflict in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split offered new opportunities for Western 
Europe to play the China card against Moscow. In Southeast Asia, de Gaulle sought a 
modus vivendi which would neutralize Vietnam. This solution presented the only 
possible alternative to further military escalation but required Chinese consent. The basis 
of any productive Western relations with Beijing was the recognition o f this vast country. 
Admittedly, de Gaulle had no guarantee that the Chinese might actually agree to the 
neutralization o f Vietnam but, in his opinion, it was at least worth the effort. Given the 
profound domestic challenges facing Beijing, Chinese leaders might be willing to accept 
the neutralization of Vietnam.166
The Khanh government in South Vietnam fomed over de Gaulle’s decision and 
resolutely criticized the recognition o f Beijing. From Saigon’s perspective the French
ls* H.W. Brands, “Johnson and de Gaulle: American Diplomacy Sotto Voce," in: Historian. XLIV, August 
1987, pp. 478-479; Maurice Ferro, De Gaulte et I'Amdrioue. Uhe Amitfd tumulteuse. (Plon, Paris, 1973), 
p. 359.
165 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 102-103; Philippe Devillers, “French, policy and the second Vietnam war,” 
in: The World Today. June 1967, p .256; Le Monde, Jan. 18,1964, p. I. Eventually, the United States saw 
the validity in de Gaulle's approach, during the presidency of Richard Nixon and Ms understanding with 
China facilitated the Paris Peace Accords o f 1973.
166 Aktea zur Aussenpolitk der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1964, VoL I, Conversation Erhard - 
de Gaulle, Paris, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 211-212; Murville^ Aussenpolitik, pp. I02-103.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
move further condoned Communist aggression. Saigon took issue with, de Gaulle’s 
interference in Vietnam’s business. Government officials called de Gaulle’s policy 
illusionary and considered it just another French effort to restore her influence in 
Southeast Asia, this time with the help o f Beijing. France was undermining the struggle 
o f the South Vietnamese against Communism and Saigon contemplated breaking 
diplomatic relations with Paris.167
Washington also deplored the French decision calling it an “unfortunate step, 
particularly at a time when Chinese Communists are actively promoting aggression and 
subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” A  Senate resolution asked the French not to 
recognize Beijing or face grave consequences in Franco-American relations. Secretary o f 
Defense McNamara told journalists that countries which recognized the PRC were aiding 
Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. He was also afraid that Paris’ decision would be 
followed by the French speaking nations in Africa. Recognition o f the PRC might upset 
the balance o f nations against Communist China in the United Nations complicating the 
American role in that assembly. But de Gaulle was encouraged by the mostly positive 
response to his decision in the rest o f the world, particularly in Asia.148
France had again a voice in world affairs. The general would definitely not 
reverse his views on Vietnam in order to placate the United States and undermine his 
strategy o f grandeur. Publicly de Gaulle defended his decision to recognize China in the 
overriding context o f the conflict in Vietnam and the China’s role in Asia as a  whole:
IST Le Monde, January 22, 1964, p. 3.
Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 103-104; Le Monde, January 25,1964, p. 5, January 28,1964, p. I, January 
29, 1964, pp. 1-2; Logevall, De Gaulle, the U S, and Vietnam, p. 85; Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 
265-266; As expected Taiwan protested and recalled its ambassador m Parts.
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There is no political reality in Asia . . .  which does not interest China. Neither war 
nor peace is imaginable on that continent without China’s becoming implicated. Thus it 
is absolutely inconceivable that without her participation there can be any accord on 
the eventual neutrality o f Southeast Asia.169
France had to recognize this vast country of 700 million people to further French 
involvement in matters o f international importance: “il est clair que la France doit 
pouvoir entendre directement la Chine et aussi s’en faire ecouter.”  Only with Chinese 
participation was the neutralization o f Southeast Asia possible through ending foreign 
interference in the region.170
The policy o f neutrality for Vietnam was discarded by Washington since it would 
allegedly only lead to a Communist victory. All of Johnson’s principal advisors rejected 
de Gaulle’s concept as detrimental to American objectives in Vietnam. None of them 
gave more than a cursory glance at the French proposal. Only a few voices of dissent 
within the U.S. government favored the French proposal but the Johnson administration 
was displeased by any suggestion o f neutralization. Washington aimed at convincing 
Americans and the world that the United States would stand by its com m itment to South 
Vietnam.171 This would prove more difficult than anticipated.
The American, effort to contain de Gaulle
The Johnson administration grew apprehensive over the ram ifications de Gaulle’s 
ideas had in Europe and also in South Vietnam. Although the Khanh government in
169 Logevall, De Gaulle, the US. and Vietnam, p. 85.
m  Le Monde, February2-3,1964, p. 3.
m Robert McNamara, fa Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons ofVietnam. (New York, 1995), p. 55; 
Logevall, De Gatdle, the U S, and Vietnam, pp. 82-83; Gardner, Johnson and die Gaulle, p .267; on dissent 
within the American government see below Chapter IV.
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Saigon strongly rejected the idea o f negotiations, not all South Vietnamese were opposed 
to French suggestions.172 General Khanh claimed that French agents were plotting to 
assassinate him and were also cooperating with the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, in fact, 
did react positively to de Gaulle’s ideas and issued an official communication that 
approved “President de Gaulle’s proposal to establish a regime o f neutrality m South 
Viet-Nam.”173 Washington needed to take action to prevent further damage by de Gaulle 
and once again adopted the strategy o f friendly coercion.
During the spring and summer o f 1964 Johnson explored ways o f influencing de 
Gaulle’s position in Washington’s favor. Ambassador to Paris Charles Bohlen and John 
Cabot Lodge in Saigon as well as CIA advisors set out to develop an approach to contain 
de Gaulle. Bohlen characterized the French president as “highly egocentric and with 
touches o f megalomania” but argued against any direct criticism o f the French leader by 
the Johnson administration.174 Bohlen recommended that Washington should present a 
clear political objective and course o f action in Vietnam to de Gaulle and request his 
cooperation in that policy. t7SJohnson concurred with the ambassador. Hence, it became 
Bohlen’s task to work directly with de Gaulle and win him over to the American point of 
view.
Johnson asked Lodge to reassure the South Vietnamese government that 
Washington was determined to “stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means
172 Logevall, De Gaulte,, the U S., and Vietnam, p. 87.
03 FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from the Embassy m Vietnam to the Department o f State, Saigon, March 23, 
1964, p. 187.
Brands, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 479-480.
17S FRUS, Vietnam, 1964-1968, VoL I, Memorandum prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen), 
Washington, March 12,1964, pp. 140-141; the CIA also warned o f the detrimental consequences de
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we can.” 17* Further, Johnson hoped that Lodge could give advice on how to handle the 
French president Lodge immediately went to work by devising a  strategy that might 
change de Gaulle’s m ind. De Gaulle had to understand that American goals in Vietnam 
were profoundly different from French objectives during the First Indochina war. The 
United States was not seeking an exclusively military solution, which by itself had no 
chance o f success, but was sincerely endeavoring to improve the lives o f the Vietnamese 
people. Moreover, American and French interests in Vietnam were not so different. The 
American effort to strengthen South Vietnam was “directly to the advantage” of French 
doctors, teachers, and businessmen in that country. French nationals could play a 
significant role for the overall progress in South Vietnam by aiding the American 
commitment.
Given the still considerable French influence in South Vietnam Washington had
to convey to de Gaulle that neutralization at the present was counterproductive to both
countries’ objectives in Vietnam:
France has an influence in Viet-Nam way beyond what it contributes in the way of men, 
weapons, and money. This is because French is still the Western language which is 
possessed by the largest number of Vietnamese —  at the present, the so-called people 
who count in Viet-Nam read French newspapers; in particular, they read background 
news stories which the Agence France Presse gets from the Quai d’Orsay. Some are 
impressed by it and others are infuriated by it, and altogether no good purpose is served. 
If  what is desired is the eventual neutralization of Indo-China or o f Viet-Nam, the way 
not to do rt is to create the furor which these statements out of Paris create. General de 
Gaulle is thus a very influential figure in Viet-Nam and, unwittingly, in a way which is 
defeating his own stated purpose.177
Gaulle's policy had fit South Vietnam, and on Western unity in general. See: Brands, Johnson and de 
Gaulle, p. 482.
175 FRUS, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the
President, Washington, March 15,1964, p. 152; Message from the President to the Ambassador in
Vietnam (Lodge), Washington. March 20,1964, p. 185.
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All de Gaulle needed to do was to modify his time-schedule for neutralization and 
postpone it for some future time. Lodge suggested de Gaulle take a look back into 
France’s own history during 1940 and 1944. Had Washington adopted neutralization for 
France then, France might have suffered Nazi occupation far longer. As in the I940’s, 
Americans continued to oppose neutralization because such policy only facilitated hostile 
attacks.178
Johnson urged Bohlen to seek an appointment with de Gaulle as soon as possible 
and inform the French president that the United States, after thorough investigation, 
rejected the idea o f disengaging from Vietnam or initiating negotiations at the present 
time. Based on Lodge’s recommendation, Johnson told Bohlen o f what he expected de 
Gaulle to do:
W hat we actually want from de Gaulle is a  public statement, prior to the SEATO 
m eeting [April 13-15, 1964], that the idea o f  “neutralization” does not apply to the 
attitudes or policies o f  the government in Vietnam or its friends in the face o f  the current 
communist aggression. W e want him to state that he does not favor “neutralization” o f  
this sort a t the present time. W e are not asking him to drop his idea for all eternity. What 
we want is a  statement that he does not think it applies now.179
Bohlen could use whatever argument he felt was most convincing but Johnson stressed in 
no uncertain terms that he expected de Gaulle to comply with his wishes and, as an ally 
and friend, “adopt an attitude o f cooperation rather than obstruction” in this area o f vital 
interest to the United States.180
m  FRUS, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam, March. 23.1964, p. 188.
08 Ibid.. 1964, pp. 188-189.
179 FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the President to the Ambassador m France (Bohlen), Washington, 
March 24,1964, p. 191.
*”  Ibid, pp. 19I-L92. LBJ wanted to hear from de Gaulle what French diplomats said in private: an 
American withdrawal from Vietnam would have disastrous results. The message to Bohlen included a
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The Khanh government reacted more quickly and demanded a  public statement 
from de Gaulle in which he would modify his view on neutralization. If  France complied, 
South Vietnam would remove current economic restrictions on French imports and 
finally appoint a new ambassador to Paris. Washington was caught unprepared by the 
Vietnamese move; Secretary Rusk deplored that “Khanh went roaring in” and decided to 
wait a few days to allow things to calm down in order to prevent a strong response by de 
Gaulle to the combined South Vietnamese-American pressure.181
On April 2,1964 Bohlen finally met with de Gaulle. During forty-five minutes of 
discussion Bohlen failed to convince the general o f the validity of the American Vietnam 
strategy. De Gaulle flatly refused to reject neutralization for Vietnam. He disagreed with 
the American prognosis that the Khanh government was winning the war against the 
Communist insurgents. The French leader pointed to the similarities o f both the French 
and American Indochina conflicts. He asserted that the South Vietnamese had “no taste 
for this war” and therefore were unable to meet the challenge of the Communist 
insurgents.182 Bohlen did not concur with de Gaulle’s assessment. The French straggle 
differed profoundly from the American efforts. France had fought a colonial war, while 
the United States assisted South Vietnam against foreign aggression. The ambassador 
implied that de Gaulle surely did not favor a Communist victory. Indeed, the general did 
not want to see a Communist take-over in Vietnam, but questioned American strategy. He
personal note o f Johnson to de GauIFe which reiterated the main points in a very straightforward languag e  
and was modified to prevent an adverse reaction from the general.
ISI FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the Ambassador m France (Bohlen) to the President, Paris, March 25, 
1964, pp. 194-195.
182 FRUS, Vietnam, Message from the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the President; Paris, April 2,
1964, pp. 216-217. De Gaulle did not even consider the Khan regime a  real governm ent. Since the fall of 
Diem, Saigon had been under the rule o f military usurpers.
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doubted whether the United States could even obtain military stabilization in the country 
and, unless Washington changed course, would eventually suffer the same debacle as 
France had a decade earlier.
According to de Gaulle’s judgement the best solution was the neutralization o f 
Vietnam through another Geneva conference including Beijing. If  Washington was 
unwilling to consider negotiations, then it had to be willing to “really carry the war to the 
North and if  necessary against China.”183 The latter alternative was disconcerting but 
presented a more clearly defined policy. De Gaulle regretted that France and the United 
States had not done more to coordinate their policies in Southeast Asia. Bohlen 
responded that the United States had in fact strongly supported France in Indochina from 
1949 onward. Regardless, de Gaulle declined to support the American policy in Vietnam 
because neutrality was the “only way out to the US other than engage in major hostilities 
against North Vietnam and China.”1*4
The French leader rejected Bohlen’s view that neutralization would lead to further 
Communist advances. Although de Gaulle could not guarantee Communist, particularly 
Chinese, cooperation in a peace conference, he repeated that the sooner the United States 
“went for neutralization the better off they would be.” Bohlen, quite displeased, ended the 
conversation by pointing out that Washington would be considerably disappointed by de 
Gaulle’s  intransigence. The general unfortunately missed a “good opportunity” to work
“ * FRUS, Bohlen to the President, April 2,1964, pp. 217-218.
IW Ibid. p. 218.
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closely with the United States on the situation in Vietnam.1 “ But de Gaulle saw no reason 
to reverse his views.
Bohlen left the meeting dismayed over his failure to impress de Gaulle. Although 
Bohlen later questioned the war in Vietnam, in 1964 he concluded that de Gaulle was 
misinformed and did not comprehend the seriousness o f the Communist threat in 
Vietnam, a feeling that was shared by Lodge.186 The answer was simple, de Gaulle was 
not misinformed. Unlike Washington, he did not perceive the conflict in Vietnam in 
terms o f Cold War ideology. To him, conditions in Vietnam had not changed since the 
Fust Indochina War. Now, as ten years ago, the Vietnamese were fighting for 
independence and for a government that truly represented the people’s interests. By 
supporting a corrupt regime, the United States only provoked Vietnamese resistance.
Washington and Paris perceived the conflict in Vietnam each in terms o f its own 
national self-interest. Their differing self-interests and resulting political agenda were too 
diametrically opposed to allow for compromise. Washington feared that a withdrawal 
from Vietnam endangered not only its strategic interests in the Pacific but undermined 
American credibility as leader o f the Western world. De Gaulle dreaded that further 
escalation might thaw France and Europe into an unwanted war - a war that once the PRC 
became involved, could become devastating for the entire world. Clearly, Vietnam was 
not valuable enough to bring the world to the threshold o f annihilation. French opposition
185 FRUS, Bohlen to the President, April 2,1964, pp. 218-221; Bohlen could not discern whether de Gaulle 
was operating on genuine conviction based on the current situation orpast French experience in Indochina, 
yet whatever the reasons the general remained firm that neutralization was the only alternative to further 
escalation. De Gaulle displayed considerable contempt not only for the Khanh government but the 
Vietnamese people in general. Khanh’s recent behavior might partly account for de Gaulle’s view. But 
again it was also obvious that  Vietnam served as a means to de Gaulle’s end -  a  greater role for France,
independent from the Anglo-Saxons.
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to the American policy, moreover, allowed France to distinguish her own views from
those o f Washington and present herself as an alternative leader to the Third World and in
Europe. Common ground was lost in this competition between the current superpower
and the “grande nation.”
The SEATO Conference in Manila o f April 1964 further exacerbated the French-
American rift over Vietnam. Rusk met with Murville to discuss the situation in South
Vietnam quickly learning that the French position was as resolute as ever. To the French
foreign minister the problems in South Vietnam were essentially political. He suggested
returning to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreement which prohibited foreign
interference in Vietnam. If these provisions were obeyed, Vietnam could obtain
independence, nonaligment, and reunification. Non-intervention in fact affected both
North and South Vietnam because the North also was not independent but ruled by
outside forces.IS7Murville believed that Saigon could not defeat the Communists
insurgents unless the United States escalated its commitment He told Rusk:
P Jf you tell me military victory, I w ill say that is fine. But if  the war is not 
extended to the North and if  U.S. forces do not participate, there is not likely to be a 
military victory in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese people are out o f the game. All you 
have is a  professional army supported from outside.18*
But even escalation might not succeed. Once again Murville alluded to his 
country’s experience. In 1962, France controlled most o f Algeria but still lost the battle. 
He reminded Rusk that victory was impossible “without the people.” IX9MurvilIe also
l“  Logevall, De Gaulle, the US., and Vietnam., pp. 88-89.
117 FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum of Conversation, U S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12, 1964, p. 
234; Ferro, De Gaulle et VAmerique, p. 362.
“* FRUS, Vietnam, U S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12,1964, p. 235.
“’ Ibid.
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maintained  that the situation in Vietnam was further complicated by Beijing. Washington 
needed to consider Chinese interests and influence in the region. For centuries China had 
coveted Southeast Asia but in 1964 any imperialist aim was impeded by the immense 
domestic difficulties within China. Thus, Beijing might be interested in any negotiated 
solution for Vietnam provided it did not threaten the PRC. Hanoi would have to follow 
suit and, at least for the time being, agree to “leave South Vietnam alone.”
Rusk was curious to leam what argument could induce China to accept 
neutralization at the present since it had been reluctant to do so in the past. The French 
answer was very simple; Beijing implicitly regarded the American presence in Vietnam 
as a potential threat to China proper. Murville stressed that the Chinese were “terrified” 
by U.S. personnel in Vietnam.190 Given the last two hundred years of Western 
imperialism in and around China even a few hundred Americans stationed in Vietnam 
might be a potential threat to Beijing. While Murville perceived China from a historical 
perspective, Rusk was unable to move beyond the more narrow American ideology o f 
containment.
The meeting between Murville and Rusk was as unproductive as that o f Bohlen 
and de Gaulle. While each side remained friendly and polite they were far from reaching 
common ground. The French foreign minister acknowledged the divergence in opinion 
but agreed with his American counterparts to keep the matter confidential. During the 
SEATO conference, Murville was obliged to present the French view unequivocally 
which made news headlines. He refused to embrace a joint communique endorsing the 
American policy in Vietnam. Such act o f defiance had never occurred before in the
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history o f the alliance. Murville explained to his colleagues that France could not support 
the American course because this policy would lead only to defeat South Vietnam might 
MI or, even worse, the conflict could escalate, which was far more damaging for all 
involved. The SEATO members firmly opposed the French position. They refused to 
even consider neutralization because all were convinced that the United States would 
prevail hi South Vietnam.191
Washington and Paris could only agree to disagree. Neither side was willing to 
give way.192 To Paris, the American position hi Vietnam was obviously misguided. So 
was the French view to the Americans. Murville recounted numerous discussions with 
Rusk, who exemplified the thinking of the Johnson administration. Accordingly, Rusk 
was convinced that the United States fought a good fight for a  just cause, namely the 
battle against  World Communism. He did not distinguish between the Soviet and Chinese 
Com m unism , ignoring the conflict between these two countries. Regarding Vietnam, 
Murville maintained that Rusk also proved incapable to understand the determination o f 
many South Vietnamese to resist American intervention. In addition, Paris alleged that 
American intervention only intensified the already difficult situation in South Vietnam.193
Rusk grew increasingly irritated about the French attitude and regarded de Gaulle 
as living a  dream of France’s past glory. The French had failed in Vietnam because they
190 Ferro, De Gaulte et ['Amerique, p. 235. 
l9t Murville, Aussenpolitik p. 104.
191 FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from tbe Delegation at the SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting to the
Department o f States, Manila, April 15,1964, p. 239.
191 Murville, Aussenpolitik pp. 105-107; Rusk, at least to Murville, never doubted that American strategy 
in South Vietnam would lead to success. Also, Rusk persistently adhered to the domino theory, further 
justifying the American role m Vietnam. Murville stated that Beijing was interested in peace talks but 
could not tolerate an expanding American presence on the Asian mainland. See also: Ferro, De Gaulle e t 
VAmerique, pp. 365-368.
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were a declining power that had tried in vain to uphold a colonial empire. He admitted 
that the American commitment was not without peril but Washington was willing to 
accept the risks in order to succeed against Communism.194 To the French, any military 
intervention in Southeast Asia would prove futile. But Washington was increasingly 
determined to use military means to end the conflict in Vietnam. As the conflict in 
Vietnam approached a new phase so did Franco-American relations. Since Washington 
refused to listen to de Gaulle, the general escalated his attacks o f America’s Vietnam 
policy.
II: De Gaulle recalcitrant. Summer 1964 to 1968
For Washington, a diplomatic solution was not feasible as long as the Viet Cong 
and North. Vietnamese troops intensified their attacks on the Saigon government. Johnson 
and most of his counsel rejected the French, view as being mistaken. For the 
administration, neutralization was only the first step toward a Communist victory in 
Vietnam, endangering all o f Southeast Asia. The loss o f South. Vietnam would not only 
have serious repercussions for American leadership in the Free World, but also at home. 
Further criticism by de Gaulle was hence both, unwelcome and damaging.
I9* Logevall, De Gaulle, the U S., and Vietnam, p. 90; for {task's view on Vietnam, see: Dean Rusk, As I 
Saw It. (New York, 1990), pp. 441-443.
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In June 1964 Johnson attempted once more to gam French approval o f his
Vietnam policy. This time he chose the skeptic among his advisors on Vietnam, George
Ball, to convey the American position to de Gaulle. Ball, like the French president,
favored an American withdrawal from Vietnam, but Johnson predicted correctly that Bail
would loyally defend American policy.l95Johnson instructed Ball to elucidate the
American commitment to a free and independent South Vietnam. More importantly,
Johnson counted on French cooperation to prevent “doubts between our two
Governments, and even division o f purpose” that could play into Communist hands and
lead to further escalation in Vietnam. The American leader expected full French support
in case he had to use military force:
In the event that the United States should find itself forced to act in defense of peace and 
independence, in Southeast Asia, I am confident that I could place reliance upon the 
firmness of General de Gaulle as a friend and ally, as America properly did in the Cuba 
crisis of ‘62, and if by any chance I am wrong in this point, it is a matter of importance 
that we should know it now.196
Ball met de Gaulle on June 5,1964. The undersecretary explained that Johnson 
was interested in de Gaulle’s comments and advice on the situation in Southeast Asia. 
While both countries desired a viable government in South Vietnam, they differed over 
methods and procedures. Washington and Paris agreed in fact that a  Communist takeover 
in Southeast Asia would be a “catastrophe for the whole free world.” Ball blamed Hanoi 
for the guerrilla activities in South Vietnam and claimed it was Ho Chi Minh not
l9S Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 377.
06 FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum from the President to the Under Secretary o f State (Ball), Washington, 
June 4,1964, pp.449*450; LBJ repeated that his favored a peaceful solution but was determined to see 
things through if  necessary. He stressed that Ball should not mention any contingency planning for South 
Vietnam because he feared de Gaulle might leak this information to the Chinese. However, he was “open” 
for any French suggestions to solve the conflict m Vietnam.
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Washington who decided over further escalation. 197 The United States, according Ball, 
had no ambition o f establishing military or political control in Southeast Asia. But if  
American aid to Saigon failed to lead to significant progress, Washington was resolved to 
“bring increasing military pressure on Hanoi in order to change the Communists* course 
o f action.”l98BalI argued that Washington did not prefer military action and still hoped for 
a  political solution. But Ho Chi Minh had to fully understand American determination. 
The last statement was perhaps a  hint to de Gaulle to utilize his diplomatic channels with 
Beijing and convey the sincerity of the United States in holding its ground in South 
Vietnam.
According to Ball, French and American views conflicted the most on the PRC. 
Washington did not expect that Beijing would accept a solution for Vietnam that 
contained the spread o f Communism. Past experiences demonstrated that the Communists 
could only be stopped by a countervailing force. The United States could not abandon 
Saigon, even after a political solution was reached, until the South Vietnamese 
government was strong enough to control the entire country.199
De Gaulle listened patiently and took note o f the American “hope” to defeat the 
insurgency. Yet he believed chances of success were faint. The French leader then 
repeated almost verbatim what he had told Kennedy in May 1961; the United States 
could not win this struggle despite its military might. The conflict was not a military but a
l9T FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram from the Undersecretary o f State (Ball) to the Department o f State, Paris, 
June 6,1964, pp. 464-465.
198 IbfcL dp.  465-466.
199 Ibid. p. 466; Ball argued that the PRC was still m an expansionist and bellicose phase o f its revolution 
which precluded an understanding with Washington.
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political and psychological challenge, affecting not only the government o f General
Khanh but the entire Vietnamese people. De Gaulle explained to Ball:
“I [i.e. de Gaulle] do not mean that all o f the Vietnamese are against you but they regard 
the US as a  foreign power and a  very powerful foreign power”. The more the US 
becomes involved in the actual conduct o f m ilitary operations the more the Vietnamese 
will turn against us, as others w ill in  Southeast Asia.200
De Gaulle did not deny that the United States had the military might to destroy 
Hanoi, Canton, and even Beijing. But what would the consequences be o f such a 
strategy? For de Gaulle it was obviously not worth the risk to allow events to proceed that 
far. Vietnam was a “rotten country” for the West to fight in, which France had learned 
with much sorrow. If  the United States decided to escalate the war in Vietnam, France 
refused to have any part in it, as “an ally or otherwise.” The message to Johnson was 
abundantly clean no French support for any policy other than negotiations as proposed by 
de Gaulle.201
De Gaulle also doubted that present American support to Saigon could lead to 
success. Washington had to realize that its involvement in Vietnam was futile and thereby 
come to the conclusion that a political settlement was the only decent way out o f the 
quagmire. A political agreement could not be reached without China and other regional 
powers. Regarding China, de Gaulle was doubtful whether the American view of an 
aggressive, expansionist country was correct Nevertheless, the United States should have
300 FRUS, Ball to Department of State, June 6,1964, p .467.
201 FRUS, Ball to Department ofState, June 6,1964, p .467; Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 378; 
De Gaulle alluded to Chinese history and pointed to the relative ease m which Western powers had 
defeated the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. For the tune being, nobody could predict the outcome o f a  war 
between the West and the PRC.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
contact with Beijing to gain a better understanding o f “what China was up to.”202 Ball
interjected that diplomatic overtures to either Beijing and Hanoi at present would
undermine the will o f Saigon to combat the insurgents. Even if  conditions in South
Vietnam were more agreeable toward peace talks, Washington questioned stro n g ly
whether the Communists would fully honor an agreement203
De Gaulle maintained that U.S. diplomatic efforts alone might not bring the
expected results. He suggested a conference of the major Western and Asian powers to
positively affect world opinion. International guarantees to uphold a settlement would
preclude further North Vietnamese aggression. De Gaulle recognized American concerns
but argued that all “policy involves risk. I f  it is a policy that does not involve risk there is
no choice o f policy.”204The present American course was unfortunately self-defeating
and, as French experience had shown, it did not have any chance of success. Again the
general did not move an inch from his position. Despite his assurance of empathy with
American hardship Ball received the impression that de Gaulle was patiently waiting for
events in Southeast Asia to develop as he predicted:
He is confident that they wilL He is certain no improvements w ill result from the present 
efforts. He probably envisages that som e time in the not distant future we w ill begin to 
consider seriously his suggestions o f  a  conference. He quite likely assumes that we w ill 
then ask the French to take soundings w ith the Chinese and North Vietnamese.205
311 FRUS, Ball to State Department, June 6,1964, p. 468; de GauHe dismissed BaU’s comparison o f the 
PRC and Soviet Russia m 1917: “Russia had had an intelligentsia, an army, and agriculture. China has 
none o f these things.”
30 Ibid: Bah maintained that South Vietnam had to be further strengthened and Hanoi’s infiltration had to 
be reduced before any talks could take place. He also pointed to the repeated transgression by Hanoi in 
violation o f the Laos accords.
** Ib id , p. 469.
305 FRUS, Vietnam, Telegram. BaU to State Department. June 6,1964, 469-470. De GauHe resented 
American criticism ofhis policy which cast him m the role of scapegoat. BaU had privately hoped that de
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De Gaulle’s refusal to fall in line triggered another round o f diplomatic debate 
between Paris and Washington on American policy in Vietnam. On July I, 1964 Rusk 
met with French Ambassador Herve Alphand in yet an effort to find consensus.206 Once 
more the discussion led nowhere. Both sides repeated the same arguments but the tone of 
the debate sharpened. Alphand blamed American interference in South Vietnam since 
1954 for the current difficulties. Rusk discarded this view and demanded that France help 
create a viable government in South Vietnam. Paris should publicly recognize the need 
for a continuous American presence in Vietnam: “Standing aside and equating the U.S. 
with Com m unist  presence was definitely not helpful.”207 As soon as Hanoi and Beijing 
would “leave Southeast Asia alone” the Americans could withdraw. Rusk asked Alphand 
to inform the Chinese that the United States was determined to protect the independence 
o f South Vietnam.208
Rusk then became “brutally frank” and in scarcely veiled terms charged de Gaulle 
with rejecting America’s Vietnam policy in the false belief that Washington threatened to 
diminish French influence in Southeast Asia. The United States, according to Rusk, did 
not seek to challenge French power and welcomed an “extension o f French influence in 
Southeast Asia, in Africa, and other parts o f the world.” Alphand angrily rejected Rusk’s 
allegations and stated that nobody in the French government feared American 
predominance at the cost o f French prestige. The ambassador emphasized that the global 
role o f the United States had been a “good thing” and had helped in securing peace in the
Gaulle’s argument might affect and perhaps even change the perceptions ofLBJ and his “hawkish” 
advisors. To no avafl.
506 Logevall, De Gaulle, the U.S.» and Vietnam, p. 95; FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum o f Conversation, 
Rusk-AIphand, Department o f State, Washington, M y 1 ,1964, p. 533.
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West. Nevertheless, American policy-making led to the deep U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia which obviously was not a  good idea.209
Rusk strongly disagreed and attacked the parochial perspective o f the Europeans.
The United States looked beyond the confines o f the Atlantic and, as a Pacific power, the
security o f Asia was o f equal importance to that o f Europe: “To us, the defense o f South
Vietnam has the same significance as the defense o f Berlin.” The French ambassador
dismissed the comparison between Berlin and Vietnam as erroneous. The loss o f Berlin
would seriously threaten Western security while failure in Vietnam would not endanger
the Western world.210 Rusk was obviously frustrated with the inconclusive discussion and
once more demanded outright French support:
The secretary [Rusk] said that the appearance o f a division o f the West in regard to 
Southeast Asia had a definite bearing on the problem and made a  solution more difficult. 
He said that the French should tell the North Vietnamese that they must leave the South 
Vietnamese alone and that France will oppose them if  they continued their 
interference.211
Rusk expected that the French would also emphasize to Beijing the need to refrain from 
further support of Hanoi. If  the Chinese refused, then Paris should also oppose the PRC. 
Ultimately, a persuasive French stand against  the Communists would truly allow the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia. A non-aligned Southeast Asia would probably turn 
toward Paris, increasing the French role and influence in the region.212
207 FRUS, Vietnam, Memorandum o f Conversation, Rusk-AIphand, July 1 ,1964, p. 534.
38 IbtU. p. 535.
38 Ibid.
710 Ibid.. pp. 535-536; Rusk maintained that the loss o f Saigon would undermine American credibility in 
the West. Alphand did not share this view and affirmed European confidence in the United States.
211 Ibid- dp. 536-537.
212 Ibid, p. 537.
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The intense debate did not change de Gaulle’s mind- With every contact between 
American and French diplomats the gap between the two powers widened, increasingly 
preventing any mutual agreement concerning Vietnam. The more Washington intensified 
its commitment to South Vietnam and implored de Gaulle to support U.S. policy, the 
more obstinate de Gaulle became in his refusal to follow America’s lead. Ball and Rusk 
identified the basic motivation of de Gaulle in his desire to pursue an independent foreign 
policy. Regarding Vietnam the French president, unlike Washington, also enjoyed the 
leisure o f waiting for events to turn in his favor. Events did play into the hands o f de 
Gaulle. He was probably not deeply interested in the fate o f the Vietnamese but focused 
on how his government could benefit from the turmoil in Vietnam. France now 
maintained relations with China, and offered an alternative from the Cold War conflict to 
Third World countries. Both were important elements for de Gaulle’s policy in Europe 
and the world.
De Gaulle would not relinquish the newly found opportunity for French grandeur 
by placating Washington. Instead he used the conflict in Vietnam effectively to serve his 
own political goals. But de Gaulle also profoundly worried over the possibility o f another 
large-scale war in Asia, a sentiment that was shared by London and Bonn. A major war in 
Asia might refocus American attention away from Europe, possibly leading to the 
withdrawal o f U.S. troops in Europe. Therefore Europe might be more vulnerable to the 
Soviet Union. Lastly, de Gaulle, as Wilson and Erhard, was apprehensive o f being drawn 
into an Asian war. Europe could live with the fall o f South Vietnam but not the fall of 
West Berlin.
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Consequently, de Gaulle became increasingly outspoken about the American 
course in Vietnam . At a state dinner  given in honor o f Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk de 
Gaulle deplored the “'cruel division” o f Vietnam which only aggravated Vietnamese 
hardships by unending foreign intervention. At a  July 23, 1964 press conference de 
Gaulle addressed V ietnam  at length and criticized American policy. He regretted that the 
1954 Geneva Accords, which prohibited outside interference, had not been adhered to for 
long. The United States quickly established itself as the protector o f the Diem regime in 
the sincere effort to combat Communism. When Diem tried to end the civil war he faced 
American objection and was replaced by military rule. Other coups followed as the 
Vietnamese grew less inclined to support a  cause pushed on them by a  foreign power. 
Frankly, he argued, the United States could not desire a wider conflict but should 
logically want a political solution. De Gaulle proposed a Geneva type conference, 
including all major powers, to end the bloodshed in Vietnam.213 The alternative was that 
Asia and then the rest of the world might be drawn into a major war which nobody 
wanted.
French intelligence indicating that Johnson contemplated augmenting American 
troops in Vietnam made de Gaulle even more pessimistic about the prospects for peace in 
the region. He was encouraged to hear that the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
U Thant, also favored a political solution for Vietnam and was asking other countries to 
do likewise. By the end of July 1964 the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, North Vietnam 
and the Viet Cong all expressed their interest in a  peace conference.2I4Washmgton and
213 Le Monde, July 25, 1964, p. 3.
2t* LogevaQ, De Gaulle, the CIS., and Vietnam, pp. 95-96.
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Saigon, however, refused to consider a  conference for the time being. Saigon issued a  
statement denouncing the idea o f another Geneva conference and neutralization as 
contrary to the self-interest o f Vietnam. General Khanh added that he was committed to 
pursue the fight for freedom and independence against the insurgents despite “colonialist 
[Le. French] and Communist efforts.” He also appealed to his allies to expand their aid in 
light o f growing Viet Cong aggression. Johnson backed Saigon by increasing the 
American personnel in South Vietnam from 16,000 to 21,000 under the mantel o f further 
military advisors and technicians.215
The Tonkin Gulf incident o f August 1964 and initial American bombings o f 
North Vietnam led to Johnson’s decision m March 1965 to send the Marines to Da Nang. 
To Paris this was a turning  point which further exacerbated conditions in Vietnam. A 
month before American ground troops arrived in Vietnam, Murville had another meeting 
with Rusk and Johnson. Murville was distressed about the Tonkin Gulf incident, aerial 
attacks on North Vietnam, and rumours that Washington might send substantial military 
units to V ietnam . He urged Rusk to consider a political solution and suggested the 
withdrawal o f all foreign forces so that the Vietnamese could finally determine their 
future without any foreign interference. Rusk was not inclined to listen.216
President Johnson openly expressed his annoyance to Murville for anyone 
desiring negotiations. In a long monologue he presented the French foreign minister with 
his views on the situation in Vietnam. Accordingly, the Viet Cong grew increasingly
215 Logevall, De Gaulle, the U.S., and Vietnam, pp. 96-97; Le Monde, July, 26,1964, pp. t-2; and July 29, 
1964, p. 3; Pam was concerned by these developments and feared that Hanoi would increase its activity m
the South. American comments that Washington would respond "appropriately”  to such aggression 
intensified French anxiety.
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aggressive, causing serious incidents which also involved Americans. The United States
had to fight back to prevent another Korea. Johnson did not desire further escalation but
he had to decide which military response was appropriate for each incident:
We are going to keep them guessing and use appropriate means in response to their 
aggression. We don’t  w ant to move to  escalation, but if  the others do it, we will do 
whatever is required on the basis o f  the wisest military judgement. W e would like to 
have everybody else’s help in our efforts and we haven’t  had much help from others.217
Johnson was merely honoring a commitment made by his predecessors to assist 
South Vietnam in establishing a viable government. He only desired that the Viet Cong 
stop its aggression and allow peace to return in South Vietnam. But negotiations were 
presently unrealistic. Saigon had first to improve its bargaining position. Johnson openly 
wondered what de Gaulle would do if  he were in the same situation facing attacks on his 
people and installations. He also pointed out that he was under growing domestic 
pressure from Republicans to respond more forcefully to Communist aggression in 
Vietnam. Unless Johnson secured sufficient support from his European, allies, the 
American public as well as Congress would maintain doubts about European reliability 
and the purpose of the Western alliance in general.218
Murville was neither intimidated nor convinced by the president’s arguments. 
Although he understood the problems the president was facing, Murville insisted that a 
political settlement was the only way out o f the American dilemma- The French politician 
point by point refuted Johnson’s views about the current situation in Vietnam calling
2X6 MurviRe,Aussenpolitk, pp. 107-108.
2X1 Gardner. Johnson and de Gaulle, p. 271.
2IS Murville, Aussenpolitk, pp. 108-109; Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 270-271. LBPs intimidation 
strategy and threat to withdraw American troops from Europe certainly worked with Bonn and nr a  lesser
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them misguided, unrealistic, and unconvincing.219 Johnson could obviously not count on 
French support. But to Murville it was also apparent that he had no chance o f changing 
Johnson’s mind. Once more both sides were deadlocked.220
On March 1,1965 de Gaulle made public his intention to cooperate with Moscow 
in finding a  negotiated settlement for Vietnam. IBs announcement came only days after 
Johnson stated that the time was not yet ripe for negotiations. Washington was deeply 
angered by the French initiative. Accordingly, de Gaulle violated the spirit o f SEATO 
which had been created to defend Southeast Asia against Communist aggression.221 But 
de Gaulle’s proposals received some favorable responses in South Vietnam.
The civilian government o f Dr. Pham Huy Quat was contemplating negotiations 
as well. Sources close to the government revealed that his cabinet, under public pressure 
to reach a peaceful solution, was willing to establish contact with the Viet Cong to 
conclude a cease-fire. It was uncertain, however, whether this was just another political 
move or a serious effort to secure peace for South Vietnam.222 Dr. Quat soon changed his 
mind. He told the press that his country would continue to fight Communist aggression 
and demanded that the NLF cease all hostilities before any settlement could be reached. 
Quat also attacked any foreign power that demanded a return to the Geneva settlement 
since, he claimed, the great majority o f the Vietnamese thought otherwise. The Buddhist
degree also with. London. But Paris was far from being impressed. Two years later, it was France which, 
withdrew from NATO command, citing the war m Vietnam as one o f the reasons for this decision.
219 Murville, Aussenpolitik., pp. 109-110; Murville afro pointed to  recent French contacts with the PRC 
which revealed that Beijing favored a  peace conference. Paris received similar signals from Hanoi.
220 Ibid, p. 110; Gardner, Johnson andde Gaulle, pp. 271-272. Murville partly blamed the influence o f the
CIA and some o f advisors for LBFs intransigence. Accordingly, the American president received too many 
“facts” that were not based on realities m Vietnam.
222 Gardner, Johnson and de Gaulle, p. 272.
~ LeMonde, March 1 ,1965, p. 2.
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movement defied the government position and demanded the withdrawal o f all foreign 
forces from South Vietnam.223 While the South Vietnamese were divided on how to react 
to the Viet Cong, W ashington was increasing its pressure on the insurgents in Vietnam. 
Bombing of North Vietnam continued as part o f the desire to negotiate only from a 
position o f strength. Washington dismissed the notion that the conflict in Vietnam was 
basically a civil war but instead increased its pressure on Hanoi.224
On March 8, 1965, two battalions o f Marines landed in Da Nang. Soon other 
Marines and Army troops followed. The United States had begun the Americanization o f 
the war in South Vietnam . Washington now faced the dangers o f an unlimited 
commitment which de Gaulle had described to Kennedy in 1961; by pouring in more and 
more troops, it hoped to turn the tide, but would find itself riding the tigers back. Paris 
opposed the American escalation and intensified its criticism o f Washington's Vietnam 
policy. This course eventually led to outright accusations that the United States was 
primarily responsible for the war in Vietnam.
Although contacts between both countries continued, France and the United States 
were evidently “hostile allies.” The tensions between both countries would only ease with 
the beginning o f peace talks on Vietnam in 1968. While the other Western Europeans 
initially endorsed the American escalation in Vietnam, despite private concerns, the 
French position remained consistent labeling American policy as gravely mistaken.
23 Le Monde, March I, L965, p. 2.
-* Le Monde, March 2,1965, p. 2; the paper commented on a recently published “White Paper” that 
alleged that most Americans were insufficiently informed on the complicated situation m Vietnam or why 
the United States was involved m that countty. On the CIA White Paper see also: Marilyn B. Young. The 
Vietnam Wars. 1945-1990. (New York, 1991), pp. 141-142; a  few critics within the United States argued 
along similar lines as Paris by stating that the pace o f escalation had accelerated not because ofVIetnamese 
action but due to increased American pressure.
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Unlike the British Prune Minister Harold Wilson, de Gaulle was not willing to handle the 
issue o f Vietnam solely through diplomatic channels, but chose to present his case to the 
media. Once again, he was motivated by profound concerns over the world-wide 
implications o f the conflict, and the possible geo-political benefits he could harvest for 
France by openly defying the United States.
fit the spring o f 1965, Murville related to the Soviet ambassador that France was 
more determined than ever to reconvene the Geneva conference and end the conflict in 
Vietnam. While Washington was seeking Western support for a  widening war in 
Southeast Asia, France was talking to Cold War opponents, Moscow and Beijing, in 
order to find a political solution. The French opposition to American escalation in 
Vietnam found the approval o f U.N. General Secretary U Thant, and other Western 
governments, as that o f Canada for example. India, Poland, and the Soviet Union, 
representing the unaligned world and the Warsaw pact, also condemned the American 
course as a violation o f the Geneva agreement, calling for an end o f hostilities.225
A visit by George Ball to Paris in early September 1965, renewed speculations 
that the Americans might be willing to consider talks over Vietnam. It was quickly 
apparent that Washington was not about to change course. Johnson was not interested in 
any French mediation and sent Ball to reiterate American goals and policy in Vietnam. 
North Vietnam was also unwilling to begin any negotiations as long as American troops 
remained in the South. De Gaulle, nevertheless, insisted that military force could not end 
the conflict and urged the return to the 1954 settlement, yet was unsuccessful at .
225 Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. 110; Mondey March 4 ,1965, p. I; March 9, 1965, p. I.
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convincing the Americans.226 The buildup in Vietnam continued and with it French 
opposition to America’s policy in Southeast Asia.
Later in September 1965, Murville addressed the General Assembly o f United 
Nations on Vietnam. He pleaded for the admission o f the PRC to the United Nations. 
Without Beijing the agonizing problems o f Southeast Asia could not be solved 
satisfactorily. Murville insisted on a political settlement for the conflict. But such a 
solution was only feasible if  all foreign powers involved in Vietnam ended them 
interference:
Voict des annees, e t d’abord par la voix du general de Gaulle, que la France s’est 
exprhnee tres clairem ent sur le reglement qul Iui parait seul etre possible e t qui doit etre, 
a  son avis, fonde sur [’independence, la neutralite e t la non-intervention dans les affaires
interieures du Vietnam, tels que ces princtpes avaient ete definis dans les accords de 
Geneve de 1954. Une negociation a cet effet aurait sans doute ete jadis immediatement 
possible.227
According to Murville, the French were appalled by the devastation caused by war and 
deeply empathized with the Vietnamese people who, despite the previous conflict with 
France, remained a true Mend to the French nation. The war not only had bloody 
repercussions in Vietnam but seriously hurt its neighbors Cambodia and Laos, which 
were also tom apart by opposing factions. In the sole interest o f the people o f Southeast 
Asia and world peace, France was willing to use all her experience, influence, and good 
will to work for a peaceful settlement and the reconstruction o f Vietnam. The French 
government once more reaffirmed that it did not support any “war o f aggression" in
226Le Monde, September 1 ,1965, pp. 1-2; September2,1965, p. I.
227 Le Monde, October 1 ,1965, p. I.
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Vietnam, and opposed foreign interference by North Vietnamese, Chinese Communists..
as well as the United States.228
The war allowed de Gaulle to pursue his ‘Grand DesignT and he exploited
successfully the American dilemma in Vietnam, thereby enhancing the French position in
the world. He continued to seek contacts with North Vietnam leading to the resumption
o f diplomatic relations with Hanoi in July 1967.229 De Gaulle also sought better relations
with Moscow in order to promote French leadership in the West. In April 1965 the Soviet
foreign secretary, Andrei Gromyko, visited Paris with both sides agreeing on their
opposition to the American role in South Vietnam. De Gaulle used the occasion to
publicly distance himself horn Washington and present France as an honest Mend and
supporter o f the Third World:
Yes, we are helping these countries, and they rely on France as a  result. In their view the 
contrast between us and the United States has become immense: while we are helping 
them, the Americans are using all their brilliant new technological inventions to 
exterminate in the m ost horrible ways thousands o f these poor long suffering 
Vietnamese, who merely want to be left alone.30
In the summer o f1965 de Gaulle visited the Soviet Union, hoping to increase his status as 
the leader o f Western Europe and creating a counter-balance to Washington. The 
rapprochement with Moscow culminated in 1966 in the joint Soviet-French declaration of 
Mendship which constituted a virtual non-aggression pact.31
28 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. IIO-II I;Le Monde, October 1 ,1965, p. I.
2:9 Murville, Aussenpolitik, p. I I I .
30 Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 272-273.
3* Guy Carmoy, The Foreign Policies ofFrance. 1944-1968. translated by Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago 
and London, 1970), p .477; De Gaulle also used economic pressure to defy the United States. He decided 
to convert U.S. currency into gold, which not only aimed to dim m ish American gold reserves but drained 
American financial resources a t a  tune when the U.S. government experienced the growing expenditures 
caused by the commitment m  Vietnam ,
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AH out ‘war* against the United States: Withdrawal from NATO and the Pnomh 
Penh Speech
On March 7, 1966, de Gaulle wrote to Johnson that France appreciated the
achievements o f the Atlantic Alliance and the essential role o f the United States by
securing its members* freedom. However, the world and France had changed
considerably since the signing of the NATO treaty in 1949:
France considers the changes which have taken place or are in process o f occurring since 
1949 in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere as w ell as the evolution o f  her own situation and 
her own forces no longer justify insofar as that concerns her the arrangements o f military 
nature adopted after the conclusion o f the alliance.232
Because France no longer required foreign forces on her soil for defense, France would 
“reassume on her territory the foil exercise o f her sovereignty.” All NATO forces had to 
leave within thirteen months. Forewarned o f de Gaulle's move by Ambassador Bohlen 
Johnson remained calm and accepted the decision by offering France a leading role in the 
Alliance if  de Gaulle changed his mind.233
De Gaulle did not change his mind. On March II , 1966 Paris sent an Aide- 
Memoire to Washington elaborating further the decision to resume its foil sovereignty. 
Most importantly, Europe was no longer the center of international crisis. The threat of
232 FR.US, Western European Region, 1964-1968, VoL XIII, Letter from President de Gaulle to President 
Johnson, Paris, March 7,1966, p. 325.
33 FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson, March 7, 1966, p. 327. Washington
was clearly angered by de Gaulle's decision but would not criticize him in public because it might lead to
detrimental reactions by other European countries. Most frustrating was the fact that France did enjoy the
status of “free-rider”  because its geography guaranteed NATO protection.
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conflict lay now in Asia where the Alliance was “obviously not implicated.”251 De Gaulle 
addressed two major concerns which forced him to disengage from NATO: the war in 
Vietnam along with American demands to give at least moral support to its policy there 
and the infringement on French sovereignty by NATO. Paris saw no choice but to 
disengage  after years o f discussion with the United States to revise the structure o f 
NATO.
To Washington the French withdrawal along with the recent overtures to Moscow
indicated that de Gaulle was set on a neutralist course between the two blocs* which
might have serious repercussions in Europe.ZJSAmbassador Bohlen blamed de Gaulle and
his policy o f grandeur for this new affront to the United States. Regardless, Washington
would be unable to alter French policy. Bohlen commented that the current NATO crisis
revealed two “diametrically” opposed ideas toward the conduct o f foreign relations:
On one hand de Gaulle is fanatically a  proponent o f  the idea o f  independence; that the 
nation-state is the sole enduring, viable entity ux international relations; that this entity is 
uncompromisable and multilateral arrangements tend to lim it its freedom and 
independence. On the other hand is the concept espoused by the US and other states in 
the modem world which considers all nations, even the most powerful, as inter­
dependent in their relations with other like minded, particularly allied states.236
234 FRUS, Western European Region, Aide-Memoire from the French Government to the US. 
Government, Paris, March 11,1966, p. 333.
35 Murville, Aussenpolitik^ pp. 61-66; Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Coulter pp. 273-275; Brands, 
Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 488-490.
236 FRUS, Western European. Region, Telegram from the Embassy fix France to the Department o f State, 
Paris, March, 3 i, 1966, p. 352.
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While the French would not find fault with the first part o f the statement they disagreed 
profoundly with the seconcL Interdependence meant nuclear sharing and an equal voice in 
the alliance, yet Washington had refused to comply with these French demands.237
Washington, albeit angered by the French decision, was hopeful that once de 
Gaulle had gone U.S.-French relations would revert back to normal. Yet the resentment 
over de Gaulle’s decision was obvious in McGeorge Bundy’s statement to the Senate 
Foreign Relation Committee in June, 1966. Bundy regarded de Gaulle’s policy as 
disappointing, “costly in its pride, wasteful in its lost opportunities, irrelevant in much of 
its dramatics.” Both countries could still reach an understanding on larger issues but 
Bundy dismissed the French claim that it presented an alternative to a bi-polar world. De 
Gaulle’s leadership had foiled to unite West Germany or attract other Western European 
countries:
The notion o f leadership in a third world was simply unreal; this heady wine did not 
survive its first voyage. The recognition o f  China was a  gesture with no practical result. 
And the present specter o f a  deal w ith Moscow is sheer fantasy -  as far beyond French 
power as it is contrary to  French intentions. . .  We have many differences with France, 
but none that we cannot endure. The m ost painful may be the quite special French 
position toward Vietnam, but in the light o f  the French past there, it is not surprising that 
there should be some differences between us. The French attitude is not helpful, but it is 
understandable and marginal.238
Even if  Americans regarded the French view on Vietnam as marginal, de Gaulle 
was certainly not discouraged and continued his criticism o f the American Vietnam 
policy. From mid-1965 to 1966 onward he expressed his misgivings to all foreign
37 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 6.5-64; Murville emphasized that, while Paris had repeatedly asked for a 
revision o f NATO, Washington considered its predominance m the alliance as the “easiest and most 
efficient way.”
m  Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, Second 
Session, June 20,1966, Statement o f McGeorge Bundy, pp. 4-5.
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diplomats, particularly Americans. The conflict was not only devastating Vietnam but 
poisoned the international climate by augmenting the fear o f another world war. 
Moreover, the war in V ietnam  demonstrated again that the United States simply could not 
accept the sovereign will o f other nations.239 De Gaulle could perceive only one solution 
for Vietnam  - the immediate halt o f the bombing against North Vietnam and negotiations.
Washington did not comply and de Gaulle decided to take the offensive. He chose 
the occasion of his state visit to Cambodia to express his position on the conflict in 
Vietnam-240 Upon his arrival to Phnom-Penh on August 31,1966 de Gaulle laid out what 
was to follow. He told Prince Sihanouk that he appreciated Cambodia’s policy o f 
independence and neutrality as promising precedent for the entire region. Vietnam deeply 
troubled both de Gaulle and Sihanouk. The two leaders defended the resumption o f 
diplomatic relations with North Vietnam as a venue to explore new possibilities o f peace 
and gather further information about the future intentions o f Hanoi. Moreover, Sihanouk 
shared de Gaulle’s pessimism about the outcome o f the Vietnam war and was 
apprehensive o f further escalation.241
Although the prospect o f peace was distant, de Gaulle could not resist the 
opportunity to voice his opinion on the Vietnam War. To a cheering crowd of 100,000 he 
congratulated the Cambodians for defending them independence from both the Khmer
239 Anne Sa’adah, “Idees Simples and Idees Fixes: De Gaulle, the United States, and Vietnam,” in: Robert 
Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. (Oxford, UK,
1994), pp. 295-298.
240 Murville, Aussenpalitik, p. 112; Ferro, De Gaulle et rAmerique, p. 370; De Gaulle urged LBJ in 
February 1966 to accept a  negotiated settlement, worried over the renewed bombing ofNorth Vietnam 
after a short break during the Christmas Holidays.
2tt Le Monde, September 1 ,1966, p .I; Sihanouk deplored that recent initiatives by France and Canada to 
Hanoi had failed. His country was certainly anxious to prevent any further escalation of the Vietnam 
conflict.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
Rouge and the United States and saving “their lives and souls.” Unfortunately, the people
o f South Vietnam still suffered from outside intervention. The United States interfered in
a  civil war. American attacks on North Vietnam, inching closer to Chinese territory,
endangered not only peace in Asia but in  the world at large. Hence, American policy was
increasingly criticized by the peoples o f Europe, Africa, and Latin America.242
De Gaulle endorsed the Cambodian policy o f neutrality as the solution for all of
Indochina and condemned those who aspired otherwise. France had learned from its own
painful experience not to fight the will o f the people. The French leader advised all
combatants, particularly the Americans, to accept the lessons of history. Washington
lacked clearly defined political objectives and the Vietnamese resented American
intrusion on their domestic affairs. The peoples o f Indochina should demand an
explanation of why the Americans were fighting in then: countries in the first place:
Eh bien! la France considere que les combats qui ravagent Plndochine n’apportent, par 
eux-memes et eux non plus, aucune issue. Suivant elle, s’tl est invraisemblable que 
Papparefl guerrier americain vienne a etre aneanti sur place, il n’y d’autre part aucune 
chance pour les peuples de PAsie se soumettent a loi de Petranger venu de Pautre rive 
du Pacifique, quelles que puissent etre ses intentions.243
Why did the United States resist a  peaceful settlement and refuse to accept the 
Geneva Accord o f 1954? Why did it oppose the right o f self-determination for the 
peoples of Indochina? The path of negotiation was complicated and arduous, and would 
require the eventual withdrawal o f all American forces, but it was the only way to secure 
peace. While the chances for negotiation were presently remote, de Gaulle appealed once
2X1 Le Monde, September 1 ,1966, p. 2; de Gaulle met with representatives from Hanoi and the NLF before 
he addressed the Cambodians.
OTIbi(L
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again to the United States to  listen to reason and not condemn the world to worse 
afflictions. De Gaulle was obligated to speak out because o f France’s earlier experience 
in Indochina and the strong ties she still maintained in the region. But it was also out o f a 
deep and old friendship with the United States that de Gaulle had to remind the 
Americans o f their long cherished belief in independence and self determination of all 
nations.2*1
De Gaulle argued that Washington still had the opportunity to change course and 
heed the advice he had repeatedly offered regarding Vietnam. It was time for the United 
States to renounce a policy from which it did not benefit and which it could not justify. 
Washington had to accept a settlement endorsed by the major international powers which 
would restore peace to Indochina and guaranteed prosperity o f this important region. To 
continue its military engagement would only hurt American pride, contradict American 
ideals, and undermined its national interest. Negotiation was also in the best interest of 
the West, and would serve to restore the credibility o f the United States in Europe and in 
Asia;
EUe [LeFrance] le dit enfin, avec la conviction qu’au degre de puissance, de richesse, de 
rayonnement auquel les Etats-Unis sont actuellement parvenus le fait de renoncer, a  leur 
tour, a  une expedition tointame, des Iors qu’elle apparait sans benefice e t sans 
justification, e t de Iui presenter un arrangement international organisant la paix et Ie 
developpement d’une importance region du monde n’aura rien, en definitive, qui btesser 
leur fierte, contrarier leur ideal e t nuire a  Ieurs interets. A u contraire, en prenant une voie 
aussi conforme au genie de 1’Occident, quelle audience les Etats-Unis retrouverait-ils 
d’un bout a  I’autre monde et quelle chance recouverait la pane sur place e t partout 
affleurs.245
244 Le Monde, September 1 ,1956, p. 2.
245 Ibid.
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While a  peaceful solution was de GauIIeTs most sincere desire, he refused to mediate the 
conflict, believing that such effort did not promise any chance o f success. Instead of 
France, Cambodia might be better situated to initiate negotiations and offer her service as 
a model o f independence in Southeast Asia.246
It was de Gaulle at his best. Foreign minister Murville was deeply impressed by 
the wisdom and clairvoyance expressed by his “glorious and venerated” president 
advising Asia and the world on restoring peace in Southeast Asia De Gaulle was close to 
having the best o f both worlds. He presented the solution for war-stricken Vietnam, 
speaking only in terms o f “friendship and respect” for the United States. At the same time 
he directly accused Washington o f imperialism. But de Gaulle refused to take any active 
role in mediating the conflict and tossed this thankless task to the Cambodians.247 In the 
final communique o f de Gaulle and Sihanouk, Paris promised to guarantee the 
independence and neutrality o f Cambodia. Both heads o f state expressed their anxiety 
about the situation in Vietnam, where foreign intervention had transformed a civil war 
into an “international conflict.” All foreign powers involved had to recognize the Geneva 
Accord o f 1954, cease their intervention and withdraw all troops from Vietnamese so2.248
Washington was infuriated by de Gaulle’s attempt to blame the United States for 
the war in Vietnam. President Johnson, in public at least, again remained calm. But he 
was worried about a  domestic backlash to de Gaulle’s speech. French accusations might 
either intensify opposition to the war or push Congress toward a more isolationist policy 
in Europe. Within a  week, Johnson responded to de Gaulle’s challenge in a press
Le Monde, September I, 1966, p. 2; Sa’adah. Idees Simples andIdees Faces, pp. 307-311.
147 Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 112-113; Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, pp.275-276.
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conference. The United States was more than ready to withdraw from Vietnam i f  Hanoi 
did so as well. However, Hanoi was not listening and mainly spoke about war. Johnson 
emphasized that the world should not only scrutinize the American role in Vietnam but 
also focus on the deeds o f the aggressor, North Vietnam and its allies.2*9 The French 
responded with another attack on America’s Vietnam policy. Murville used a speech to 
the General Assembly o f the United Nations to reiterate the main points de Gaulle made 
in Phnom-Penh. He blamed the United States for the escalation of the war and maintained 
that Washington was obligated to take the first steps for a  negotiated settlement.250
In October, 1966, the French foreign minister met again with Johnson. Although 
storms clouds were gathering between Paris and Washington, the American president was 
surprisingly pensive during their ninety minute private meeting. Instead o f demanding 
direct French support Johnson employed a much more subtle approach to convey his 
views. He told the Frenchman about his life, his hopes and worries, and his endeavor to 
reform American society. But most o f all he addressed his sorrows over Vietnam and the 
dreadful responsibility the war had caused. Virtually day and night he was busy 
supervising the progress o f military operations in Vietnam. On the day of Murville’s visit 
Johnson selected bombing targets in the Hanoi area, profoundly aware o f the casualties 
and hardships his decision caused. The president’s monologue undoubtedly touched 
Murville. He was impressed by Johnson’s inner turmoil. But the foreign minister also 
worried that Johnson was unable to follow his moral instincts because he received biased 
information on Vietnam. Johnson’s advisors dismissed any strategy other than war, which
** Le Monde, September3,1966, p. 3.
^B rands, Johnson and de Gaulle, pp.490-491; Ferro, De Gaulle et I ’Amerique, pp. 372-373.
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precluded a meaningful appreciation o f the French proposal to seek a negotiated 
solution.251
Johnson’s inner turmoil quickly evaporated and he made clear that he was iiritated 
by French contacts with Hanoi. He hoped that de Gaulle would cease his efforts to find 
channels for negotiations without consulting Washington first.252 After two years of 
inconclusive discussions with the French, the American leader recognized that de Gaulle 
would remain obstinate. The only question was who could outlast the other. The Vietnam 
War presented de Gaulle’s with a irresistible opportunity to enhance France’s role in 
world politics. He refused to even consider the American point o f view and insisted on 
pursuing any course he considered proper in the event the conflict in Vietnam might 
further escalate.253
The low point in Franco-American relations was reached in 1966. Both sides 
remained diametrically opposed to the future course in Vietnam and neither was willing 
to make concessions to the other side. De Gaulle stated in October 1966 that the war in 
Vietnam not only threatened world peace but forced France to pursue an independent 
policy vis-a-vis the United States. French independence should not be interpreted as 
either isolationist or hostile by Washington, but meant that “we decide ourselves what we 
have to do and with whom.” France had surrendered to foreign dominance during the 
Second World War and the Fourth Republic. She had almost lost her soul and identity
250 Murville, Aussenpotitik, p. 113.
351 Ibid. pp. 1I3-I14; LBJ gave a  similar speech to Ludwig Erhard, leading to the question whether the 
- American president just needed an outlet to voice his own doubts about Vietnam or that he used the “teary 
eyes” approach to wm approval for his policy.
251 Ferro, De Gaulle et I Amerique, p. 374.
251 FRUS, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Circular Telegram from the Department o f State to the
Embassy m France, Washington, October28,1966, p. 490.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
B l
but, under de Gaulle’s lead, was no longer willing to be a mere tool in the hands of 
outsiders, be that Washington, Moscow, or any other nation.25* Both Washington and 
Paris also thought they could outlast the other side and ultimately prevail. By the end o f 
1966 Johnson predicted that a showdown was indeed coming and the day o f “reckoning” 
with de Gaulle was quickly approaching.255
Yet the day o f reckoning did not come in terms o f  outlasting de Gaulle, but rather 
it was events in Vietnam that undid Johnson. Although the Tet Offensive in  early 1968 
was a military victory for American forces the joint VC - North Vietnamese forces 
delivered a profound psychological defeat to the United States. Johnson accepted the 
consequences in March 1968 by announcing that he was not seeking reelection and 
ordered an end to the bombing of North Vietnam, opening the path for negotiations. Paris 
greeted Johnson’s decision as a first step in the right direction and commended his 
political courage. The bombing halt was a positive sign that the United States finally 
considered de Gaulle’s proposal o f a negotiated settlement. Paris was selected by Hanoi 
and Washington as meeting place for peace talks. For Johnson and de Gaulle, their “cold 
war” over Vietnam was over, although the war in Vietnam would linger on for five more 
years.
French-American antagonism over Vietnam serves as a valuable case study in the 
trans-Atlantic relationship. Until 1969 both France and the United States persisted on the 
exclusive validity o f their respective policies and failed to build on shared values. For the 
United States in Vietnam this meant that a major European ally not only refused to
251 Sa’adah, [dees Simples and Idees Fixes, pp. 310-311; Hoffmann,. Decline or Renewal, p. 284.
755 Gardner, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, pp. 277-278; Brands, Johnson and de Gaulle, p . 491.
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support Washington but even publicly criticized the American role in Southeast Asia. 
The Vietnam controversy marked a  turning point in U.S.- French relations. As the 
Vietnam War revealed the limitations o f American military intervention, French refusal 
to sanction U.S. policy in Southeast Asia placed boundaries on American political 
predominance within the Atlantic Alliance. French-American antagonism over Vietnam 
demonstrated that the United States could not dictate blind, obedient support from a  key 
European ally. Ultimately, the French-American debate over Vietnam revealed that the 
United States needed the assistance o f its allies as much as they needed U.S. support. 
America could not face the challenges around the globe alone and neither could Europe. 
For the alliance to succeed and thrive on both sides o f the Atlantic, the allies had to listen 
closely to each other’s concerns and realize that selfish interest is self-defeating. Had the 
United States seriously entertained de Gaulle’s advice earlier, America’s experience in 
Vietnam might have been less costly. The importance o f allied support and guidance has 
not been lost on successive American administrations.
French-American relations improved considerably with the change of American 
administrations. The new president, Richard Nixon, visited France shortly after taking 
office in February 1969, and played the game of diplomacy more astutely than his 
predecessor. Nixon reaffirmed that Europe was of primary importance to the United 
States. He asserted the political autonomy o f Western Europe in whose affairs the United 
States had no intention or right to interfere.257 De Gaulle was particularly pleased with 
Nixon’s recognition o f French leadership in Western Europe. To the ultimate delight o f
256 Murville, Aussertpolitik, pp. 116-118.
257 Ib id . p p . 126- 128.
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the French, president, Nixon treated Great Britain as merely another European power and
no longer as the special ally o f the U.S. As Nixon later reflected:
I wanted this trip, my first abroad as President, to establish the principle that we would 
consult w ith our allies before negotiating with our potential adversaries. I also wanted to 
show the world that the new American President was not completely obsessed with 
Vietnam, and to dramatize to Americans at home that, despite opposition to the war, 
their President could still be received abroad with respect and enthusiasm.258
De Gaulle could not agree more. Although Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 
ended any dreams de Gaulle had o f reviving the old French-Russian alliance, the future 
looked promising for a new age o f French grandeur.
De Gaulle’s triumph lasted only a short time. Like Lyndon Johnson, de Gaulle 
was challenged and eventually swept away by a younger generation disillusioned with the 
values, goals, thinking, and self-assertive leadership o f its elders. In May 1968 student 
protests erupted in Paris which were soon supported by French workers, leading to large- 
scale strikes. De Gaulle managed to stay on for ten more months, then resigned in March 
1969 after a popular referendum rejected his constitutional reforms. De Gaulle retired to 
his ancestral home at Colombey and died there on November 9, 1970. Lyndon Johnson 
survived the general for a  little more than two years. Neither would see the end of the 
Vietnam War. As de Gaulle had envisioned the Second Indochina War ended with a 
negotiated settlement. The United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in early 1973. 
Two years later Vietnam was unified by the Northern victory over the South. Even
as Richard Nixon, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990) with. an. new mtroductibn by Richard 
Nixon, pp. 370-374; Nixon and de Gaulle agreed on the necessity to engage China - certainly a  departure 
from previous American policy. Nixon felt that he and de Gaulle had established a “new entente cordiale” 
between their countries. Regarding Vietnam, de Gaulle again stated that negotiations were the only way out 
and suggested direct contacts with Hanoi. Nixon was indeed interested, confident that the French would 
deliver his message to Hanoi.
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though Vietnam became a Communist country, most other “dominoes” in Southeast Asia 
did not fall.
De Gaulle sought a  greater voice for France in Europe and world affairs and 
mostly succeeded. He increased French grandeur. He elevated his country from the 
turmoil o f the Fourth Republic to a major voice in international politics and gave the 
French a renewed sense o f self confidence. Certainly, not everyone would or could agree 
with his methods. For the United States and, in a  lesser degree also to Great Britain, the 
general was a obstinate, worrisome “ally.” De Gaulle’s political goals as well as his 
suspicion of “Anglo-Saxons” placed a heavy burden on French-American relations. The 
growing conflict in Vietnam presented an irresistible opportunity to enlarge France’s role 
in international politics and defy American predominance in the W est Yet his initial 
advice on Vietnam given to Kennedy was both genuine and far-sighted. American refusal 
to seriously consider de Gaulle’s approach, and heed that o f other voices o f dissent both 
in Europe and the United States, triggered open French opposition to the American role in 
Vietnam. By being less defiant and more understanding o f Washington de Gaulle might 
have had a better chance to affect America’s Vietnam policy. While the general proved a 
great statesman for France, his desire to enhance French prestige as well as his deep- 
rooted suspicion o f “Anglo-Saxons” provoked crises and misgivings within the trans- 
Atlantic alliance. Once the storm created by the Vietnam conflict had cleared, the 
successors o f de Gaulle and Johnson learned and profited from the lessons o f this 
turbulent chapter o f the Western alliance. France proved a  reliable ally to the United 
States during the Gulf War and NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia.
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The Eager Ally:
The Federal Republic of Germany and America’s W ar in Vietnam
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Johnson hat diese Kalamitat nicht angefangen, er hat sie von Kennedy
geerbt Aber wenn eine grofie Nation entdecfct, daft ein bestimmter Kurs
schwieriger ist, als erwartet, dann ist es keine Demutigungjur sie, wenn sie ihre 
Politik andert. Sie mussen sich aus Vietnam zuruckziehen. .  - Europa ist 
schlieftlich die allerwichtigste Zone ju r die USA, nicht Lateinamerika, nicht 
Asien. Wenn sie ims ignorieren besteht die Moglichkeit, daft die So\vfetunion die 
Kontrolle uber Deutschland im d Frankreich erringt
Konrad Adenauer on America's Vietnam, policy, August 8,1966
In an interview with the New York Times in August 1966 former chancellor of the 
Federal Republic o f Germany Konrad Adenauer urged Lyndon B. Johnson to disengage 
from Vietnam. Both the Erhard government and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
deplored Adenauer’s frank statement and, taking the opposite position, strongly endorsed 
America’s Vietnam policy.259The spat between Adenauer and Erhard on the “Vietnam 
question” reflected their differing approaches to West German foreign policy-making. 
Both chancellors were affected by limitiations on West German sovereignty in 
international relations.2”  Adenauer and Erhard were committed to secure American 
protection, achieve German unity and maintain the freedom of Berlin. Both were afraid 
that German goals might become o f secondary importance to the Western allies in a 
climate of detente. Following the Berlin crisis Adenauer tried to expand the German role 
in transatlantic relations by strengthening Bonn’s European base, most notably through 
close cooperation with France. Erhard rejected this policy and regarded the United States 
as Germany’s principal ally. He hoped that loyal support of Washington would result in 
new initiatives on the German question. But Erhard could not dismiss France’s role in
159 For Adenauers statement and the reaction to it see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 8,1966. 
Erhard headed a  coalition government o f the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP).
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achieving unification. The “Vietnam question” intensified the German dilemma of how to  
pursue the quest o f unity when its major allies, Washington and Paris, were at odds over 
the conflict in Southeast Asia. Erhard faithful support o f Washington precluded an 
unconstrained German voice regarding the Vietnam conflict and he chose to fully endorse 
American policy in Southeast Asia. By doing so he alienated Charles de Gaulle and found 
himself increasingly pressured by Lyndon Johnson to participate in the American effort in 
Vietnam. America’s conflict in Southeast Asia and Bonn’s response to it not only 
complicated relations between Germany, the United States, and France but impeded 
progress on the issue of German unification.
I. K onrad Adenauer: 1961 to 1963
The political life o f the Federal Republic during the first two decades o f its 
existence was dominated by Konrad Adenauer. Bom January 5, 1876 in Cologne to a 
middle class family, Adenauer was shaped by his roots as a Catholic and Rhinelander261 
Early on, Adenauer was intrigued by politics and joined the Catholic Center Party 
(Zentrum Partei). In 1906 he won a seat in the city council o f Cologne and was elected 
mayor in 1917. He held this post until he was forcibly removed by the Hitler regime in
260 hi 1955, the FRG became officially sovereign, but the Allies still retained the final say m a peace 
settlement for Germany, the issue o f reunification, and the status ofBerlin.
261 AmuIfBaring, On Anfang war Adenauer: Die Enstehung der Kanzfenfemoicratfe. (MQnchen, 1982), pp. 
86-91; see also Willy Brandt, Mv Life in Politics. (New York, 1992), p. 27; Though Adenauer resented 
Prussian militarism, which he blamed for the First World War, many of his contemporaries assign him 
distinct “Prussian” traits. His home town, Cologne, maintained close ties to France. Catholicism, too, 
represented a  major cultural divide in Germany until recently. Adenauer’s views reflected this cultural 
divide, to him the Elbe was the frontier with Asia, whereas the Rhineland reflected far greater liberal spirit 
and sophistication.
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1933. Ia  1945, Adenauer joined the newly formed Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and 
served as its chairman from 1946 to 1949 in the British occupied zone. In 1949 Adenauer 
was chosen president o f the parliamentary council convened to write a new constitution 
for Germany. This prominent position gave him national recognition and paved the road 
to his election as first chancellor o f the Federal Republic with the majority o f one vote - 
his own.262
From 1949 to his resignation in October 1963 Adenauer was the prime architect 
o f West German foreign policy.263 IBs approach was based upon three basic assessments 
o f the international system. First, international politics were ruled by the antagonism 
between the free Western world and Communist expansion. The creation o f two German 
states was the obvious result of that conflict. Second, although Europe’s future was 
primarily determined by the Soviet challenge, it was still influenced by horrors o f the 
recent World War, which made it potentially an anti-German system. Finally, all Western 
European democracies relied heavily on the United States for them survival in this 
antagonistic system.264
262 Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer, pp. 108-109; Sonthenner, Die Adenauer Ara: Grundlegtmg der 
Bimdesrennhlilc. (Mtachen, 1991), p. 26; Alfred Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands sert 1945: Eme Bilanz. 
(Mtlnchen, 1970), pp. 172-174; Adenauer was fervently opposed to Socialism and Communism and 
believed that only a free market economy could best serve the nation's interest. He also clashed with the 
Nazis and was arrested twice. His return as mayor o f Cologne m 1945 was short-lasted and he was soon 
dismissed by the British.
20 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe: Forty Years o f German Foreign Policy. (New 
Haven, 1989), p. 5; Sonthenner, D ie Adenauer Ara, pp. 29-31; Baring, Im Anfang v/ar Adenauer, pp. 109- 
I I I ;  Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp. 420-425; The initial goals o f Adenauer were to end occupation 
status and facilitate West German economic recovery. The latter was greatly aided by the European 
Recovery Program (ERP or Marshall Plan) and by 1955 the Allied High Commission lifted the status o f 
occupation and relinquished most o f its control over West German foreign policy.
264 Hans-Peter Schwarz. Adenauer und Europa. in: VTertelsiahreshefte filr Zeitgeschichte. 27. Jahrgang 4, 
October 1979, pp.474-475.
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The solution for Adenauer was close relations with the United States and foil 
integration o f West Germany into Western Europe, which actually fitted neatly into the 
American policy toward Germany. Since 1947, the United States emphasized both West 
Germany’s economic recovery as the core o f the Economic Recovery Program, as well as 
the integration o f that country into the West European state system in order to contain any 
potentially dangerous German political ambitions.265 Adenauer also believed that a fully 
integrated Germany in an independent and internationally influential Europe might 
preclude any American-Soviet settlement over Germany without consulting European 
powers or Germany.266
West German foreign policy, according to Adenauer, had to be built upon the 
pillars o f European integration and friendship with the United States. But dependency 
upon the United States and allied restrictions on German sovereignty allowed only 
limited room for maneuver which made the European aspect o f Adenauer’s foreign policy 
equally important. The comer-stone for a unified Europe was to mend ways with France. 
French-German friendship would provide a “Schutzwall” or protective wall against the 
Soviet Union. At the same time, Adenauer was fully aware that without American 
protection West Germany could not survive. But the European angle was a  useful tool to
265 Hans JQrgen SchrOder, “Die USA und westdeutscher Aufstieg,” in: Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppeland, 
Deutschland und die USA an 20- Jahrfnmdert: Geschichte der Politischen Beziehungen. (Darmstadt, 1997), 
pp. 99-101,103-105; Hanrieder, Germany^tmerica, Europe, pp. 6-7; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German 
Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices, in: Wolfram Hanrieder. West German Foreign 
Policy: 1949-1979. (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 16-17. To Adenauer, Western European intregation also 
prevented a  Franco-Russtan rapprochement. See: Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, p. 480.
266 Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, pp. 480-481; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer’s Ostpolitik, in: Wolfram 
F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979. p. 131; Adenauer feared another Potsdam 
conference where German had no say about their own future.
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regain American attention in times when the United States displayed less interest in 
German concerns.267
By integrating West Germany into Europe, while at the same time fostering ties 
with the United States, Adenauer hoped to achieve his ultimate goal - German 
reunification. He did not believe that reunification could be obtained in the short run. 
Rather, a  consistent and reliable foreign policy would eventually change the perception o f 
Germany from an aggressive power to reliable partner, both in the West and in Moscow. 
Nothing could be gained by a neutralist position which might bring unity at the price o f 
freedom. In addition, the resulting and economic prosperity o f the West would make it 
increasingly impossible for the Soviet Union to keep East Germans under then rule. 
Western prosperity and liberty would be irresistible.268 Adenauer refused to recognize the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) because its existence perpetuated the German 
division. Accordingly, West Germany solely represented the German nation and was the 
successor state to the Weimar republic. In order to maintain the claim o f sole 
representation, Adenauer also refused to establish or ceased diplomatic relations with any 
country that recognized the GDR.2®
267 Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, pp. 482-485. Adenauer also hoped to engage Britain deeper into 
European politics but London remained aloof o f the European Economic Community until the early 
I960’s.
261 Schwarz, Adenauer und Europa, p. 511; Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 8-9; Brandt, My 
Life in Politics, pp. 54-35; Adenauer was quite correct; until the construction o f the Berlin Wall, several 
hunched o f thousands o f East Germans fled to the West.
269 Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer, pp. 234-236; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp.459,461; After 
Adenauer’s historic visit to Moscow in 1955, which led to  the establishment to diplomatic relation between 
both countries, Bonn followed the Hallstein Doctrine which prechided offlcal relation with any country 
that recognized East Berlin. The Western Allies supported the West German position for the tune being but 
it placed a  serious obstacle m over-coming East-West tensions.
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During the I950’s and early 1960's Adenauer followed events in Vietnam, but he 
viewed conflict in Indochina prim arily in terms o f its implications for Europe and 
Germany. The First Indochina War required a balanced policy o f not openly criticizing 
France's position and preventing serious repercussions for West German interests in the 
planned European Defense Force (EDF). The EDF would give West Europeans a greater 
share in their own defense, but the French overcommitment in Vietnam ultimately 
torpedoed the project. Bonn recognized the South Vietnamese regime in I960 but 
maintained until the early 1970’s that Saigon represented all of Vietnam, dismissing the 
factual division o f that country.270
After the French defeat in 1954, Adenauer endorsed American support for South 
Vietnam based on the need to further secure American protection o f West Germany. 
Bonn had to prove its loyalty to the Western allies, but could neither support the French 
nor the Americans militarily, due to West German constitutional restriction on the 
German military. Official sanction for Western aid to Diem’s Vietnam also demonstrated 
that West Germany had cut all ties with its Nazi past, was a reliable partner in the West, 
and even a champion o f democracy in the Third World.271 A good will tour by Vice- 
chancellor Erhard to Southeast Asia in 1958 reiterated these goals. His expressions of 
sympathy for South Vietnamese independence gained favorable responses in Washington
270 Volker Berresheim, 35 Jafare Indnchmanolitik: der Bundesreoublik Deutschland. (Mitteflungen. des 
Instituts ftir Asienkunde, Hamburg, 1986), pp. 31-32; the French colonial conflict was not received with 
enthusiasm and the German Parliament insisted on strict neutrality in the war. The sole recognition o f 
Saigon o f course was a reflection ofBonn’s attitude to represent all o f Germany.
271 IbttL. pp. 14-15; the German Basic Law did not allow any aggressive act by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, its army was created out o f completely defensive reasons and German troops could not be 
deployed beyond the scope ofNATO. The endorsement o f American policy hr South V ietnam  in the 
I950’s made any recognition o f Hanoi obviously impossible. In 1955, the GDR recognized North Vietnam, 
which allowed an easy way out for Adenauer by following the Hallstein doctrine.
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and Third World countries. Erhard also delineated the future West German position to the 
increasing turmoil in South Vietnam: Bonn was unable to send any troops but had a 
“moral obligation” to contribute to the victory o f the free world in Southeast Asia.272
A First Strain in U.S.-German Relations: Berlin and the Franco-German Treaty
The erection o f the Berlin Wall in  August 1961 resulted in a  crisis o f the German- 
American relationship. The events leading up to August 1961 revealed the different 
perspectives o f both powers regarding  the German question and global politics. The crisis 
further exposed West German policy limitations and the country’s utter dependence on 
the Western Allies. Berlin was a deeply emotional issues for Germany since the Soviet 
Blockade o f the city in 1948-49. It was the rem aining spot where Germans from East and 
West were not yet separated by barbed wire and mine-fields. In early 1961 Germans 
hoped against all odds that the freedom of the entire city could be secured. They soon 
discovered that the three Western Allies were only willing to defend their rights in the 
Western sectors o f the former capital.^For Washington, Berlin was only one of the many 
global challenges facing the United States, and the tensions over the city presented a 
major obstacle in reaching an arms reduction agreement or detente with the Soviet Union. 
The crisis in Europe evoked the demon o f nuclear war, which was neither in the best 
interest o f the United States nor the Soviet Union. Washington also linked the issue of
271 Berresheim, Indochinapalitik, pp. 102-103.
251 Haims JQrgen KQsteis, Konrad A denauer und Willy Brandi in der Berlin-Krise, I958-1963, 
Viertelsfahreshefte fUr Zeitgeschfchte. 40, No. 4, Oct. 1992, pp. 491-492; Knichshev's offer o f a separate 
peace treaty was unacceptable for Bonn, because ft might be considered as disloyalty to the Western allies,
alluding to another RapaHo. Stalin had tried a  similar strategy by offering German unification as Tong as 
the country would be “neutraL”
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Berlin to Communist challenges in Southeast Asia. Apparently, the Soviet Union pursued 
an aggressive course on Berlin to gain concessions in Indochina.
Kennedy decided that a  West German military contribution to NATO and full 
integration o f the Federal Republic into Western Europe was more important than 
reunification.274 Not only was Bonn securely tied to the West but recognition o f the status 
quo in Europe would allow for fresh approaches in American-Soviet relations in order to 
increase American influence in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Kennedy considered 
Soviet pressure on Berlin as a test o f NATO and American determination as well as an 
likely attempt to neutralize West Germany. West Germany had to remain securely tied to 
the West, but it also had to accept the status quo.275 The shift in American emphasis was 
apparent to Adenauer.276 Kennedy was reluctant to address the issue o f Berlin. The 
sensitive Germans noticed with some concern that the American president had not 
mentioned Berlin in his inaugural address. Kennedy frequently used the term o f “West- 
Berlin” instead o f Berlin inclusively while the President was unwilling to give up the
274 Marc Raskin, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, June 1,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security 
Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; Raskin debated the pro and cons o f what to do about West Germany. 
The best solution for Berlin would be a  unified city under tLN. mandate, but rather unlikely. Washington 
even toyed with the idea the exchange West Berlin for East German territory (Magdeburg) near the inner 
Germanborder. See also: KQsters, Adenauer und Brandt in der Berlir^Krise, pp. 499-500; In a speech on 
June 17,1961, Governing Mayor Willy Brandt decried any attempt to conlude an agreement on Berlin over 
the heads of the German people “as treason against our compatriots, treason against German unity and 
freedom,” see: NSF, Western Europe, 1961-1963, JFKL; Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland, p. 217.
275 Arthur M. Schlesmger, Jn, A Thousand Davs: John F. Kennedy in the White House. (Boston, 1965), p.
318; Grosser, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 443; Andreas Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur StabilitSt Kennedy, 
Chruschtschow und das gememsame Interesse am Status quo m Europa”, Vtertelsfahreshefte fUr 
Zeitgeschtchte. 46 (1998), pp. 69-73; o f course, the US was also keenly aware that it was targeted directly 
by Soviet nuclear missiles since the late 1950’s.
276 Frank A. Mayer,"Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era ofDistrust in German-Amencan Relations?”, m: 
German Studies Review. VoL XVII, No. I, Feb. 1994, p. 83-85; Joachim Arenth, “Die Bewahrungsprobe 
der Special Relationship: Washington und Bonn (1961-1969)”, in: Klaus Larres/ Torsten OppeUand (eds.), 
Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte deroolrttschen Bezfehungen (Darmstadt, 1997), 
p. 152; see also: Schlesmger, A Thousand Days, p. 338; JFK and Adenauer were rather apprehensive of
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rights o f the Western Allies in Berlin. He was also determined to prevent a major war by 
refusing to go beyond Western claims to their respective sectors in the city.277
In the summer o f 1961 the question o f Berlin gained further urgency. The Vienna 
summit o f June 1961 between Kennedy and Krushchev led to an understanding on Laos, 
but no agreement on Germany or Berlin was reached, hi July, President Kennedy 
declared that, i f  necessary the United States would defend West Berlin with force.27* 
Kennedy and his advisors concluded that Krushchev deliberately intensified tensions over 
the former German capital to gain concessions in other areas o f the world, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. The crisis over Berlin was another Soviet attempt to enhance its 
bargaining position in the global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, felt that Berlin was o f more 
symbolic importance to the Soviets and simply a test o f American determination. Despite 
Krushchev’s belligerent language, Moscow was not seeking a war over Berlin and might 
“envision a relaxation o f the Berlin crisis in exchange for an understanding that the U.S. 
would not forcefully resist further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.”279 Burke 
argued that the president should not play into Krushchev’s hand by focusing solely on
each other. Kennedy was during the I950’s more impressed by SPD leader Kurt Schumacher and felt that 
the chancellor was a relic o f the Cold War. Adenauer m turn favored Richard Nixon m the 1960 campaign.
m  Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, pp. 153-154; Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen:
1959-1963. (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 91-93. The first encounter between the two statemen was very friendly 
but did not cover German concerns, only possible contigency plans for Berlin. 
m  Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland'r pp. 248-249; McGeorgeBundy, Danger and Survival: Choices 
About the Bomb m the Fust Fifty Years. (New York, 1988), pp. 361-362; Great Britain and France also 
strongly affirmed Western rights and access to the city. During the Vienna meeting Krushchev again 
threatened to conclude a  unilateral peace-agreement with the GDR, trying to end allied rights for the city as 
a whole.
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Berlin , but instead reassure America’s Asian allies that the United States had no
intentions of disengaging from that region.280
Senator Hubert Humphrey also saw Berlin connected to wider global issues, and
Southeast Asia in particular. He advised Kennedy that:
People needed to be reminded that what happened to Berlin - its division - and what 
happened to Germany - its division - has happened to Viet Nam, has happened to 
Korea, is happening to Laos, that the Soviet Union is seeking to divide and cut up. . .  
[W]e must make it crystal clear. . .  that we are not afraid, that our commitments 
are real and will be honored.281
American resoLve, insisting on free elections in Berlin as well as German self- 
determination, would also have a positive impact in the Third World where people were 
indirect participants in the power straggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.282
President Kennedy agreed with his advisors to be firm in the question o f Allied
legal rights in and access to West Berlin. In a report to the nation on M y 25, 1961.
Kennedy implicitly recognized the partition o f Berlin by stating that the “endangered
frontier o f freedom runs through a divided Berlin.”283 The strain over West Berlin was not
an isolated problem but part o f world-wide Communist aggression:
We free a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where 
the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the danger of communism 
is less apparent to those who have so little. .  .West Berlin. . .  has now become — as 
never before — the great testing place of Western courage and win, a focal point
OT Arleigh Burke, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs o f StafL 19 June, 1961, John F. Kennedy National 
Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963. The president should not overextend American forces by 
sending additional troops to Berlin unless the conflict intensified.
30 Walt Rostow, Memorandum to the President, July 15,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security Files, 
Western Europe, 1961-1963.
m  Senator Hubert Humphrey, Memorandum to the President, July 14,1961, John F. Kennedy National 
Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963.
32 Ibid.
35 Bundy, Danger and Survival* p. 368.
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where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and 
Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.2**
Unlike in Asia, Kennedy accepted the status quo in Europe. West Germany and 
the three Western sectors in Berlin would be defended but Kennedy would not go beyond 
this commitment285 Adenauer and Governing Mayor o f West Berlin Willy Brandt were 
alarmed by the American guarantees for only the Western sectors o f Berlin. Both hoped 
to preserve freedom and self determination for the entire city.286 While German concerns 
were duly noted, Washington desired more flexibility in its approach toward Germany 
and the Berlin issue. Only then could both the United States and the Soviet Union find 
common ground to negotiate over global challenges and arms reductions.287 But Adenauer 
would not accept an easy American way out o f the problems o f Germany. The entire city 
o f Berlin remained the prime domino in Europe that could not fall to Communism.288
On August 13, 1961 the East German government, with approval from Moscow, 
began to build the Wall. Most Germans were shocked and angered by Western inaction.
34 Office o f the White House Press Secretary, Text o f the President’s Report to the Nation on the Berlin 
Crisis, July 25,1961, John F. K ennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963.
35 Department o f State Polity Planning Council, United States Objectives, July 29,1961, John F. Kennedy 
National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; the American goal was to show Moscow and the 
Western allies that it would not abandon its commitment and was “willing to act firmly and faithfully” to 
abide by these commitment without further escalation. Washington was “realistic,” according to the 
council in understanding German and world problems.
36 Willy Brandt, My Life In Politicsy pp. 3-4; Frank Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, p. 88; Arenth, 
Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, pp. 152-153.
37 Wenger, Der lange fFeg zur Stabilitat, p. 78; Walter Rostow, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, 
August 7,1961, JFK National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; JFKL. The U.S. was still not 
willing to recognize the GDR [and did so only m 1972] but hoped that inner German contacts might lead to 
progress on the “German question”. Washington had accepted the status quo but gave some flexibility to 
Bonn. One can just wonder what Washington -  or Moscow - would have said to a  comprehensive German 
understanding. Saigon did not enjoy similar “flexibility” and any real or rumored contact between Saigon 
and Hanoi met with strong disapproval in Washington.
31 Memorandum o f Conversation between the Secretary o f State, Rusk, and Chancellor Adenauer, August 
10,1961, John F. Kennedy National Security Files, Western Europe, 1961-1963; Adenauer was distressed
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Newspapers ran the headlines: Der Westen Tut Nichts, but nobody knew how to prevent 
the obvious. Many Germans felt sold out by the allies and were angered by Chancellor 
Adenauer’s lack o f response.2®9 Washington accepted the division o f Berlin and only 
Soviet aggression on the Western half o f the city or the FRG itself would create a  casus 
belli. While Adenauer blamed the United States for not doing enough, he was too much 
of a pragmatist not to understand the fundamental implications of the Berlin crisis. But 
Kennedy’s recognition o f the status quo in Europe and his attention toward non-European 
theaters made the chancellor more distrustful o f the United States.290
In light of the limited options for West Germany, Adenauer resorted to playing 
the European card to regain leverage in Washington. France was the obvious choice. Two 
years o f negotiations finally led to an understanding with de Gaulle on close Franco- 
German cooperation. In September 1962, de Gaulle sanctioned an agreement 
coordinating French-German policy regarding Berlin, East-West relations, defense, and
by recommendations o f Senators William FoQbright and Mike Miansfield to make Berlin a free city under 
UK command.
39 Rasters, Adenauer und Brandt in der Berlin-Krise, pp. 527-530; Only days after the construction o f the 
wall, Adenauer met with Soviet Ambassador Smirnov and stated that Bonn would do nothing to harm 
German-Soviet relations. Obviously many Germans were appalled by the chancellor's statement and it did 
cost him considerable support m the up-coming elections. Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 370; Bundy 
admits that the American reaction to the Wall was slow but stresses that none of the Western powers and 
West Germany included would have been willing to risk war over Berlin. Kennedy, as a  gesture both to 
West Berlin and the Soviet Union, sent LBJ and General Lucuis D. Clay on a  good-will tour to the city as 
well as 1500 additional U.S. troops.
30 Wenger, Der lange W egzurStabilitat, pp. 83-84; Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, pp. 91-94; Bonn 
refused to accept any security arrangement for Central Europe which recognized the status quo and also 
insisted on equal status as a KATO member m any negotiations with the Warsaw Pact; see also: The 
President's European Trip, West-Gennany-Berlm, Eire, Italy, June 1963, J. F. Kennedy National Security 
Files, JFK Library; informing the president on the domestic situation m West Germany it was obvious that 
Brandt more than Adenauer was willing to accept a  modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.
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relations with the Third Wod<L De Gaulle shared Adenauer’s skepticism about
policymaking in Washington and was pleased with his new ally.291
The Franco-German Treaty, signed on January 22, 1963 was a  mile-stone in
French-German relations. Nevertheless, Washington was shocked and wondered how
German-American relations might be affected. France pursued an increasingly
independent, antagonistic policy toward the United States and now West Germany might
also become more unpredictable following de Gaulle’s lead.292
Adenauer had no intentions o f becoming an capricious partner to the United
States. Rather, it was his growing doubts about American reliability that made the
Franco-German Treaty indispensable. As he told de Gaulle in early 1963:
L am quite concerned about the United States. I do not know which defense strategy 
might be adopted since everything seems to change quickly there.. .  The present time 
was full of insecurity. One could not predict which defense strategy the United States 
would adopt for the future.. .  Germany was immediately facing Russia and France was 
directly in line behind Germany. The danger for Western Europe had become very 
considerable. In regard to the changing American strategic thinking nobody could be 
sure whether the political strategy might change as well, resulting in a possible general 
malaiseJ33
291 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 119-121,123-127,138-140. De Gaulle assured Adenauer that 
he would oppose any U.S.-Soviet understanding that recognized the GDR. It is obvious that Adenauer's 
overtures played nicely into de Gaulle aspiration of leading Europe and weaken “Anglo-American 
dominance.”
291 Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, p. 95-96; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, p. 198. Only days 
before the Franco-German treaty was signed, de Gaulle vetoed the British entry to the EEC, which 
profoundly dismayed MacMillan and also Kennedy, who had hoped for more influence m Europe with the 
British membership m the EEC.
293 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 199-200: Ich bemerkte eingangs, in der jetzigen unsicheren 
Zeit komme dem Zusammenstehen Frankreichs und Deutschlands noch groftere Bedeutung zu. Ich set sehr 
unruhig wegen der Vereinigten Staaten. Ich wisse nicht. welchen Verteidigungskurs man dort habe, derm
alles anderesich dart sehr schnell Deutschland stehe in unmittelbarer Beruhrung mit Rutland direkt
dahinter komme Frankreich, Die Gefahrjur Westeuropasei sehr graft geworden, Angesichts der 
sprunghaften amerikanischen strategischen Auffassungen konne man nie wissen, oh sich nicht auch die 
politischen Auffasungen anderten, so daft eine altgemeine Malaise ubrigbliebe. See also: Akten zur 
Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1963, VoL I, Consersadon between Chancellor 
Adenauer and President de Gaulle, Paris, January 21,1963, pp. 11 l- l  15.
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Adenauer’s rapprochement with de Gaulle was the evident result o f his frustration with 
the policy o f the Kennedy administration. He resorted to the traditional pattern of 
European balanced power politics and tried to gain greater leverage in Washington by 
more closely allying Bonn with Paris.294 The American response to the Franco-German 
treaty revealed that Bonn did not enjoy the same freedom o f action as General de Gaulle.
Kennedy was upset and voiced his opposition to the treaty repeatedly in no 
uncertain terms. He felt stabbed in the back by Bonn only days after de Gaulle had again 
expressed an “anti-American policy” by vetoing the British entry to the EEC.295 Secretary 
o f State Rusk was also worried where Germany was heading. Rusk had no intention of 
forcing Bonn to chose between Washington and Paris but Bonn could not possibly prefer 
“fifty French bombs over fifty thousand American missiles.”296
Washington’s message to Bonn was clear. West Germany’s policy initiatives 
remained limited. On the other hand, Adenauer made his point in demonstrating that 
West Germany, despite its restrictions, had to be accepted by Washington as a political 
force. Since Adenauer left office in October 1963, it is uncertain how he might have 
responded to the American escalation in Vietnam as Chancellor. Two years after his 
resignation, Adenauer maintained that the American escalation in Vietnam was a grave
34 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 206-207; AAPD, pp. 121-123. Adenauer noted that 
Americans did have sympathy for Berlin but much less so for the FRG. De Gaulle’s mediation might result 
into a far better understanding of German concerns m Washington.
395 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein, Washington to Foreign Secretary SchrOder, January 23,1963, pp. 162- 
165; Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy, pp. 95-97; Hans-JQrgen SchrOder, Deutsche Aussenpolitek 1963/64: 
Die “Aktenzur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Viertelsiahreshefte filr 
Zeitgeschichte. July 1995, p. 525.
36 AAPD, pp. 166-169; to contain the damage m Washington Ambassador Knappstein hurried to explain 
that the Franco-German Treaty might actually benefit Washington in that Bonn now had greater influence 
on de Gaulle. But Rusk maintained that France already caused enough hardship for NATO, SEATO, and 
the United Nations and he would not be pleased by additional capricious endeavors by Bonn. American
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mistake. The war in Vietnam was senseless. Washington should have listened to the 
French advice and sought negotiations since the Americans could not win the war in 
Southeast Asia.297 In August 1966, Adenauer repeated this assessment to the New York 
Times and urged for an American withdrawal from Vietnam. He argued that Europe was 
the prime region o f interest for the United States. I f  Washington neglected Europe, the 
Soviet Union might have the opportunity to gain control over West Germany and 
France.298 His opinion did not affect Washington and was not shared by his successor 
Ludwig Erhard.
n . Ludwig Erhard
Ludwig Erhard regarded the United States as Germany’s principal ally. He was 
skeptical of Adenauer’s advances to de Gaulle and even more suspicious o f the General’s 
quest for leadership in Europe. Bonn could not lose the friendship and protection of the 
United States. First and foremost, Bonn had to prove its loyalty to Washington. Then, 
Erhard hoped he could win stronger American support for German unification. This easy 
equation proved unrealistic. Erhard neglected the second pillar Adenauer saw as 
important for German foreign policy-making - the European angle.
Ambassador Dowling repeated the thinly veiled threat to Bonn, see: AAPD, 1963, VoL I, Conversation 
Undersecretary Carstens with American Ambassador Dowling, Januray 24,1963, p. 169 
37 Horst Osterheld, Aussennoiitik unter Bimdeskanzfer Ludwig Erhard. 1963-1966: Em dokumentarischer 
Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt. (DQsseldor£ 1992), p. 274.
Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung, August 8,1966; the paper commented that the Erhard government 
shared Adenauer’s concern about American neglect ofEuropean security, the SPD strongly rejected 
Adenauer’s claim that Kennedy was responsible for the conflict in Vietnam and also complained that 
Germans should not constantly distrust the American commitment to  Europe.
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Erhard pro-American policy limited the options for Bonn and soured relations 
with de Gaulle. The Vietnam conflict complicated Geiman-American understanding, 
resulting in American demands to directly aid the U.S. endeavor in Vietnam. The war in 
Vietnam also affected the general spirit o f detente with the Soviet Union and 
overshadowed East-West relations. The German question no longer topped the 
international agenda with both super-powers accepting the status quo in Germany.
Unlike Adenauer, Erhard was far better versed in economics than in the intricacies 
o f foreign policymaking. Erhard was bom February 4,1897 in Furth, Bavaria. He served 
in the First World War and was seriously wounded in France. He obtained his Ph.D. in 
economics and sociology at the University o f Nuremberg. He taught there until 1942 
when he was dismissed because o f his refusal to join the NSDAP but quickly found 
employment in the private sector. From 1945 to 1947, Erhard worked as advisor to the 
allies and also as minister of economics in the Bavarian government.299^  soon rejoined 
the academy as professor of political economy at the University o f Munich but continued 
to work as advisor and then secretary for economics in the combined American and 
British zone. In 1948, Adenauer successfully urged Erhard to join the CDU.300 As 
Adenauer’s minister o f economics Erhard’s program o f a social-market economy quickly 
proved successful. Yet, his relations with Adenauer soured. While Adenauer pursued 
European integration based on the core o f German-French understanding, Erhard desired
299 Christian Hacke. Wehmacht wider Willen: Die AtiBennolitik der Bundesrepnblik Deutschland. 
(Frankfurt a. M_, 1993), p. 110; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlcmds  ^p. 177.
300 Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlandsr pp. 256-25S. By 1948 Erhard had fully developed his theory o f a 
social-market economy (Sbziale Marfctwirtschaft), combining free market competition with safeguards for 
the individual from the excesses of capitalism.
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to move beyond these limitations and engage all Western European countries. Adenauer 
prevailed until 1963 when Erhard replaced him as Chancellor.301
Erhard’s foreign policy: “Courtship with Uncle Sam, Cold Shoulder to Marianne”
Erhard and Foreign Secretary Gerhard Schroder felt that a reevaluation o f German 
relations toward Washington and Paris was necessary. Both believed that the German- 
French Friendship Treaty not only caused resentment within the EEC but affected the 
indispensable good-will o f the United States. Only the United States could guarantee 
German security. The new chancellor rejected Adenauer’s strategy to gain greater 
leverage vis-a-vis Washington by playing the French card. Unlike Adenauer and de 
Gaulle, Erhard had no doubts about the reliability o f the American commitment to 
Europe. He concluded that German security interests did not conform with those of 
France and required a continuously strong bond with the United States. The United States 
was also the more promising partner in the quest for German unity. But Bonn needed to 
assess the current policy o f detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Rapprochement between Washington and Moscow appreciatedly limited the danger of a 
nuclear Armageddon but implicitly recognized the status-quo in Germany. Should Bonn 
pursue a more active and original policy to propel the allies toward negotiation over 
unification?
301 Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen, pp. 111-112: Frank R. Pfetsch. Die Aufienpolitik der Bundesrepublilc 
Deutschland. 1949-1992: Von der Snaltune zur Veremignng. (Munich 1992), pp. 158-161; Erhard's 
success m rebuilding West Germany earned him the nick-name ‘father o f the economic miracle.’ Adenauer 
was apprehensive ofErhard’s popularity and felt that Erhard was unqualified to succeed him. Adenauer 
still retained considerable influence after he left office and continued to head the CDU.
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Erhard failed to conceive o f new strategies for Germany. He lacked art 
understanding o f the larger global picture and the importance o f the European angle to 
broaden German options. Unification would not fall into Germany’s lap simply by 
reiterating the German desire to overcome division.302 Generally, Erhard’s foreign policy 
framework revolved around the Bonn-Washington-Paris triangle, which, to him, 
prescribed the boundaries and possible opportunities for West Germany. Erhard soon 
discovered that his tenuous balancing act between Washington and Paris was further 
complicated by the war in Vietnam.303 During the next years, Erhard tried - ultimately 
unsuccessfully - to win the Western powers for new initiatives for German unification. 
President Johnson acknowledged the desire for unification, but his Vietnam policy did 
not allow for additional complications in the relations with the Soviet Union. Across the 
Rhine, de Gaulle repeatedly offered Erhard participation in France’s force de frappe and 
greater independence from the whims and demands o f Washington, but Erhard steadfastly 
stood with the United States. Erhard’s reliance on Washington eventually resulted in 
growing difficulties in his own party, the CDU, which split into factions favoring either 
the Atlantic alliance or closer ties to France. This debate increasingly undermined 
Erhard’s leadership and contributed to his fall in 1966.301
301 For Erhard’s approach toward unification see: Peter Bender, Die “Neue OstDolmk” und ihre Foigen:
Vom Mauerbau zur Wiedervereinigung. (Munich, 1996), pp. 105-106.
303 Great Britain was consulted as well on issues o f the Common Market, arms control nuclear sharing, and 
the German question; but neither side faced as intense pressure to constantly find common ground as 
Erhard experienced m his interactions with Washington and Paris.
301 Waldemar Besson, Die AuBenpotitik der BundesreoubBk Deutschland: Erfahruneen und Mafistabe. 
(Munich, 1970), pp. 310-314 and329; Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen  ^pp. 114-116; Pfetsch, Aussenpolitik 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 162-164; for criticism on Erhard’s new course see: Osterheld, 
Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 18-20. Osterheld, head of the Chancellery, was deeply loyal to Adenauer 
and suspicious o f Erhard tLS- policy since according to Osterheld it was a  result ofErhard’s ambition and 
might place West Germany between a rock and a  hard place.
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Within days after his election Erhard outlined his departure from the Adenauer 
policy to Dean Acheson and Dean Rusk. While the German-French understanding was 
essential to European reconciliation, the German-American cooperation was o f even 
greater significance for the security and survival o f Europe.305 Erhard worried that West 
German interests might be ignored in the rapprochement between the two world powers. 
Despite lessening tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union any solution 
o f the German question appeared remote. Also, Erhard was concerned over rumors that 
Washington might reduce its troops in Europe. The Americans reassured the chancellor 
that Washington was sensitive to German anxieties. But Rusk stressed that Bonn had to 
cease viewing world affairs solely from a German perspective.306
A month after Erhard's election South Vietnam made headline-news with the 
overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. Bonn hardly took 
notice, and the events were not discussed in the cabinet.307 Vietnam was not yet a  major 
concern for German foreign policy makers but the growing American commitment to that
305 AADP, Volume III, October I to December 31 ,1963, (Munich, 1994), Erhard conversation with Dean 
Acheson, O ct 19,1963, pp.I337-I340; Erhard criticized the current French policy, most notably the de 
Gaulle veto against the British entry to the EEC. While he had cautioned against too close relations with 
France long before his election as chancellor, obviously he employed his skepticism of de Gaulle to placate 
his visitor from Washington. Foreign Secretary SchrOder painted a similar picture and stressed that the U.S. 
commitment was vital to West Germany, see: AAPD, SchrOder conversation with Dean Acheson, Oct. 19, 
1963, pp. 1343-1344
306 AAPD, Erhard conversation with V S. ambassador McGhee, Oct. 22,1963, pp. 1363-1364; while 
assuring McGhee ofhis complete confidence m the VS., Erhard was very much concerned about 
suggestions o f members o f Congress and former president Eisenhower to withdraw more G.I.’s from 
Europe; see also: AAPD, Erhard conversation with Dean Rusk, Oct. 25,1963, pp. 1385-1386; Erhard once 
again reassured Rusk o f German allegiance and loyalty. Rusk pomtedout that the U.S. not only had to 
protect Germany but so far had sacrificed more than one hundred thousand men in the struggle against 
Communism; AAPD, SchrOder conversation with Dean Rusk, Oct. 26,1963, p. 1392; Rusk complained 
that West Germans were extremely sensitive to any rumor about American troop withdrawals while 
obviosuly nobody bothered that the French reduced then forces m West Germany.
307 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 37-41; Osterheld was highly critical o f the American 
involvement m Vietnam and its complicity m the overthrow ofDiem. He maintained that coup was a  grave 
mistake that farther drew the Vnited States in the quagmire o f Vietnam and destroyed a  chance for victory.
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Asian country and subsequent French opposition to the American policy in Southeast 
Asia increasingly forced Bonn not only to take a stand regarding Vietnam but required 
strategies to accommodate both allies. The German goal o f unification necessitated the 
support o f both the United States and France, along with that o f Great Britain. 
Additionally, the opposite view o f the former two on Vietnam created problems for Bonn 
on how to placate both sides in order to win assistance for any initiative on Germany. 
Bonn decided to approve o f the American position in Vietnam, partly to demonstrate its 
loyalty, yet also anxious about the repercussions o f a Communist victory in South 
Vietnam for American policy in Europe.
In early November 1963, Washington asked Bonn to establish diplomatic 
relations with the new government in Saigon of General Duong Van Minh, which was 
seconded by a personal request by the Vietnamese general. While the United States 
supported the new government, Washington was reluctant to recognize Minh as the first 
Western country to preclude any suspicion of American involvement in the coup against 
Diem. Hence, Washington desired that Bonn take the lead and endorse Minh.308Bonn was 
on the spot but complied with the American request mainly because Minh enjoyed 
American backing. But Bonn also worried that a lack o f Western support might aggravate 
the situation m South Vietnam and perhaps even tempt Saigon to negotiate with Hanoi, 
leading to even greater chaos in the region. Despite justified doubts about the legitimacy
AAPD, Memorandum of Undersecretary Alexander BSker, Nov. 7,1963, pp. 1415-16: BOker points 
out: “Die Amerikaner haben den Wiinsch ausgesprochen, das neue Regime moglichst bald anzuerkennen. 
Sie mOchten jedoch nicht die ersten sem, die erne solche Anerkennung aussprechen, da dies ihre 
Verantwortlichkeit fOr den Umsturz, der durch den Mord an Diem und Nhu befleckt ist, unterstreichen 
wflrde."
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and viability o f new regime the situation in South Vietnam required that Bonn 
immediately recognized the Minh government.305
Saigon soon demanded more from Bonn. West Germany, according to General 
Minh, should not only increase its financial contribution to South Vietnam but use its 
influence on Paris to prevent de Gaulle from interfering in Vietnamese affairs. Bonn sent 
more money but remained apprehensive about the viability o f the Minh government. 
General M inh lashed out against  de Gaulle’s plan to neutralize Vietnam and demanded 
greater European support in general. The U.S.-French disagreement over policy in 
Vietnam further underm ined his struggle against Communist aggression. He pleaded with 
Bonn to apply its influence as closest ally to France by urging Paris to end its detrimental 
policy of neutralization.310
The Vietnamese request troubled German Ambassador to Saigon Wendland. He 
was uncertain about American aims in Vietnam and even more confused o f what to make 
o f French contacts with the People’s Republic of China, aiming at diplomatic recognition. 
Wendland opposed any German interference in the French-American debate over the 
possible neutralisation of Vietnam. Circumstances in South Vietnam might actually
Great Britain, like the U.S. was reluctant to regognize the new regime. France refused to
acknowledge any government coming to power illegally but France would maintain its already established
ties with South Vietnam .
309 AAPD, Memorandum, Nov. 7,1963, p. 1417; Bfiker feared that any negotiation between Saigon and 
Hanoi might lead to the same chaos that already existed m Laos and Cambodia, and fully accepted the 
American domino theory for Southeast As o l
3,0 AAPD, Ambassador York Alexander von Wendland to Foreign Ministry, Dec. 16,1963, p. 1647.
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require neutralization to save Saigon unless significant progress could be made in the 
coming months. The other alternative was further escalation and major war.311
Obviously Bonn had doubts about the American role in Vietnam, but chose to 
pursue the course o f most loyal ally and back Washington. The French refusal to endorse 
the American commitment created a stir o f anger in Washington. Yet, as the German 
ambassador to Washington, Karl Heinrich Knappstein, observed France enjoyed 
substantial latitude in the United States. Franco-phile President Kennedy was more than 
willing to reconcile the differing views based on a “certain understanding o f de Gaulle’s 
position.” Bonn could only benefit by improving in U.S.-French relations.312 The 
German-French Treaty had shocked Washington but the Americans increasingly 
appreciated the advantages of Franco-German reconciliation and they believed that Bonn 
now was in the position to influence French foreign policy making. However, Bonn still 
had to earn complete trust by the Americans.313 The problem for Bonn was how to change 
the de Gaulle’s mind and deliver what Washington expected.
Bonn’s “China Card”
The Erhard government was aware of its limits vis-a-vis Washington, but the 
question remained whether Bonn could pursue other venues to further German self-
m AAPD, Wendland to Foreign Ministry, Dec. 16,1963, p. 1648. West Germany gave a  S 15 million 
credit to Saigon; Wendland remained ambiguous in his advice to Bonn -  he leaned toward de Gaulle’s idea 
of neutralization but feared a  Communist sweep over Southeast Asia.
Jn AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, Nov. 19,1963, p. 1453.
10 AAPD, 1964, Vol. I, Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 22, 1964, pp. 110-112; Knappstein further 
elaborated on the different status ofFrance and West Germany in the United States. France's aid to 
American independence and alliances o f two world wars gave Paris a  freedom of action that Bonn could 
only dream o f Accordingly, France could be “unfaithful”  from time to time but Germany did not enjoy 
such tolerance, see: IbitL. pp. 112-114.
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interest The Sino-Soviet conflict presented such a  window o f opportunity. French 
overtures to Beijing offered new prospects for the Federal Republic as well. Following 
French reasoning, Bonn hoped that friendly relation with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) might add to its bargaining position with the Soviet Union regarding German 
unification and the recognition o f West Berlin as part o f the FRG. But the conflict in 
Vietnam was a major obstacle o f any bi-lateral understanding with the PRC. Washington 
considered China as the source o f Communist aggression in that region. In addition, 
taking sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict might appear as meddling in a “family conflict” 
and could back-fire.
The only feasible course for Bonn was to establish economic ties with the PRC. 
Direct diplomatic relations were impossible for two reasons. First, diplomatic relations 
with Beijing not only confirmed the division of China but might undermine Bonn’s claim 
o f sole representation o f the German people. Second, and more importantly, an 
understanding with Beijing might be unacceptable to the United States.314 Yet, the China 
angle was too promising to dismiss.
The PRC also desired further recognition in the W est The broader the support for 
the PRC in the West the better were the chances to be accepted into the United Nations, 
despite American opposition. In May 1964, Beijing officials conveyed their interest in 
contacts with the Federal Republic. The Chinese proposed a  trade and cultural agreement 
along with discussion o f other pertinent questions and accepted confidential talks. While
AAPD, Wickert Memorandum: Relations between the FRG and die PRC, Dec. I I , 1963, pp. 1617-1619; 
Wickert pointed out that Washington should be informed by any German approach, to Beijing and even 
economic relations could be voided by Washington, given its concern about Chinese military support of 
Hanoi.
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a  trade agreement was promising, Bonn remained reluctant to the exchange o f officials.315
Bonn was dodging the question o f any German recognition o f the PRC, but further talks
with the Chinese could be advantageous to Bonn's overall goals. Bonn could probe the
Chinese view on the German question and possibly use the Sino-Soviet conflict to pursue
negotiations on unification:
We should not miss any opportunity to assess how the Sino-Soviet conflict might 
be utilized for the solution o f  the Germany and Berlin question. This o f even greater 
importance now since our W estern allies realized that a  new approach [i.e.on Germany] 
has no chance o f success m Moscow. Every opportunity to gain greater room to 
maneuver has to be pursued. M ost o f all, we have to explore whether and how for 
Beijing might be willing to downplay or even reassess its relations with the Soviet 
Occupied Zone.316
While Bonn was hoping to win the Chinese for its position, the Foreign ministry 
was concerned about American objections to any German-Chinese understanding. 
Therefore, Bonn developed a ‘defense strategy* toward Washington. Five NATO 
members, including Great Britain and France, maintained diplomatic ties with the PRC 
while Bonn was only considering trade relations. More importantly, the West could not 
miss the opportunity given by the Sino-Soviet tensions. Also, Western Europe could 
assume the role o f mediator with Beijing in lessening global tensions. For West Germany, 
in particular, contacts with the PRC served the purpose to explore additional venues on 
the German question. Lastly, the American ambassador to Warsaw, John Cabot, had 
maintained close but ultimately unsuccessful contacts with PRC ambassador Wang Ping- 
nan. Accordingly, the United States to could not object to any exploratory German 
consultations with Beijing.317
Jt5 AAPD, 1964, Memorandum of Senior Official Krapf Foreign Ministry, May 19,1964, pp. 542-543. 
m I6id, p. 543.
}tT Ibid, pp. 545-547-
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The Chinese were certainly interested in negotiation with Bonn as a first secret 
meeting in Bern revealed. Tsui Chi-yuan, head o f the PRC delegation in Switzerland, was 
eager for a  trade agreement and quite disappointed to learn that Bonn had not yet made a 
final decision. Tsui emphasized that his government conducted its own independent 
policy to foster world peace, implicitly referring to Sino-Soviet relations, and Beijing was 
solely guided by the concerns of its own people. German consul in Switzerland, Nieis 
Hansen, was delighted by the Chinese position and pushed hard for the recognition that 
Bonn represented all o f Berlin internationally. Tsui remained reluctant, though he 
regarded the German division as abnormal. Beijing favored unification through 
negotiations between the two ‘parts’ o f Germany, which made perfect sense since the 
PRC hoped for a similar solution with Taiwan. Beijing saw no reason to break diplomatic 
relations with the GDR but promised to refrain from interfering in inner-German affairs 
provided that Bonn followed the same policy of non-interference in the conflict with the 
Soviet Union.3t8Senior official Krapf recommended that Washington be informed about 
the recent talks. He did not foresee any American opposition regarding a trade agreement 
since contacts with Beijing were helpful toward a solution o f the German question and 
did not damage American interests.315
In July 1964 Hansen again met with Tsui m Bern. Hansen was worried about 
press reports on Sino-German contacts and suggested further meetings should be held at a 
secure place. Tsui was quite displeased with recent statements by Chancellor Erhard 
rejecting closer ties to the PRC. Tsui feared that Bonn, like the United States, had
111 AAPD, Memorandum of Senior Official Krapf Mai 30,1964, pp.585-588.
319 Ibid-p. 589.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
adopted a hostile course toward Beijing. Thus further Sino-German negotiations appeared 
futile. Hansen replied that Bonn was still interested in a trade agreement, downplaying 
the press reports along with Erhard’s comments, and Tsui accepted to continue talks in 
secrecy.320 The talks went nowhere because Erhard lacked the political courage to 
continue the China angle. He rejected any approach that endangered the precious 
relationship with the United States. Since Erhard did not pursue the China angle to its 
fullest it is hard to predict what might have happened in terms o f an American response to 
this German initiative. The conflict in Vietnam, along with Erhard’s deference to 
Washington ended the German rapprochement with Beijing.
Bonn -Washington-Paris and the problem o f Vietnam, 1964-1965
The short-lasted Chinese interlude demonstrated that Erhard’s policy making was 
self-restricted to the overriding need o f a  solid friendship with the United States. Erhard’s 
courtship o f Washington increasingly alienated de Gaulle. The French president had 
placed high hopes on comprehensive relations with West Germany and a  more 
independent Europe under his own leadership. Consequently, de Gaulle was thoroughly 
disappointed Erhard’s new course. De Gaulle even labeled Erhard as subservient to the 
United States. Erhard was deeply offended, but he insisted that his pro-American course 
was the best way to serve West German interest. The first encounter with Lyndon 
Johnson in Texas seemed to prove Erhard correct.
120 AAPO, Memorandum ofNiels Hansen, Consol m Bern, July 21, L964; the Japanese government was 
also worried about Sino-German contacts. Bonn downplayed the issue by stating it was only interested in 
better trade condition. See: AAPD, Message o f Undersecretary Carstens to the Embassy in Tokyo, July IS, 
1964, pp. 863-864.
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Meeting on the LBJ ranch shortly after Christmas 1963. both leaders started off 
well. Erhard reaffirmed his complete trust in the United States and pledged his 
unequivocal support to the president.321 Johnson was primarily concerned with domestic 
problems and relations with the Soviet Union. The president promised to closely consult 
Erhard on any questions o f detente with the East.322 The chancellor worried that an 
improvement in East-West relations might result in diminished American interest in 
German unification and lead to the recognition o f the status-quo. Johnson assured Erhard 
that Germany like any other nation enjoyed the right of self-determination and should 
stand firm in pursuing the goal of reunification.323 This first encounter established a 
pattern that would continue during the following years. Erhard eagerly assured his loyalty 
to the United States, hoping to gain concessions and backing on vital German concerns. 
Johnson was pleased to find an encouraging voice in Erhard but German issues were and 
remained secondary on Johnson’s foreign policy agenda. Erhard received kind words 
instead o f substance but believed that he had an impact on Johnson.
Events in Asia, soon, preoccupied the Americans and the French and increasingly 
affected Bonn. In early 1964, France established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Bonn 
opposed this move because it run counter Bonn’s agenda. Any recognition of the Chinese 
division might undermine Bonn’s claim to solely represent the German people and, more
521 AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Lyndon Johnson, Stonewall, Texas, Dec.28,1963, pp. 1672-1674.
122 AAPD, Memorandum, o f Undersecretary Carstens, Dec. 30,1963, pp. 1712-13; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik 
unter Erhard, pp. 44-48. The Germans were quite happy about the good start at LBJ ranch and felt that 
both leaders had established a  agreable relationship. Obviously, Bonn, did place much greater emphasis on 
the encounter than the American side.
m AAPD 1964 VoL I, Memorandum of Foreign Minister SchrOder, Jan. 6,1964, pp. 15-18; SchrOder 
reminded the German ambassadors that they had to continue pressing arguments for German unification. 
Although some countries grew tired o f and oblivious to this German concern, the diplomats had to keep the 
issue alive.
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importantly, the French decision intensified tensions between Paris and Washington.32*De 
Gaulle justified the recognition to Erhard by pointing to the possible benefits both for 
V ietnam  and Western Europe. On Vietnam, de Gaulle repeated the position previously 
expressed to Washington; the conflict could only be solved through negotiations.325
Erhard disagreed with de Gaulle. The Germ an leader accused Beijing o f actively 
promoting aggression and Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Erhard considered 
the French recognition o f the PRC as premature. He was concerned with the possibility of 
Beijing and Moscow ending their disagreements once they realized that the West was 
exploiting the split o f the Communist world. After all, Communism threatened free 
countries around the globe and Erhard concurred with the American position that the free 
world could only stand up to aggression if it fought the enemy jointly.326 Erhard was less 
concerned about the actual motives of the Chinese, with whom Bonn was negotiating as 
well, than the negative repercussion of the French recognition of the PRC for West 
Germany.
De Gaulle dismissed Erhard’s repetition o f the American point of view. He 
refused to placate Washington merely to present an unanimous front within the NATO 
alliance. While Paris was open to debate, it also reserved the right to express and pursue 
its self-interest within NATO or elsewhere. Bonn could not refute this argument because
AAPD, Memmoradum of Undersecretary Carstens, Jan. 15,1964, pp. 42-45; Paris o f course hoped that 
Washington would eventually recognize the validity of the French course both toward Vietnam and China. 
125 AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  de Gaulle, Feb. 14,1964, pp.208,211-212. De Gaulle maintaine d  that 
while the U.S. was unwilling to disengage from South Vietnam, it could not possibly succeed with its 
current strategy. Since Washington rejected all out war against North Vietnam and China, the U.S. could 
only sink deeper into a quagmire. Given the domestic problems m China, Beijing might be willing to 
accept a settlement over Vietnam.
325 AAPD, Conversation Erhard—de Gaulle, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 213-214; Osterfaeld, Aussenpolitik unter 
Erhardy pp. 64-68.
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West Herm ans also hoped for a more influential role within NATO. At the same time, 
Erhard could not officially endorse the French position regarding the PRC and Vietnam 
given his own policy goals to secure the protection and good will o f the United States.327
By early 1964 Vietnam had become another issue on which France and the 
Federal Republic agreed to disagree, mainly because Bonn felt the necessity to prove its 
unqualified allegiance to its prime protector, the United States. Interestingly, Bonn and 
Paris, at least unofficially, were not completely at odds over Vietnam and China. The 
German ambassador to Saigon doubted that an American victory in South Vietnam was 
achievable and in secret Bonn was also seeking closer ties to Beijing. Nevertheless, 
Erhard felt compelled to be the most loyal and trustworthy ally to Washington.28 Despite 
his differences with Paris, Erhard was acutely aware that he had to maintain a 
constructive dialogue with de Gaulle because further deterioration in French-German 
relations might torpedo chances for progress toward unification.
To Bonn the French diplomatic recognition of the PRC and its fallout for the 
Atlantic Alliance put West Germany on the spot.329 What could Bonn do to facilitate 
French-American relations? Bonn found de Gaulle’s “grand design," a Europe from the
327 Fora more m depth, debate about Franco-German difference over the recognition o f the PRC and 
Vietnam see: AAPD, SchrCder - de MurvHIe, Feb. 14,1964, pp. 224-225; Murville blamed the United 
States for the crisis within the alliance and stated that Paris was willing to openly discuss the problems in 
Southeast Asia, with other NATO members. Both secretaries agreed that bi-lateral talks were m fact quite 
helpful to resolve thorny issue and current divergence o f opinion on Vietnam between Bonn and Paris. 
53 AAPD, Erhard conversation with U.S. Ambassador McGhee, Feb. IS, 1964, pp. 257-259. Erhard 
restaged his recent encounter with de Gaulle for the American ambassador. This time it was Erhard who 
lectured his French counterparts on the pitfalls o f neutralization hr Vietnam and strongly denounced die 
PRC as the true aggressor m the region. De Gaulle was trying to play the “angel o f peace” undermining 
American effort. Erhard, o f course, fully supported the American commitment to Vietnam.
339 AAPD, Ambassador Klaiber, Paris, to Foreign Ministry, March 6,1964, pp. 316-320; Klaiber argued 
that the cause of French-American tensions was o f course de Gaulle, who since 1958 did everything 
possible to increase the independence o f France vis-h-vis the United States. De Gaulle disregarded allied 
concerns and inewrf relished the role o f defender o f the Third World.
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Atlantic to the Ural, appealing but this unified Europe might result in an isolationist
policy in Washington. West Germany policy goals depended both on American and
French cooperation. Bonn had to work for reconciliation between Paris and Washington:
Nut wenn war Washington und Paris auf unserer Seite haben, konnen wir unseren
Interessen zum Durchbruch verhelfen Unsere Atrfgabe muB es seinjeder weiteren
Verschlechterang des Verhaltnisses Frankreichs zu Amerika mit all unseren KrSften 
Emhalt zu gebieten. Wir werden weder de Gaulle passiv einfach gewahren lassen noch 
aktiv fur die USA Partei nehmen durfen. Mit der ersten Alternative wurden wir das 
Verhaltnis mit den USA fiber Gebuhr strapazieren, mit der zweiten Alternative dem 
Vertrag fiber die deutsch-franzfisische Zusammenarbeit praktisch die Grundlage 
entziehen.330
West Germany was and could not be in a position to chose only one o f its Western 
partners if  unification was to become reality, but the French-American antagonism over 
Southeast Asia undermined Bonn’s own “grand-design.” .
Bonn also realized that the German question was currently of only marginal 
importance to American foreign policymakers, Washington was more interested in 
solving Cold War conflicts outside o f Europe and, perhaps later, might address the thorny 
issue of German unity.331 For Erhard unification remained the prime goal and he hoped 
for a more active American approach regarding Germany. In return, the chancellor 
completely accepted Johnson’s position on Vietnam.332 Soon Erhard realized that his
330 AAPD, Klaiber to Foreign Ministry, March 6,1964, p. 323: “Only if  we have both Washington and 
Paris on our side, can we attain our objectives.. .  We have to prevent with ail means possible any further 
deterioration in Franco-American relations. We cannot remain passive to de Gaulle’s actions nor can. we 
actively take sides with the Americans. The first alternative would cause extensive harm to German- 
American relations while the second would de facto nullify the Franco-German treaty”
331 AAPD, Conference o f Ambassadors, April21,1964, pp. 467-469; Undersecretary Carstens wondered 
why the United States did not take advantage o f the current economic problems within the Soviet Union 
and external difficulties resulting out o f the Smo-Soviet split. The ambassadors argued that Washington 
was unwilling to adopt “classical power-poIMcs” and hoped for evolutionary changes within the Eastern 
bloc to improve the situation m Europe. The West Germans were unwilling to realize and accept that 
Washington, at least for the present, was not interested to challenge the status-quo in Europe.
332 AAPD, Erhard letter to Johnson, May g, 1964, p. 517; Bonn adopted a “Deutschland-Initiative” m 
January 1964 that prescribed several steps for the reunification o f Germany, which was debated with no
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endorsement not only covered American ‘technical’ support to Vietnam but possible U.S. 
airstrikes on industrial targets North Vietnam. The other alternative to those air-attacks 
was U.S. military intervention to prevent the collapse o f South Vietnam.333
Erhard wrote to Johnson that he fully backed the United States’ policy m 
Vietnam The Federal Republic would do everything within its constitutional means to 
support the United States in the endeavor to preserve the freedom of South Vietnam 
Bonn promised to continue its political, economic, and cultural aid to Saigon.334Johnson 
was contented but demanded a  public statement in which Erhard denounced 
neutralisation for Vietnam. Bonn refused to do so because such a declaration would only 
increase Franco-German tensions without changing anything in South Vietnam Bonn 
found a middle way instead. Erhard assured Ambassador Nguyen Qui Anh, representing 
the new government of General Khanh, that West Germany endorsed the American 
position in Vietnam, but refused to directly criticize the French plan of neutralization.335
The French were angered by the German attitude and the intense debate over 
Vietnam between both government continued. Bonn maintained that the conflict in 
Vietnam was another chapter in the straggle o f the free world against Communist
results. In 1964 Erhard regarded the initiative as a  first hopeful sign that the Western allies were willing to 
work harder for a solution regarding Germany.
m  AAPD, Erhard tetter to Johnson, May 5,1964, p. SIS; Ambassador von Wendland, Saigon, to Erhard, 
Wendland’s assessment is documented as footnote to Erhard’s letter which includes a report by ambassador 
to Washington, Knappstein, describing the determination o f Johnson to prevent the fait o f South Vietnam 
at all costs.
514 AAPD, Erhard letter to Johnson, May S, 1964, pp. 515-516; Erhard maintained that South Vietnam was 
a symbol for Western determination against the Communist threat. He also subscribed to the “domino 
theory", fearing that the fall of Saigon would have serious repercussion for all of Southeast Asia. 
Neutralization would only accelerate a Communist take-over.
m  AAPD, SchrOder to Erhard, Mai 17,1964, pp. 541-542; Erhard expressed his sympathy with and 
admiration for the “heroic struggle" o f the South Vietnamese against Communist aggression. He hoped that 
General Khanh remained font to save his country's independence, which was m the best interest not only 
of Southeast Asia but the world.
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aggression, implicitly acknowledging its own dependence on Washington. The French 
disagreed. The crisis in Indochina resulted out o f an indigenous struggle for self- 
determination but was further complicated fay U.S.-Chinese antagonism.336Paris also 
criticized the German notion o f solidarity with the United States on Vietnam, 
condemning it as uncritical and shortsighted. De Gaulle argued that Western solidarity 
could be best achieved when any member of NATO was at liberty to express its honest 
opinions on that matter.337
French criticism o f Bonn was an obvious consequence of de Gaulle’s own foreign 
policy agenda. The basic component for French influence in the world was its leadership 
in Europe. The Franco-German treaty promised close cooperation, and a shared policy for 
Europe. But Erhard rejected the path taken by Adenauer. Erhard proved reluctant to 
accept French guidance and oscillated into the American sphere. While firm in its 
commitm ent to the United States, Bonn endeavored to maintain a basic understanding 
with Paris in order to preserve its chances for eventual unification. It was difficult for the 
West Germans to reject the French view on Vietnam outrightly, given the lack o f German 
expertise in Southeast Asia. Although de Gaulle was unable to fully convince Erhard o f 
his point o f view, the General’s argument in favor o f negotiations did impress the 
chancellor and his advisors.
Erhard made a tentative attempt to affect American thinking on Vietnam during 
an encounter with Rusk in the summer of 1964. The chancellor wondered whether
236 See for example: AAPD, Conversation. SchrSder - Couve de Murvflle, June 8,1964, pp. 622-623:
MurvOIe presented to Bonn the same argument the French used m Washington: The war m Vietnam was a 
civil war, and m order to prevent further escalation the U.S. should reach an understanding with the PRC.
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Beijing could be persuaded to end its interference in Southeast Asian affairs. Rusk’s 
response was a straight no. The secretary regarded China as the major threat for Southeast 
Asia as well as Korea and India. A liberal policy toward Beijing would only provoke 
further Com m unist offensives. If  Beijing insisted on its current course it might lead to 
another war in Asia. With Americans dying in South Vietnam, Washington contemplated 
escalation, unless Hanoi and Beijing realized that aggression was futile.138 Rusk’s 
assertion was revealing to Erhard and left no doubt that Washington would not back 
down over V ietnam . Erhard hurried to ascertain that the Federal Republic was not all 
considering diplomatic relations with the PRC but was merely interested to expand trade 
relations. Erhard even doubted whether contacts with the PRC could lead to any new 
approach on the German question.339Facing American pressure, the chancellor caved in 
and retreated from his government’s earlier assessment on China and surrendered to the 
American point o f view.340
Meeting Erhard m July 1964, Johnson expressed his appreciation over German 
support, especially since the other European allies did nothing to help the United States in 
Vietnam. German aid was also beneficial in Johnson’s efforts to rally Congress and 
public opinion behind his Vietnam policy. Nevertheless, the president still faced difficult
For Vietnam, the best solution was the return to the Geneva Settlement o f1954 by neutralizing the entire 
country.
537 AAPD, Conversation SchrSder- Murville, June 8,1964, p. 624.
AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 12,1964, pp. 646-648.
229 AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 12,1964, p. 648; Erhard clearly told Rusk a different story 
than his own advisors assessment on possible contacts with Beijing; he discarded the China card to placate 
Washington.
340 AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  Johnson, June 12,1964, pp. 653-654; LBJ scorned those countries that 
did have diplomatic ties with the PRC since it undermined the U.S. effort m South Vietnam. Erhard did not 
even attempt to discuss possible German-PRC relations and hinted that Bonn was working to send a 
hospital ship, the Helgolandrt to relieve the suffering of the South Vietnamese.
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decisions on Ms country's future course in Vietnam.341 Erhard cherished Johnson's trust 
and friendship. As another sign o f German good-wili Erhard promised to settle the 
question o f off-set contribution to ease the financial burden for American troops in West- 
Gennany.342 Once more Erhard believed Ms strategy o f unconditional support o f 
Washington correct He failed to realize that Johnson was mainly interested in European 
endorsement o f his Vietnam policy and had no intentions to embark on a  campaign for 
German unification. German and American perceptions o f global issues and national self- 
interest were miles apart
While Erhard received some approval from Johnson, the chancellor was scorned 
by de Gaulle during their next encounter in July 1964. De Gaulle used threats as well as 
the bait o f unification to win Erhard to Ms side. The general accused Erhard o f being a 
deferential vassal to Washington, but then invited Bonn to join not only Ms force de 
frappe. and work for a  European solution for the German question. De Gaulle depicted 
himself as champion o f German unity and maintained that Washington was not at all 
interested in tMs vital German issue.343 Neither intimidations nor promises worked.
m AAPD, Erhard -  Johnson, June 12,1964, pp. 655-657; Johnson complained about domestic pressure on 
Vietnam, with Republicans urging him to do more while the left was against further engagement. The lack 
of European support made it even more difficult for Johnson to justify his policy at home and obtain the 
needed financial support from Congress. LB J also hinted at the far-reaching decisions he still had to make 
on Vietnam, which would have repercussions beyond the United States. While he did not provide details, 
he was refering to the possible deployment of ground troops.
342 Ibid.. pp. 658-659; The offset payments would come to haunt Erhard two years later, when West 
Germany caught m an economic crisis had difficulties to comply American demands. Erhard was affected 
by Johnson's somber mood and the president’s anxieties over Vietnam; see also: Osterheld, Aussenpolitik 
unter Erhard\ p. 91.
341 AAPD, conversation Erhard - de Gaulle, July 3,1964, pp. 714-716; though de Gaulle would also be a
“friend” o f the U.S., he made it abundantly clear to Erhard that he was not willing to conduct his foreign
policy m mere deference to American wishes. For participation in the force de frappe see: AAPD, 
conversation Undersecretary o f State Carstens with de Gaulle, July 4.1964; de Gaulle told Carstens that 
the MLF would not give Germany control over atomic weapons and offered a  German participation m the
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Erhard desired a  stronger European voice in global affairs but the current crisis in 
Vietnam required the undivided moral support o f the United States.3*4
But Erhard’s defiance o f de Gaulle only intensified the German dilemma. Bonn 
needed both the United States and France to sanction German campaigns toward 
unification. But how could Bonn please both allies when they were at odds over Vietnam 
and China? Erhard was unable to envision an alternative to his current balancing act 
between Washington and Paris. The chancellor also harbored serious doubts whether the 
General’s vision o f a united Europe could ever be achieved. Europe was far from the 
unity, while the protection and commitment of the United States was already 
reality.M5Washington remained the most important ally because only Washington could 
completely guarantee the viability o f the Federal Republic even if  that meant unification 
was postponed.
With France’s increasing pressure on Bonn to support its policies, Erhard again 
turned to Washington in search for reassurance believing that only through close 
cooperation with the United States could unification become reality.3*6 Erhard would 
remain unfailing in his support o f the United States in Vietnam in return for a more 
productive American effort towards German interest. Washington was more keen on 
German assistance in South Vietnam. Johnson hoped that Bonn publicly endorsed
force de frappe [ de Gaulle: Warum gehen Sie niche mit uns zusammen? Wir haben die Bombe auch. Bei 
uns kOnnen Sie etnen weft grOBeren Anted erfaalten]
w  AAPD, Erhard-de Gaulle, July 3,1963, pp. 718-721; Erhard refused to accept de Gaulle’s position on 
NATO, China, and Southeast Asia.
** AAPD, Erhard-de Gaulle, July 3,1963, pp. 774-775.
*** On continuous French pressure on Germany to  follow de Gaulle’s  lead see: AAPD, conversation 
SchrOder- Couve de Murville, July4,1964, pp. 762-764; AAPD, conversation Erhard -  US. ambassador 
McGhee. July 6,1964, p. 788; Erhard bitterly resented thatde Gaulle called him a  “mere vassal” o f the 
United States, probably hoping for American sympathy.
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Washington’s policy, while he was less forthcoming on the German question.347 By
supporting the American Vietnam policy, Bonn invested heavily in the relationship with
Washington, simply based on the hope to obtain further support for unification, yet this
hope became more and more unrealistic.348
The resulting quandary for Erhard was that, while he made the decision to stand
by the United States, he still had to placate Paris to prevent a  complete rift with de
Gaulle. But the growing disparity in American and French foreign policy aims, placed
Erhard an untenable situation. Against all odds he kept on trying to procure some benefit
for West Germany. He simply could not lose the support of either Washington or Paris.
Undersecretary Carstens defined the German strategy that required good relations with all
three Western allies as imperative for any chance toward German unity:
Unser oberstes Ziel, die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, konnen wir nur erreichen, 
wenn wir mit unseren drei westlichen Partners zusammengehen. Durch eine deutsch- 
franzosische Union allein, ohne oder gegen die USA, ist es nicht erreichbar. Es mag sein, 
dafi die aktive UnterstQtzung unserer Wiedervereinigungspolitik durch die USA zu 
wOnschen Qbrig IaBt. Insbesondere sind die USA zur Zeit ofFenbar nicht bereit, Druck 
auf die Sowjetunion auszuflben. Das Sndert nichts daran, da0 erne Deutschland-Politik 
ohne oder gar gegen sie hoffhungslos ist. Wir mQssen daher auf die USA immer wieder 
emwirken, um sie zu einer aktiveren Unterstutzung unseres Standpunktes zu bewegen. 
Dazu mQssen wir unser bisheriges enges Verhaltnis zu Omen erhalten.349
147 AAPD, Erhard - McGhee, July 6,1964, pp. 794-795; McGhee promptly presented Erhard with a list o f 
projects in Sooth Vietnam that required foreign aid. He also assured Erhard that Washington would never 
regard de Gaulle as the sole voice o f the Europeans.
** Osterheid, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 101-102; Osterheld was dismayed that Erhard refused to 
participate in theforce defrappe, but Erhard had made Ms choice m favor o f the United States. But he 
encountered increasing criticism by Adenauer and other members of Ms party.
349 AAPD, Memorandum o f Undersecretary Carstens, July 27,1964, pp. 887-888: “Our supreme goal, the 
unification of Germany, can only be obtained if we join wih our three western allies. A Franco-German 
union, without or even against  the United States will not lead to unification. Actually, the United States 
could do more to actively support our unification policy. At the present, the United States & not willing to 
exert pressure on the Soviet Union which however does not change the fact that a German policy without 
or even against the United States would be completely hopeless. Hence we have to continue encouraging 
the United States to en g ag e  in a more active support o f our policy, h t  order to gam  that support we have to 
maintain our currently close relations.”
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The goal o f unification trapped Bonn. It could neither embrace de Gaulle’s views on 
NATO and Vietnam. De Gaulle, whether right or not on global affairs, lacked the 
capability to guarantee West German security. Situated on the front-line between East 
and West, West Germany more than France needed the military protection o f the United 
States. De Gaulle’s idea of a Franco-German political union could do more damage than 
good. It would not lead any closer to European unity and, far worse, might alienate the 
United States. De Gaulle might find forgiveness for his action in Washington, while Bonn 
could not expect the same tolerance.350
Carstens did agree with the French position in regard to China and Vietnam. 
Germany should improve relations with the PRC to entice Beijing to a more productive 
attitude toward the German question. Regarding Vietnam, Carstens concurred with the 
French assessment that chances of an American victory there were dim.351 Although Paris 
and Bonn were not that far apart in their assessment on the PRC and the discouraging 
prospect in Vietnam, Bonn believed that it simply could not permit a possible strain in 
German-American relation by criticizing the American policy in Southeast Asia.
III. America’s Vietnam and the resulting Quagmire for Erhard
In December 1964 Bonn received disturbing news from Washington. Johnson was 
contemplating a  further escalation o f American involvement in Vietnam. Bonn hoped to
350 AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens, July 27,1964, pp. 888-889.
351 Ibid, pp. 891-893; Carstens was also worried that de Gaulle might adopt an openly unfriendly course 
toward Bonn and recommended that his government refrain from any public criticism o f de Gaulle.
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prevent an escalation o f the conflict552 Regardless o f repeated German declarations 
supporting the American role in Vietnam as vital to the survival o f the free world, to 
Bonn the conflict in the Far East presented an undesired impediment in the pursuit of 
German unity. American escalation in Vietnam would move German interests farther 
down the list of top priorities in Washington. Erhard tried his best to be a loyal ally while
American military strikes against North Vietnam after the Pleiku attack in 
February 1965 increased German apprehension despite assurances that the United States 
did not intend to escalate the conflict.555InteIligence gathered by German diplomats 
stationed in Asia reaffirmed the French view that the chance o f an American victory in 
Vietnam was discouraging. But an American defeat in Vietnam might result in the 
collapse of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, affecting the entire Pacific rim. The French 
plan o f neutralization was also not very promising since it might quickly lead to a 
Communist take-over o f South Vietnam.354 More importantly for Bonn, an American 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia might weaken American determination to defend the 
Western world, which touched at the core o f German security concerns. Bonn was 
concerned mostly about a possible reduction o f U.S. troops in West Germany and, more 
generally, whether Washington might lose interest in Europe.555 Erhard saw no other
352 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to the Foreign Ministry, December30,1964, pp. IS7I and 1573.
30 AAPD, 1965, Conversation Erhard -  Ambassador McGhee; February 8,1965, p .274.
354 AAPD, Conversation Schrdder with General Secretary ofNATO, Manlio Brosio, March 2 5 ,1965, p. 
617; see footnote 20 about ambassador conference.
155 AAPD, Conversation Schrdder- Rusk, May 13,1965, p. 823,831-834; Rusk, as well as McNamara 
assured Bonn that despite the growing number o f ground troops m Vietnam no forces would be withdrawn 
from Germany. Rusk also downplayed the German concern that Beijing might intervene. He suggested that 
die situation m Vietnam would come to a  conclusion more quickly if “the other side engaged in large scale 
military action”, which remained puzzling to Schrdder.
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choice than to support Washington’s policy. Not unlike the Johnson administration, Bonn 
could not envision a  viable alternative to the current American Vietnam policy.356
Deployment o f American ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965 was barely 
noticed in Bonn due to a brewing crisis in the Near East over West German arms 
deliveries to Israel.357 Soon, the increasing number o f U.S. forces in Vietnam elevated 
German public awareness and concerns about the conflict Foreign Secretary Schroder 
sought American advice on how to justify the bloodshed in Vietnam to his constituency 
at home. He expected that Washington would inform Bonn in detail about the progress in 
Vietnam, allowing him to give the German people an objective account o f American 
goals in Southeast Asia. Rusk proved understanding but complained about a lack o f allied 
support for the United States in Vietnam. Rusk stressed that the West had to appreciate 
the gravity o f the situation in Vietnam and demanded that America’s allies be more 
forthcoming in their support.35* Schrdder confirmed German loyalty and his country’s 
willingness to contribute financially to American projects along the Mekong river and the 
founding o f an Asian Development Bank.359 National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy 
demanded even more forcefully an greater German effort in Vietnam. Washington was 
determined to succeed in Southeast Asia despite possible obstacles ahead.360 Bonn was
356 AAPD, Conversation Schrdder- Brosio, March 25,1965, p. 617.
357 Osteiheld, Aussenpolitifc unter Erhard, pp. 149-157,168-173,188-189; The crisis in the Near East grew 
more complicated by the visit of East German head o f state, Walter Ulbricht. West Germany had provided 
military equipment to Israel m secret, albeit sanctioned by Washington. The exports of weaponry were a 
very sensitive matter both m terms of constitutional restriction in West Germany and the delicate relations 
to Israel as a result o f the Holocaust. The crisis eventually led to diplomatic relations with Israel and the 
cessation o f ties with Egypt and other Arab countries.
“* AAPD, Conversation Schrdder-Rusk, June2,1965, pp. 922-928; Neither Moscow, Beijing, or Hanoi 
were willing to engage in a constructive dialogue. Rusk admitted that Hanoi profitted from the struggle 
between Moscow and Beijing and continued its policy o f infiltration.
35» Ibid, dp.  927-928
340 AAPD, Conversation Schrdder and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, June 3,1965, p. 942.
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forewarned that Washington had made its decision to seek victory in Vietnam, even if  it 
required taking a long arduous road to get there.361 Secretary o f Defense McNamara also 
focused on Vietnam in a meeting with the Chancellor intimating his expectation that 
Bonn contribute its share by complying folly with offset payments for U.S. troops in 
Germany.362
The Vietnam war was no longer an issue that Bonn could disregard. It touched not 
only the German need for American protection but exposed a decreasing American 
willingness to explore new opportunities in the German situation. McNamara proposed 
increase o f U.S. troops in Vietnam was disconcerting. While Erhard did not see any 
alternative but to sanction American escalation in Vietnam, he did worry whether the 
conflict might lead to U.S. troop withdrawals from West Germany. Hopefully, a 
sufficient number of G .I/s would remain to protect the Federal Republic, but would they 
remain if  the war in Vietnam turned badly, as de Gaulle predicted? How could Erhard 
work for unification if the Cold War intensified over the Vietnam issue. Lastly, Bonn 
faced increasing demands by Washington to further contribute to the conflict in Vietnam. 
What else could Bonn offer if  economic and hum anitarian aid was not sufficient in the 
eyes o f Washington. France would object to an even stronger German endorsement to the 
American war effort in Vietnam. Bonn was more and more trapped diplomatically by the 
conflict in Vietnam. The war strained relations with France, increased doubts about the
Mt AAPD, June 3,1965, p. 943; though Bundy gave the usual reaasurance that Washington was working to 
solve the German question, he was much more worried about the French opposition to the American role m 
Vietnam and hoped that Bonn could influence de Gaulle.
341 IbirL. pp. 945-946; AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Secretary o f Defense McNamara, June4,1965, 
pp. 947-953; France and her obstinate policy toward NATO was also discussed in depth. McNamara, 
bombared Erhard with the number game on Vietnam. Erhard was concerned about Soviet intervention in 
Vietnam but to McNamara replied such scenario was very unlikely unless the PRC was directly attacked.
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U.S. commitment to West Germany and, most o f all, removed the issue o f German, 
unification from the international agenda. Despite the troubling outlook for his own 
policy goals, Erhard chose to hold fast in his commitment to Washington.
During a subsequent summit with Johnson in June 1965, Erhard repeated the 
German litany of loyalty regarding Vietnam. The chancellor hoped that Johnson would 
show* the same commitm ent regarding the German question as the president demonstrated 
in his Vietnam policy. Erhard grew more anxious over the implications o f Vietnam 
conflict. He was concerned whether the United States would stand by its commitment to 
West German security. An American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, on the other hand, 
might cause further apprehension among West Germans whether the United States was 
truly a reliable ally. Erhard discussed these concerns with General de Gaulle and 
explained that he could perceive no other path than reassuring Washington o f Germany’s 
confidence and loyalty.363
De Gaulle sympathized with the German predicament yet deeply regretted the 
American policy in South Vietnam. But de Gaulle could do nothing to alleviate German 
fears since, to him, the American effort in Vietnam was doomed.364 By painting a worst - 
case scenario, de Gaulle again tried pulling West Germany into his orbit. He masterfully 
used the conflict in Vietnam as demonstration to Erhard that Germany was vulnerable in 
its present reliance on Washington- Bonn would be far better off to follow the general’s
153 AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  de Gaulle, June 11,1965, pp. 1002-1005.
364 Ibid. pp. 1007-1008; De Gaulle felt that events in Vietnam proved his continuous warning to 
Washington as correct. De Gaulle also regarded the possibility o f a political solution as more than dim, 
because the U S. had missed the chance to do so and “it was now too late." He also suggested that failure in 
Vietnam might induce the U.S. to adopt an isolationist position and abandon Western Europe as welL See 
also: AAPD, Second Conversation Erhard -  de Gaulle, June II, 1965, p. 1018; De Gaulle proposed
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leadership. Erhard wanted reassurance that German concerns mattered and had no 
intention to exchange his reliance on Washington with an open endorsement to de Gaulle.
365
hi July 1965, Averill Harriman informed Erhard that President Johnson would 
increase the number o f Americans troops in South Vietnam. Harriman assured Bonn that 
no U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Europe.366The ambassador also delivered a 
request by Johnson asking for additional political, psychological, and economic support 
in Vietnam. Washington was urging Western unity regarding Moscow, Beijing, and 
Hanoi:
[Soviet Premier} Kossygin is a hardened Communist and believes that Communism 
will be victorious also through wars of liberation. This conviction could be dampened if 
a revolutionary war, tike in Vietnam, could not succeed. The war in Vietnam has to 
be won. The United States have to demonstrate that Mao Tse-dong and Giap were 
wrong. The Soviet Union will then focus more on its internal development and hence be 
less dangerous. Vietnam is the key to this new direction.367
Harriman skillfully reversed de Gaulle’s argument on the best course in Vietnam. The 
ambassador maintained that the American commitment in Vietnam did not endanger the 
security o f West Germany. Instead, victory in Vietnam would further strengthened the 
Free World against Communism.368
modifications of the NATO obligations, which would require mutual assistance in case of Soviet 
aggression, but did not apply in case of a Chinese or North Vietnamese attack on the U S.
345 Moscow also showed no interest in negotiations with Bonn; East Berlin caused further headaches by 
impeding East-West transit and killing refugees at the inner German border. See: AAPD, Ambassador 
Knappstein to the Foreign Ministry, reporting on bilateral talks on prospects of German unification, June 
17,1965, p. 1055; Rusk met with Erich Mende, Minister for Inner German Affairs and both were 
concerned about the renewed intransigent attitude m Moscow on the German question. Rusk admitted that 
the American role m Vietnam, clearly strained U.S.-Soviet relations. AAPD, Ambassador Blankenhom to 
the Foreign Ministry, reporting from the meeting o f the West European Union (WEU) m Luxembourg, 
June 30,1965, p. 1097.
366 AAPD, Conversation Erhard with Ambassador Harriman, July 24,1965, pp. I250-I25I.
367 Ibid, p. 1251.
348 Ibid.: see also Osterheld, Aussenpolitkvnter Erhard, pp. 217-219; Osterfield commented on the 
remarkable skills o f persuasion m Harrimanrs delivery. The American eloquently praised German support
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In August 1965 Bonn, for the first time, had the opportunity to discuss the 
Vietnam situation with London. The meeting revealed the British to be optimistic about 
the chances o f an American victory in Vietnam. Undersecretary Alexander Boker was 
informed about recent British diplomatic initiatives to establish contacts with Ho Chi 
Minhj which had unfortunately faded. The British were skeptical about the viability of 
the Saigon regime and maintained some reservations about American strategy, but 
refused to openly criticize Washington. London, at least publicly, did fully support 
America’s Vietnam policy. The Foreign Office deplored the Soviet refusal to cooperate 
with Britain as co-chair in Geneva, further impeding peace talks. According to the 
British, Beijing profited from the Vietnam conflict but would not intervene unless 
directly attacked by the United States. Boker was confused about the contradictory 
assessments of his British colleagues and felt that London lacked any clearly defined plan 
for future negotiations.369
Based on this short discussion, Bonn assumed that the Anglo-American side was 
generally in agreement over Vietnam policy. The gloomy French scenario on Vietnam 
left its mark on Bonn, and British optimism about American chances there came 
somewhat as a surprise. Bonn was obviously not aware that London, too, had profound
for Vietnam, which even surpassed that o f the British. In Britain, the ruling Labour party was tom. about 
the conflict in Vietnam. The “special ally” fell short o f the endorsement Washington received from Bonn. 
Erhard quickly assured Harriman o f continuous German support and expressed his deep empathy with the 
South Vietnamese.
569 AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior official BOker, German-British consultation on problems m Africa, the 
Near and Middle East, and South and Southeast Asm, August 18,1965, pp. 1372-1373; Baker was clearly 
surprised by the British response that the U.S. could win the war m Vietnam. His surprise reflects the 
doubts o f the Erhard government that Washington indeed could succeed in Southeast Asia. The documents 
of the AAPD to the end o f1966 include no other evidence on German-British consulation over the 
Vietnam conflict. The British, like the Americans, insisted on greater financial contribution for the up-keep 
o f them troops in Germany.
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doubts about the American Vietnam strategy but chose to keep these concerns secret. 
Although the diplomatic approach seemed proper for British interest, it deprived Western 
Europe, and Bonn in particular, o f a mediating voice. With British backing, Bonn might 
have a  greater impact on Washington regarding Vietnam. But Erhard did not seek further 
discussion on Vietnam with London. He was left in his own quagmire trying to plot a 
course that brought some progress for unity while Paris and Washington were drifting 
further apart on Vietnam.
During his election campaign in late summer o f 1965, Erhard pledged that he 
would continue economic and humanitarian aid to Saigon. Although most Germans 
empathized with the plight of the Vietnamese, many became weary o f Erhard’s overall 
direction in international affairs. The opposition, media, and even members o f the CDU 
accused Erhard o f lacking in leadership and undermining Bonn’s influence in world 
affairs.370 Paris blamed the Vietnam conflict as being the major reason for increased 
international tensions and urged a more assertive stance by the European countries. The 
United States, disregarding European advice, increased its commitment in Vietnam.371
Facing British reluctance toward and outright French opposition against American 
policy in Vietnam, Washington increasingly focused on what the Federal Republic could 
do to aid the American effort in Vietnam.372 Rusk asked Schroder for German aid to 
Saigon in form o f technical engineers, medical personnel, and even police units and also
310 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 220-227,237-238; Adenauer reproached Erhard for not 
cooperating closer with de Gaulle; the CDU was increasingly polarized as well between the Adenauer and
Erhard camp by favoring either Washington or Paris as the principal ally. 
m  AAPD, Conversation Schrdder - Couve de Murville, November 12,1965, p. L7Q4.
McNamara pressured European NATO allies to do more m Vietnam and threatened the redeployment of 
U.S. troops m Europe. He met with no success. No country volunteered to send forces to Vietnam. See:
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encourage the private sector to do business in South Vietnam. Otherwise Congress might 
reconsider the American commitment to Europe because of growing costs in 
Vietnam.373Srhrnrier was hesitant to comply, pointing to the difficult legal situation in 
deploying any German nationals beyond the scope o f the Western alliance. He had 
already discussed Vietnam with several aid organizations, and most doctors and the Red 
Cross were reluctant to get involved in the Vietnam conflict.374 But German constitutional 
intricacies did not interest Washington. As with Britain, Johnson expected a public 
gesture o f support from Bonn. Johnson was determined to exert additional pressure to 
receive the desired backing from West Germany.
Vietnam completely overshadowed the state visit o f Erhard to Washington from 
December 19 to 22, 1965 which turned out to be one o f the most tough and eye-opening 
encounters during Erhard’s tenure as chancellor. The treatment Erhard received was a 
well organized display of pressure, cajoling, and thinly veiled threats. The bottom-line 
was that Johnson insisted on a greater German contribution in Vietnam, not only in the 
form of money but by deploying German troops.375 Erhard countered by pointing to 
current German aid to South Vietnam and his record o f moral support to Washington.376 
But Washington wanted more. McNamara stated frankly that it was unacceptable that the
Foreign Relations o fthe United States, 1964-1968, VoL XIII, Western Europe Region, Telegram From the 
Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department o f State, December 18,1965, p. 287.
m  AAPD, Conversation SchrCder- Rusk during NATO Conference m Paris, December 15,1965, pp. 
1899-1900; Rusk explained to the German that he and McNamara were doing their best to prevent troops 
withdrawals horn Europe, but Congress demanded greater contributions from the NATO partners. 
m  AAPD, Conversation SchrOder-Rusk, December 15,1965, p. 1900.
375 AAPD, Conversation Erhard-Rusk and McNamara, December20,1965,pp. 1915-1917.
576 AAPD, Erhard -  Rusk and McNamara, Dec. 20,1965, pp. l9I7-I9l8;Ruskpomted out that Johnson 
was deeply worried how the Vietnam conflict would affect his domestic program. Johnson had his heart 
and soul set on his “Great Society" while he felt damned by whatever choice he made m Vietnam. Erhard 
as well should follow through his commitment.
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United States sacrifice so much for the defense o f the free world while the allies hardly 
did anything. Bonn had to comply m full with the off-set purchases to cover the costs of 
American troops in West Germany, and any additional help very welcome.577
Johnson demanded German acquisitions o f American weaponry as off-set 
payment for the expenses o f American troops in Germany. The president directly asked 
for Germ an military contributions in Vietnam. Erhard responded that according the 
Germ an constitution he could not sent any troops or even any engineering or medical 
corps to Vietnam. Johnson was not ready to concede, and his “good Mend” Erhard 
received the full Johnson treatment of threats and sweet-talk. The president reminded 
Erhard o f all America had done for West Germany during the last decades and it was now 
time for Germany to pay back its dues. The United States needed concrete and feasible 
help in Vietnam and Bonn had to provide whatever it couId.378Erhard left the meeting 
deeply shaken and near despair and his counsel was simply bewildered. They had some 
idea that Johnson was a passionate “full-blooded” politician but nobody expected that he 
would confront Erhard in such a brutal fashion and ask for the impossible. The depressed
177 AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk and McNamara, Dec. 20,1965, pp. 1918-1919. McNamara relayed 
that 200,000 American, would be m South. Vietnam by the end o f1965, with more to be deployed hi 1966. 
The war already costS 10 bOIIon per year, which would further increase. McNamara's indicated that the 
U.S. reached the end of the line in its duty to Western freedom, while its allies remained complacent. 
Erhard’s first encounter with Johnson appeared a short relief from Vietnam. LBJ showed interest in 
Erhard’s desire to have greater access to nuclear weaponry. See: AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  Johnson, 
December20,1965, pp. 1920-1925.
m  Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 268-270; AAPD, German-American government 
consultation, December20,1965, pp. 1929-1931; Rusk and McNamara made it abundantly clear that the 
U S. would stand by South Vietnam. Hanoi was unwilling to negotiate and hence the bombing ofNorth 
Vietnam would continue until it broke them will to fight. McNamara admitted that success could not be 
achieved quickly, since North Vietnam was basically an agricultural country. To Erhard it was clear that 
Vietnam would be on the agenda for a long time, which made life quite difficult for him.
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Erhard soon left for bed while his team spent the rest o f the night deliberating how they 
could escape “partly unharmed from this crazy situation.”379
The visit was a debacle for German leader. Johnson was adamant concerning the 
off-set payments despite German pleas to consider their current economic difficulties. 
The president even threatened that American troops might be reduced in Germany if 
Bonn was not more forthcoming. Most disturbing was the American demand for German 
troops. McNamara repeated the American request for a  construction battalion and a 
medical company to South Vietnam in January 1966. hi addition, Washington badly 
needed the presence of German military units in Vietnam which went even beyond the 
demands made by Johnson.380
Erhard was willing to provide more financial aid, and even convened a  special 
government commission to evaluate the conflict in Vietnam, but could not send armed 
forces. His reasoning was based on constitutional stipulations that the Bundeswehr was 
created solely for defensive purposes. Even more disconcerting for Bonn was that 
German soldiers in Vietnam would seriously undermine the carefully nurtured image o f a 
peaceful and ‘rehabilitated* Germany. Only twenty years after the Second World War, a 
German military mission, however Justifiable, would cause consternation among Western 
Europeans and most likely Soviet hostility. The West Germans were disinclined to
119 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 270.
3,0AAPD, 1956, Ambassador Knappstein to Foreign Ministry, January 11,1966, p. 7-9; Knappstein 
commented on McNamara’s request for German troops that the secretary was under political pressure to 
find allied support for Vietnam. Knappstein asked for further guidance from Bonn how to respond to the 
question o fa  German military contribution to Vietnam. For Erhard’s public statement see footnote ffl o f 
Knappstein document. U.S. ambassador McGhee also asked for a  Germ an contribution m every way 
possible. See: AAPD, Conversation SchrSder -  McGhee, January 1 4 ,1966, pp. 21-22; SchrOder m aintained  
that Bonn was already doing more than most Western allies. As another sign o f support Bonn sent the 
hospital ship Helgoland to South Vietnam.
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support such a decision by Erhard. Consequently, German-American friendship on which 
Erhard had placed so much faith was less amenable than he had thought. For Erhard’s 
advisors and the CDU debate on whom to trust more, Washington or Paris, became more 
relevant than ever.381 Even worse, none o f the allies was interested in German 
unification.382
By the end o f January 1966 Bonn decided that military deployments to Vietnam 
were impossible because o f legal and political concerns. Any Gom an military 
engagement in Vietnam would be detrimental for both the Federal Republic and the cause 
in Southeast Asia. A German military contribution in Vietnam endangered the security o f 
Berlin and would probably not be welcomed by any Western European country, much 
less by the majority o f West Germans.383
Neither Washington nor Paris appreciated the German position. While the United 
States was eager that Bonn provide additional assistance to Saigon, de Gaulle grew 
increasingly gloomy over Vietnam and urged Bonn to follow his lead.384 The Germans 
worried about their own security which might be undermined by further escalation in 
Southeast Asia, leading to withdrawal of American troops from Europe. In addition,
m AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  Johnson, December20,1965, pp. 1938-1942; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik 
unter Erhard, pp. 271-272.
3,2 AAPD, Memorandum of Undersecretary Carstens, January 27,1966, pp. 77-78,80,93. All German 
allies were preoccupied with problems they deemed more important than German unification . Vietnam 
forced the Moscow to adopt a more aggressive policy against the U S. because ofVietnam. But the Soviets 
had not intentions to intervene militarily. For Bonn, this new ice-age crushed any possibility to even begin 
meaningful discussions on unification
30 AAPD, Senior offical Krapfto Ambassador Knappstein, Washington, January 28,1966, pp. 111-112. 
Krapf pointed to the past difficulties to even establish the Bundeswehr and argued that any military rote m 
Southeast Asia, would leave the FRG more vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
m  Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard* P- 286; McNamara in particular became the black sheep for 
German policy-makers; AAPD, Conversation SchrCder -  Couve de Murville, Feb. 7,1966, p. 159; Murville 
maintained that the war m Vietnam was far more complicated than the Americans perceived and he was
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Bonn was also apprehensive o f anti-European reactions by the American public and 
Congress which could result in a  reduced American commitment in Western Europe.385 
Vietnam represented a  messy situation to Bonn. The Americans wanted greater German 
aid for a  dangerous, and probably unsuccessful war. European and German interest was 
not served by contributing to that conflict but Bonn needed American goodwill. Tom 
between Washington and Paris, Bonn hoped to placate either ally by providing only 
“moral” support to South Vietnam.
A meeting of Erhard’s special cabinet commission for Vietnam in February 1966 
revealed that Bonn had no intentions o f increasing current aid to Saigon. The most 
important members o f the commission, the foreign secretary and secretary o f defense, 
were absent. Instead, the secretaries of economic cooperation, finances, health, urban 
development, Walter Scheel, Rolf Dahlgrun, Elizabeth Schwaizhaupt, and Paul Lucke, 
respectively, attended the meeting. Only Lucke favored a deployment of personnel to 
Vietnam. His colleagues emphatically disagreed. Secretary Scheel (FDP) urged that Bonn 
distance itself from the war in Vietnam. The dispatch of the hospital ship Helgoland 
sufficed completely in showing West German support o f the United States in Vietnam 
while reaffirm ing  the solely humanitarian character of German aid. They agreed that 
Bonn should definitely refrain from any action which might be interpreted as being either 
military or political support for the Saigon regime.386
still concerned about Chinese interference. It was American intransigence than prevented a peaceful 
settlement in Vietnam. Only negotiations could prevent further deterioration.
>%s AAPD, Conversation SchrOder-Murville, Feb. 7,1966, pp. I6I-I64.
m  AAPD, Memorandum of Senior official Thierfelder, head o f the legal division of the Foreign Ministry, 
Cabinet commision on aid to South Vietnam, Feb. 14,1965, pp. 187-188; Rudolf Thierfelder, head o f the 
legal division o f the Foreign Ministry arrived [ate for the meeting in did not participate m the discussion.
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The commission was mostly concerned about the increased financial burden 
additional aid to Saigon might pose. German business was reluctant to send 
representatives to Vietnam. Private charity organization further complicated matters for 
Bonn. The relief organizations insisted that any assistance be provided equally to both 
South and North Vietnam, which of course would send the wrong signal to the United 
States. If volunteers were to be recruited, Bonn had to guarantee financial security and 
that o f their families in case the volunteers were killed in Vietnam. Lucke had a  meeting 
later that day with a representative of German business which, although not promising, 
was considered a positive gesture in itseIf.387With the exception of Lucke, nobody proved 
willing to provide more than financial aid to Vietnam, apparently also reflecting the 
opinion of Germans in general.
Despite official statements that Americans were fighting in Vietnam for German 
freedom as well, the American policy failed to win unqualified enthusiasm in Germany. 
Certainly, many Germans emphasized with the hardship and suffering of the Vietnamese 
people. As in the States, the war entered German living-rooms every night dining 
newshour. Body counts, pictures of bombed landscapes, and napalm victims brought 
back buried memories o f the past world war and, with it, a  sentiment o f solidarity toward 
the Vietnamese people and growing skepticism about American goals and conduct in the 
region.3®8 A possible deployment of German troops might encounter criticism and
387 AAPD, Memorandum o f Senior Official Thierfelder, Feb. 14,1964. pp. 188-189; all ministerswere 
worried about insufficient and unseasoned personnel at the German embassy m Saigon and were happy to 
hear that with Wilhelm Kropf a exprienced diplomat was taking over. Further discussion o f the topic was 
postponed and immediate responsibility handed over to their department heads.
50 See: Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, p. 163; personal reflections o f my parents and 
them generation affirm Arenth*s observation; while the appreciation o f American aid and support after the
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opposition at home. The conservative Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung opposed a Rusk
proposal o f military contributions by Western Europe and rejected any German military
role in Southeast Asia. The burden of German history would not make German military
aid a success but could only undermine the Western effort in Vietnam:
Die Lage Deutschlands, die sowohi auf Hypotheken der Vergangenheit beruht wie auf 
seiner gegenwartigen Exponiertheit, braucht kaum im einzelnen dargestellt zu werden. 
Brachten wirkliche militariscne Hflfeieistungen unter solchen Umstanden der 
amerikanisch-westlichen Seite einen moralischen Vorteil? Ware es nicht zu befurchten, 
dafi die damh einhergehenden Nachteile uberwiegen? Es gibt sicberlich andere Mittel 
urn eine zu billige moral ische UnterstQtzung materiall zu unterbauen.389
German constitutional restriction, thus provided the Erhard government with the easiest 
way to reject American demands for military contributions in Southeast Asia.390
Pressure from Washington continued. Several senators demanded German 
military deployment and in a secret Senate hearing Secretary McNamara again indicated 
that West Germany might also contribute militarily.391 An official statement of the State 
Department, however, denied that Washington was urging Bonn to send soldiers.392Not
war remained very strong among the great majority of West Germans, the pictures coming from Vietnam 
were disturbing and evoked feelings o f empathy towards the Vietnamese.
389 Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 25,1966, p. I.
190 For the constitutional restraints o f the FRG see: AAPD, Memorandum, Luitpold Werz, head of cultural 
affairs section, Foreign Ministry, to embassy m Washington, April 18,1966, pp. 506-510; Werz presented 
a lengthy memorandum discussing the clauses of the Basic Law; Article 26 condemned aggressive actions 
and made them a  punishable offense, which o f course could be used by Washington. Nevertheless, the 
overall intent of the Basic Law, along with the fact that no branch government even could declare a state o f 
war, made it abundantly clear that Bonn could not deploy German troops beyond the narrowly and purely 
defensively defined scope ofNATO.
391 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstein to Undersecretary Carstens, Feb. 21,1966, pp. 204-205; Knappstein 
was deeply concerned about statements ofDemocratic Senators Stennfs and Russell in favor of a West 
German military contribution to Vietnam. The Baltimore Post claimed that McNamara had made the same 
proposal m a  Senate hearing, which sent Knappstein on a  frantic search to fe d  out what McNamara had 
actually told the committee. While the actual statement was classified, the ambassador finally received a 
shortened version that acknowledged the constitutional restriction preventing Bonn from deploying 
military units. However, McNamara expressed his hope to convince Bonn “to come in” and contribute 
more m Vietnam.
391 IbicL. pp.205-206; Knappstein was told that only a few senators were actually demanding a German 
military contribution. The entire affairs made Knappstein quite apprehesensrve and he hoped that a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
surprisingly, news indicating possible negotiations with Hanoi was greeted with relief by 
the Erhard cabinet393 The chancellor also rejoiced over Washington’s acceptance that no 
German military units should be employed in Vietnam.394 Yet this success was shortlasted.
The O ffset payments and the Fall of Erhard
Although Johnson no longer demanded a German military contribution to 
Vietnam, Bonn had to assist financially. The offset payments were the means to increase 
German aid in Vietnam. Washington adamantly insisted that Bonn fulfill its obligation. 
Erhard, though willing, was unable to meet American demands. He faced an economic 
crisis, resulting in a German budget deficit. American persistence that Erhard pay 
intensified domestic criticism of the Chancellor. His efforts to find a compromise with 
Washington failed because of American intransigence, hastening Erhard’s fall. The offset 
payments became the principal issue of contention between Bonn and Washington in 
1966. Since Erhard could not comply, he had no options left to placate 
Washington.395Erhard’s difficulties with Washington threatened the first pillar of
meeting with McNamara could better clear the air. Bonn hoped that further discussions would be held m 
secret m order to avoid an anti-American backlach hr Germany.
m  AAPD, Erhard letter to President Johnson, Feb. 25,1966, p. 225; the Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung 
followed the American initiative closely and was anxious about a failure. Then the dice were cast and the 
conflict would rage more viciously and dangerously than before; see for example: FAZ, Jan. 3,1966, p. I. 
Feb. 14,1966, p. I.
m  AAPD, Conversation Carstens - Alfred Puhan, March L4,1966, pp. 298-299.
59SHubert Zinin ermann. * ... they have got to put something in theJamify pot’: The Burden-Sharing 
Problem in German-American Relations, 1960-1967, German History. VoL 14, No. 3, pp. 329-332; Until 
1955, West Germany covered the cost ofU-S. troops as part o f the occupation payment. From 1955 
onward, Washington covered all cost but money spent by GX’s led to a  dollar glut hr Europe. This 
situation was further worsened by the economic recovery ofEurope, reversing the trade balance to 
Europe's favor.
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Adenauer’s foreign policy paradigm -  mutually good relations with the United States. 
Erhard found himself not only at odds with Paris but also with Washington.
American demands that Bonn contribute to the costs of U.S. military com m itm ent 
in Germany was not a  new issue. Since 1960, Bonn faced growing American pressure to 
financially contribute to the up-keep o f U.S. personnel in West Germany, hi 1961, and 
again 1963, Bonn agreed to purchase large quantities of military equipment from the 
United States.396 But Bonn remained apprehensive about the potential correlation between 
American protection and West German offset-payments. In 1964, Washington’s budget 
was strained by the intensifying war in Vietnam, and Congress insisted on larger financial 
contribution o f the Europeans to the Atlantic AlIiance.397Bonn agreed to a new off-set 
settlement in May 1964 that provided for annual weapons purchases o f $ 675 million. 
This agreement did not include the safeguard o f former understandings with Kennedy, 
which made German purchases dependent on a balanced budget in West Germany. 
Shortly afterwards West Germany experienced a recession accompanied by inflation 
which led to difficulties in balancing the federal budget. Erhard’s desire to find consensus 
in Washington quickly vanished during his fateful December 1965 visit to Washington.
m  Znnmermann, Burden-Sharing, pp. 352-338; In I960, Bonn refused a monetary settlement, arguing it 
would be regarded by Germans as occupation costs. In Ggbt o f the construction o f the Berlin Wall, Bonn 
was more malleable to the American demands and, m October 1961, Bonn agreed to order military 
equipment for S 1,425 billion during the next two years, which covered the foreign exchange of U.S. 
troops; at that tune the BxaidesvK.hr needed the ordered materiel and the agreement was renewed for two 
more years m 1963.
m  Ibid. pp. 337-338; de Gaulle's decision to cash m American dollars held in gold caused hardship in 
Washington, which was further intensified by the weakness o f the British pound. West German financial 
contributions hence became even more important
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Johnson insisted on. an immediate offset payment o f $ 100 million and additional S 50 
million for the war in V ietnam . This was not what Erhard had hoped for.398
In the spring o f 1966 McNamara posed an ultimatum: either Bonn would stand by 
Its financial obligations or face a reduction o f U.S. troops m Germany. Bonn was 
disturbed by the unveiled threat and pointed to NATO stipulations which did not make 
European security dependent on monetary contributions.399 But Washington remained 
adamant. Rusk was angered by constant European pleas for American protections while 
the Europeans were unwilling to increase then contributions to Europe’s defense. Unless 
European attitude changed, the United States was forced to cut its expenses in Europe. In 
Bonn, there was no doubt that American intransigence on the off-set question was a result 
o f the Vietnam war.400
The off-set payments issue became a burden to the chancellor attracting media 
attention in both countries. Diplomatic exchanges between Bonn and Washington grew 
more tense. The armories o f the Btmdeswehr were over-flowing with American weapons, 
yet Washington would not accept any delay in recompense and offered Bonn the 
opportunity to acquire American technology in other areas - as long as the money kept 
coming. By May 1966, Bonn was S 660 million behind in payments but pledged it would
Zimmermann, Burden-Sharing, p. 338; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 271.
399 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to the Foreign Ministry, May 2 4 ,1966, p. 680.
400 AAPO, BCnappstem to Foreign. Ministry, May24,1966, pp. 681-682; Congress was openly disgusted 
with European failure to play then part. Some congressmen charged that the European had forgotten the 
hardships of the previous World Wars and focused sorely on then self-interest, which, made then “fat and 
lazy.” British demands for a greater German contribution for then army o f the Rhine made matters worse 
for Erhard. He refused to pay more to Britain but McNamara would not tolerate the same approach. See: 
AAPD, Conversation Erhard -  British Chancellor o f the Treasury, James Callaghan, May24,1966, pp. 
683-685.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
fulfill its obligations as soon as possible. Washington did not accept further German 
shortcomings.401
In June 1966 Rusk asked Erhard for a pre-payment of DM I billion which was
urgently needed to contribute to the expanding American, budget over Vietnam. Erhard
was baffled by the enormous sum and could not comply.402 McNamara repeatedly singled
out Germany in his demand for greater monetary compensation:
I think we can say to the Germans, as we have, that over a reasonable period of time 
either we must have collective defense of the free world or we are not going to have 
any defense at all because this country is not going to continue to bear a 
disproportionate burden of the defense of the free world and we certainly aren’t going to 
defend it alone.403
The Vietnam crisis was now deeply affecting Bonn. McNamara was not interested 
in German security issues or unification. The war in Vietnam had become his overriding 
concern and Bonn must contribute financially.4<MGerman-American relations reached a 
historic low. Generally, the German media and public were apprehensive about U.S. 
troop withdrawals but angered by American financial pressure.405 Johnson was also not in 
the mood for compromise in the off-set question. To Rainer Barzel, head of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary representatives, Johnson repeated his uncompromising stand.
401 Zimmerman, Burden-Sharing, pp. 338-339; AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to SchrOder, 
June 2,1966, pp. 744-746.
401 AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, June 9,1966, pp. 785-786.
4(0 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to SchrSder, June 10,1966, pp. 802-808; Congress also 
demanded greater financial contributions by the Europeans to cover American global commitments.
404 Frankfurter Aligemeine Zeitung, July 29,1966; accordingly, West Germany was increasingly isolated in 
NATO council in its insistence on the Soviet threat. McNamara adopted the position that a Soviet attack 
was unlikely and announced that two reserve divisions would be no longer available for Europe and 
redeployed to South Vietnam.
405 AAPD, Ambassador Knappstem, Washington, to Schrfider, June 10,1966, p. 80S. Knappstem suggested 
that Bonn worked on alternatives for the possible withdrawal o f GJ.*s. He was also deeply concerned that 
the frequent leaks from Washington to the American media, on the offset question which would severely 
damage the image of the U S. m West Germany.
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The United States was stretched to its limits due to the war in Vietnam and, unless the 
Europeans assisted Washington, his country might turn to isolationism and leave the 
Europeans to the Soviets.406
The American message to Bonn was unmistaken: support us, pay us, or we might 
abandon you. Was Johnson completely sincere? O f course, he had no intentions of 
relinquishing the American role and predominance in the Western World. He successfully 
employed the same strategy o f scare tactics during Erhard’s visit in December 1965. 
Johnson’s advisors further debated this approach to Germany during the summer o f 1966, 
and they were divided on how much pressure to exert. Ultimately McNamara prevailed. 
His strategy of a “tough stand” was aimed at maneuvering Bonn into asking Washington 
to “cut troops” and “invite us out.”407 McNamara insisted on “100% weapons-offset, 
regardless of German politics” and stressed that the message had to be delivered instantly, 
since otherwise the German budget might simply not allow any payments in full for the 
coming years. While Johnson remained reluctant to issue an ultimatum, it was obvious 
further confrontation with Bonn was still to come.408
McNamara’s argument was interesting and revealing. Was Washington so 
obsessed with Vietnam to risk a loss o f influence in Europe by forcing Bonn to ask the 
United States to abandon Germany? The answer is simple: Washington could pressure 
Bonn to fall in line. With France pursuing grandeur by defying Washington, and London
** AAPD, Conversation Rainer Barzel with Lyndon Johnson, Washington, June 16,1966, pp. 825-826; 
Johnson pointed out that die US had lost more than 2000 Americans in Vietnam. I f  America behaved as 
selfish as the Europeans and simply quit Europe; it would mean war in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
407 FRUS, 1964-1968, Western European Region, Vol. XIII, Memorandum from the President's Deputy
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson, August 11 ,1966, pp. 444-445. 
Ball and McGhee cautioned against too much pressure on Erhard or risk the collapse of his government.
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working for a diplomatic settlement on its own, Germany was unable to use the European 
card in its relations with the United States. Erhard’s course had led nowhere in the 
international arena. Washington demanded money and not kind words o f moral support.
Erhard’s agony was intensified by domestic criticism on both his foreign and 
economic policies. The chancellor was blamed for a CDU loss in July 1966 to the SPD in 
state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia.409 The press attacked Erhard’s failure in 
maintaining good relations with Washington and Paris. Many journalists and politicians 
now endorsed Adenauer’s close cooperation with Paris, concluding that Bonn, when at 
odds with France, was always seen with less respect in the United States. Erhard 
remained defiant and hoped that his up-coming September visit to Washington would 
bring positive results and a way out o f the domestic dilemma.410
However, Erhard would travel to the States empty handed. He lacked the fiscal 
means to pay the German dues to Washington for 1966 and I967.4tl McNamara 
continued his media attacks on West Germany. Rumors of U.S. troop reductions also did 
not end.4,2In the middle o f this growing storm Bonn reaffirmed its support for the
40* FRUS, 1964-1968, Western European Region, Memorandum from President's Deputy Special 
Assistant, Bator, to Johnson, August I I , 1966, pp. 446-447.
** Adenauer certainly did not spare Erhard either, h i August 1966, the former chancellor embarked on 
public campaign criticizing his successor. Adenauer recommended the American withdrawal from 
Vietnam, and urged Erhard to improve French-German relations. Many CDU-CSU members agreed and 
the CSU (the Bavarian faction o f the CDU) officially endorsed Adenauer's criticism of the U.S.; see: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August, I I , 1966.
4,0 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp. 337-339; the press speculated about changes in the cabinet 
and demanded a  new course. Public opinion polls regarded the international situation o f the Federal 
Republic worse than ever. The SPD and some members o f the coalition partner FDP demanded Erhard's 
resignation.
4tt AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens, July 22,1966, pp. 977-978; Germany would pay its 
nationals working on American bases, provide free storage facilities, and free maintainance o f U S. training 
facilities.
4tz Ibid.. pp. 979-981; Knappstem complained to Rusk that McNamara's press campaign seriously 
undermined German-American understanding Rusk assured the ambassador that the US. had no intention
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American role in Vietnam. A German delegation visited South Vietnam during the 
summer o f 1966 and was deeply shocked by the hardship and suffering witnessed there, 
promising additional hum anitarian aicL4t3WhiIe this show o f good-will pleased Saigon, it 
did not change anything for Bonn with the Americans. More urgently than before, 
Washington needed any possible kind o f Western support since it increasingly faced 
domestic criticism over the war in Vietnam.414
September 1966 turned out to be one of worst months for Erhard as chancellor. 
His trusted advisor Ludger Westrick resigned, leading media and politicians alike to 
demand changes in the cabinet including the office of chancellor. Struggling at home, 
several advisors cautioned against the scheduled visit to Washington. But Erhard believed 
the trip might result in a  badly needed foreign policy success, allowing him to regain the 
confidence o f the public and party skeptics. His hope was unrealistic given the bad news 
he had to convey regarding the off-set payment. Bonn was fifty percent behind in the 
scheduled contributions and would be unable to close the gap in the next year.415
In Washington, Erhard promised to pay German dues but indicated that he could 
not meet the 1967 deadline. He planned to increase the defense budget to prevent similar
of reducing troops in West Germany, but also pointed to congressional pressure to receive German offset 
payments in full. McNamara amd his British colleague Denis Healey threatened substantial troop 
withdrawals unless Bonn met its financial obligations. See: AAPD, Memorandum of Senior Official Ruete, 
August S, 1966, pp. 1039-1040
■*IJ AAPD, Conversation between Westrick and General Nguyen Huu Co, August 12,1966, pp. 1061-1063; 
Erhard reaffirmed his support for the American policy m a  meeting with Swedish Prune Minister Tage 
Erlander. Unlike Eriander, Erhard was against any negotiations on Vietnam at the present tune. The U.S. 
fought m South Vietnam because o f contractual obligation, and Bonn relied on a similar American 
commitment for its viability. See: AAPD, German-Swedish Government Consultation, September2,1966, 
pp. II27-II2S, 1131.
4,4 AAPD, Memorandum Undersecretary Carstens on conversation with Ambassador McGhee for 
upcoming visit in Washington, August25,1966; Arenth, Bewahrungsprobe der Special Relationship, pp. 
163-164; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 346.
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calamities in the future.416 Erhard reminded Johnson of the American security guarantees 
for Europe and pointed to anxieties possible U.S. troop reductions caused in Germany. As 
his last resort, Erhard played the French card. He told Johnson that many Germans, 
including a growing number of delegates in the Bundestag, preferred closer ties with 
France. While he was against any bilateral agreement with de Gaulle, Erhard added that 
he “hoped the President would not misunderstand him but he wanted to say that a  
different German Government that might succeed his Government might not show the 
same loyalty and determination to cultivate close ties with the United States." The 
chancellor hoped that Johnson appreciated his current predicament and that the offset 
problem could be settled in a manner satisfying both sides.417
Johnson fired back that he faced even more serious difficulties and it was not 
“clear to him what the essence of the chancellor’s remarks was.” The president continued 
that during the past years he had always relied on the “German word,” and if they could 
not fulfill then commitment, it would “put them in a very serious and disconcerting 
position” by nullifying the existing offset agreement. Johnson refused to accept any 
alteration in the current payment schedule and accused Erhard o f dishonesty. The 
chancellor left the meeting near despair, empty handed and shamed.418
4,5 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 350; AAPD, Memorandum of Section in  A4, Offset- 
payments, September21,1966, pp. 1234-1235.
415 AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Rusk, Washington, September 26,1966, pp. 1237-1238; Rusk was
relatively understanding but obviously it was left to Johnson to forcefully debate the issue.
417 FR.US, Western European Region, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 
September26,1966, pp.47I-473; AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, Washington, September26, 
1966, pp. 1242-1245.
4t* FRUS, pp. 476-477; Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, p. 354. LBJ was obviously determined to 
force Erhard to pay. The chancellor swallowed the verbal abuse and invited LBJ to visit Germany. Erhard 
also agreed to tripartite (U.SJU.K. FRG) negotiations on offset payments.
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Erhard’s vision o f a strong American-German friendship, eventually opening the 
path for German unification, was torpedoed by the American engagement in Vietnam. 
Erhard remained the loyal soldier by assuring Johnson that the United States was doing 
the right th ing in Vietnam.4I9McNamara remained “hard like Shylock” and did not give 
an inch toward a compromise in the offset question. The final communique at least 
allowed Erhard  to save face by promising to do his best to comply with the scheduled 
contributions for American troops in Germany.420
The visit to Washington only intensified the growing clouds hanging over 
Erhard’s political future in Germany. The budget calamities remained unresolved and 
measures to consolidate government spending, including higher taxes, were strongly 
criticized by the media and by the coalition partner FDP. On October 27, 1966 the FDP 
ended the coalition and its ministers resigned from the cabinet. On November 2, Erhard’s 
own party, the CDU, urged him to step down. In the Bundestag the SPD and FDP 
intensified their pressure to force Erhard’s resignation and, on November 10, the CDU 
decided to select a  successor for Erhard and nominated Kurt Georg Kiesinger. On 
November 30, 1966 Ludwig Erhard finally resigned and Kiesinger was elected 
Chancellor the next day, heading the Great Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD. Foreign Secretary Gerhard Schroder was replaced by Willy Brandt.421
AAPD, Conversation Erhard - Johnson, Washington, September27,1966, pp. 1266-1267; the record of 
the meetmg.onIy gives a. hint o f Erhard’s desperation. Johnson’s attack on Erhard’s good word and honor 
must have been very difficult to swallow. Perhaps the Federal Archives ofW est Germany will shed more 
insight on the encounter.
420 Osterheld, Aussenpolitik unter Erhard, pp.356-358; mostly critical o f Erhard, Osterfeld had to give him 
credit for gaining a  little more time m the offset payments and not breaking under pressure.
421 Vogelsang, Das Geteilte Deutschland, pp. 279-280; Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands, pp. 178-179.
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Erhard’s inability to forcefully convey his concerns to Washington, and the 
increasing American pressure on his government to assist in the Vietnam war, contributed 
to his fall. The conflict in Southeast Asia demolished Erhard’s foreign policy agenda. The 
more South Vietnam preoccupied policy-making in Washington, the more the German 
question became o f only secondary importance. Washington was unwilling to risk 
additional tensions in Europe by challenging the status quo. Kennedy had accepted the 
division o f Germany during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, and Johnson did not change this 
course. Upon assuming office in late 1963, Erhard sincerely believed that German loyalty 
to the United States would bring greater benefits for the Federal Republic. He pursued 
this policy partly because he distrusted de Gaulle’s ambitions in Europe. Although 
Erhard’s concern about de Gaulle was not unfounded, the chancellor further limited his 
foreign policy options by refusing to play the European card in negotiations with 
Washington. During his last encounter with Johnson, Erhard finally used the European 
angle, but it was far too late.
Unlike Adenauer, Erhard ultimately failed to understand the motivations and self- 
interest that shape international relations. Erhard also rejected Adenauer’s paradigm that a 
successful German policy had to be build on both good relations with Washington and a 
solid grounding in Europe. Undoubtedly, both Adenauer and Erhard put German interests 
first, but they differed profoundly in their respective approaches. Adenauer was a 
politician of the old school o f balanced power. Erhard was more o f a  idealist, hoping that 
his loyalty to Washington would be some day rewarded. In hindsight, the limitations 
placed on German foreign policy-making make Erhard’s course understandable. The 
Federal Republic depended on American protection and, unlike France, which even after
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its withdrawal from NATO command enjoyed a  “free-rider^ position simply because o f 
its geographical location, Bonn could not afford to alienate the United States.
Perhaps the only opportunity for a more promising German impact on American 
thinking was a concerted European policy, but Erhard did not even consider this option 
because he regarded good relations with Washington as paramount for his policy goals of 
West German security and progress on unification. While Bonn, London, and Paris were 
doubtful and apprehensive about the growing American commitment in Southeast Asia, 
they never discussed the possibility o f a  joint initiative to make their voice heard in 
Washington. Bonn and Paris repeatedly discussed the Vietnam conflict, but did so with 
their own (not common) interests in mind. Erhard, the “eager ally,” supported the 
American role in Vietnam because he believed it would help his own political agenda. It 
did not Instead, he faced increasing American pressure to contribute to the war. Johnson 
needed European support, but with a defiant France, and a reluctant Great Britain, West 
Germany was the ideal ally to contribute to the effort in Vietnam, regardless of the 
domestic costs to Erhard.
Action taken by both Kennedy and Johnson reminded West Germany of its 
limitations in foreign policy and, in the process, dampened German expectations of what 
the United States could, and would, do for them. In West Germany, the Vietnam War 
caused a more skeptical attitude toward the United States. While Germany’s “silent 
majority” still strongly appreciated the values and protection o f the United States, 
younger Germans grew more critical o f America. The Willy Brandt government learned 
from the lessons o f German-American relations during the 1960’s and successfully
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expanded on Adenauer’s European angle in pursuing new approaches on the German 
question by engaging the Cold War opponent - the Warsaw Pact.
West Germany was the most eager but also weakest ally in transatlantic relations. 
Unlike, B ritain and France, the Federal Republic refrained from telling Washington what 
to do in Vietnam although the “Vietnam question” hurt German self-interest. The 
question that rem ains to be answered is why Washington refused to respond to profound 
concerns over Vietnam by its major European allies.
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I  don't think i t ’s worth fightingfor and I  don't think we can 't get out. And it's  the 
biggest damn mess. . .  What the hell is Vietnam worth to m e ..  What is it worth 
to this country?
Lyndon Johnson on Vietnam, May 1964.
The United States did not follow European advice regarding the American 
involvement in Vietnam for several key reasons. Ideological differences, American public 
opinion, and the unequal status of the Western Europeans in their relationship with 
Washington all contributed to the lack of response by American policymakers to 
European concerns. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson perceived foreign policy 
based on the ideological conflict with Communism. Propelled to the leadership role o f the 
Free World since the Second World War, American policy-makers sought to contain 
Communism and prevent further encroachment by the Soviet Union in Third World 
countries. Fear of Communism also pervaded domestic opinion. Communism was the 
antithesis to everything the United States represented, such as freedom, democracy, and a 
free market system. The American public and media fully endorsed the country’s role as 
defender o f freedom and democracy around the globe. Vietnam was one o f the global 
trouble spots where Communist forces were advancing against the West. Following 
Truman’s containment policy, since 1954 South Vietnam was directly linked to American 
security interests. The possible fall of the Southeast Asian country would have serious 
repercussions for the region and might even endanger the freedom o f the entire Pacific 
rim.
The Western Europeans did not regard Southeast Asia as being o f prune 
importance for Western security. As both the British and French knew well, the region 
was difficicult territory for any Western military intervention. Washington disagreed and
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believed that it could hi feet meet the Communist challenge in Vietnam on both moral 
and material grounds. As leader o f the West during the Cold War, America had the 
obligation o f protecting Western interests around the globe. This global responsibility 
differed, at least in the eyes o f Washington, from the parochial and selfcentered policy o f 
the Europeans.
The United States vastly contributed to the reconstruction o f Western Europe after 
the Second World War while also guaranteeing its security. In return for aid and 
protection, Washington expected unqualified support from its European allies. While 
Great Britain, France, and West Germany in varying degrees tried to influence American 
policy-making they were delegated to the position of “junior partner" and their political 
influence on American foreign policymaking was limited.
The origins of America’s engagement in Vietnam were based on guidelines 
defined by the National Security Council Resolution (NSC) 68 written in 1950. NSC 68 
furthered the Truman Doctrine by postulating American reaction to even limited 
expansion o f Communism. During the previous years, Washington remained officially 
neutral in the French Indochina War, but with the victory of Mao Zedong in China in 
1949, Southeast Asia became a major focus o f American foreign-policy making. The 
Korean war further validated American suspicions that the Soviet Union and Communist 
China intended to conquer and dominate Asia, and therefore American aid to the French 
was increased. President Eisenhower continued Truman’s commitment to the French 
effort to defeat Communist guerrillas in Indochina. Although Eisenhower refused direct 
American military intervention or the use o f nuclear weapons to save the French in
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Indochina, he nevertheless restated the importance o f the region for American security 
interests.
Following the Geneva Settlement in 1954, Eisenhower was unwilling to renounce 
American influence in Southeast Asia and hoped that the newly created Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and indirect American support to the government o f Ngo 
Dinh Diem would be sufficient to secure the viability of South Vietnam.’22 Washington 
consequently embarked on a “nation-building” policy in South Vietnam, which centered 
around President Diem. This policy worked quite well until 1959. By then domestic 
opposition against the repressive Diem regime intensified, leading to the formation o f the 
National Liberation Front (NLF) in I960.423 Progress in South Vietnam proved rather 
precarious, but Eisenhower remained committed to Saigon based on the conviction that 
Communism had to be contained. Accordingly, American security interests were at stake 
in Vietnam. If  South Vietnam fell, so would the rest o f Southeast Asia, endangering the 
entire Pacific Rim and the United States.
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the foreign policy paradigms 
o f their predecessors. Although the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, both 
presidents were determined not to lose that Asian country. American interference in 
Greece, Iran, and the Dom inican Republic, for example, proved that victory over anti- 
Western forces was certainly possible. Following the neutralization o f Laos in 1962, the
42 The origins of the American involvement in Vietnam have been discussed m detail m numerous
scholarly works. See for example: George C. Herring, America's Longest Wan The United States and
Vietnam. 1950-1975. Second Edition, (New York, 1986), pp. 3-30; Marilyn B. Young. The Vietnam Wars.
1945-1990. (New York, 1991), pp. 1-59; David L. Anderson, Trapped Bv Success: The Eisenhower
Administration and Vietnam. 1953-1961. (New York, 1991), pp.21-35,68-75,85-90; Larry Berman,
Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization o f the War in Vietnam. (New York, 1982), pp. 11-16.
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stakes in Vietnam were even higher. Kennedy initiated American escalation by sending 
more advisors and materiel responding to crisis after crisis in South Vietnam. Yet, 
American aid proved little more than a band-aid solution and, while he would not commit 
ground troops, he also refused to disengage despite better knowledge that the current 
policy was anything but successful.
T. John F. Kennedy
In December I960, President-elect John F. Kennedy was briefed by President 
Eisenhower on global challenges facing the United States. In Southeast Asia, Laos was of 
immediate concern. Kennedy decided against U.S. military intervention and appointed 
Averill Harriman to find a political solution.424 In 1962 another Geneva Conference, 
under the co-chairmanship o f Great Britain and the Soviet Union, neutralized Laos. But 
repeated violations o f the agreement by North Vietnam left a sour taste in Kennedy's 
mouth and also raised concerns for the safety of South Vietnam. Kennedy’s Republican 
opponent, Richard Nixon, called the Laotian settlement an “unqualified disaster.”
43 Herring, Longest War, pp. 50-64; Young, Vietnam Wars, 52-59; for the last year of Eisenhower policy 
m Vietnam see also: Anderson, Trapped by Success, pp. 175-197.
424 Two differing accounts exists on Eisenhower’s recommendations. Rusk understood that Ike would favor 
unilateral intervention if  necessary. McNamara remembered that Ike was “deeply uncertain” about what 
action to take. See: Dean Rusk, As I Saw It. (New York, 1990), p .428; Rusk's report was confirmed by 
notes taken by Eisenhower; see: William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam Wan 
Executive and Legislative Roles and Relatihnshths. Part II; I96I-I964, (Princeton, NT, 1986), p. 4; Robert 
S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons ofVietnam. (New York, 1995), p. 36; see also: 
Richard Reeves. President Kennedy: Profile m Power. (New York. 1993), pp. 31-32; for Clark Clifford’s 
memorandum on the meeting see: Berman, Planning A Tragedy, pp. 16-17.
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Following the Bay o f Pigs debacle in 1961, Kennedy politically could not afford a  similar 
failure in South Vietnam.425
As Congressman, Kennedy favored American support for South Vietnam. He was 
intensely critical o f the French during the First Indochina War, but quickly endorsed the 
new leader o f South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem. Interestingly, his comments on French 
policy in Indochina were right on the mark for the future American role as well - but 
perhaps as president Kennedy did overlook his own assessment o f April 1954. At the 
time, Kennedy could not possibly foresee a  French victory because the French pursued an 
outdated policy based on colonial interests and failed to promote a “strong native non- 
Communist sentiment” which was the basis for any success in Vietnam. Unless the 
Vietnamese were willing to fight for their independence a “military victory, even with 
American support,. . .  is difficult, if  not impossible, o f achievement.”426
Where the French failed, Americans could do better. In 1953, Kennedy met Diem 
and was immediately impressed with the South Vietnamese politician. As a founding 
member o f the American Friends o f Vietnam Kennedy fervently defended Eisenhower's 
commitment to South Vietnam. To Kennedy, that country was the “cornerstone of the 
Free World in Southeast Asia” and a “proving ground for democracy.” The United States 
was the “godparent” o f South Vietnam and had a moral obligation to stand by Saigon.
425 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990), pp. 232-235. Nixon, obviously 
unhappy with Kennedy's foreign, policy wanted to give a  critical speech, o f the president's actions but the 
Bay o f Pigs debacle intervened. Nixon, however, m aintained  that more should be done in Laos.
426 Congressional Record -  Senate, April 6,1954, p. 4673.
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Failure to do so would profoundly blemish: the American image in ah of Asia and also 
hurt American strategic interests.427
By 1961, South Vietnam was neither on the road to democracy nor was its 
survival assured. Days after his inauguration, Kennedy received an alarming report from 
General Edward G. Lansdale who, as a CIA agent played a major part in the 
implementation o f American policy in South Vietnam from 1954 to 1956. According to 
his information, Communist insurgency was growing in numbers and many Vietnamese 
were disgruntled with Diem’s authoritarian leadership, partly a result of the unconditional 
American support for the South Vietnamese leader. Lansdale recommended American 
“emergency treatment” Otherwise Saigon could do no better than “postpone eventual 
defeat” Kennedy immediately approved $ 42 million in aid for South Vietnam.428 The 
president also adopted a counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam already under discussion 
during the last year of the Eisenhower administration. National Security Action 
Memorandum on Vietnam (NSAM 2) authorized infiltration and harassment operations 
against Viet Cong guerrillas, even in North Vietnamese territory. A special task force of 
the Army - the Green Berets - was created and trained in counterinsurgency. Kennedy 
further increased the number o f American “advisors” to South Vietnam beyond the 
officially allowed limit o f685 under the 1954 Geneva Agreement.429 While Kennedy did 
not want another war in Asia, he was also resolved not to lose in South Vietnam.
427 Gibbons, UiS, Government, pp. 5-6; Herring, Longest War, p. 43; Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen. E. 
Pelz, “The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War”, in: Thomas G. Paterson, 
Kennedy’s Onest for Victory: American Foreign Policy. I96I-I963. (New York, 1989), p226.
m  Gibbons, UJL Government, pp. II-I2 ; Herring, Longest War, p. 76.
429 Herring, Longest War, pp. 78-79; Berman, Planning a  Tragedy, pp. 19-20.
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How important was Vietnam to Washington? French president Charles de Gaulle 
called it a “rotten country” and warned Kennedy in May 1961 not to make the same 
mistakes as the French. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan also urged against 
further involvement, while the West Germans pleaded for American help to maintain the 
freedom of Berlin. But for Washington, Berlin and South Vietnam had become symbols 
that demonstrated American determination to draw the line against Communist 
aggression. As vice-president Lyndon Johnson put it after he returned from his first visit 
to Saigon:
We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw back 
the towel in the arena and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a ‘Fortress 
America’ concept. More important, we should say to the world in this case that we don’t 
live up to treaties and don’t stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend 
that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend 
themselves.430
Kennedy’s own campaign propaganda accused Eisenhower o f softness against
Communism and he evoked the infamous “missile gap” by stating that the United States
was foiling behind in the aims race against the Soviet Union.43tAbandoning South
Vietnam would most likely backfire politically at home.
Republican opponents were also closely watching Kennedy’s moves. In May
1961, Nixon gave a speech, on foreign policy issues in Chicago that indirectly addressed
Vietnam, once again reminding Kennedy not to be or appear weak on Communism:
Whenever American prestige is to be committed on a major scale we must be willing to 
commit enough power to obtain our objective even if all our intelligence estimates prove
430 Johnson’s comment is quoted in Gibbons, K £ Government, p. 45. Johnson was sent to South Vietnam 
to reassure Diem of the continuous commitment ofthe United States. Johnson relished m the alignment, 
while otherwise so much overlooked by Kennedy. What he saw obviously impressed the Vice-president 
and he even haded Diem as the Winston Churchill o f Southeast Asia.
4,1 James N. Gielio. The Presidency o f John F. Kennedy. (Lawrence, KS, 1991), p. 17.
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wrong. Putting it bluntly, we should not start things in the world unless we are prepared 
to finish them.432
Whatever farsighted advice de Gaulle and Macmillan had to offer, Kennedy had to follow 
through with what he had promised as a presidential candidate. He had to maintain the 
image o f being a determined warrior against Communist encroachment, thereby 
preempting possible criticism by the Republican Party and hard-line Democrats. The 
majority* o f Kennedy^ advisors also recommended expanding the American effort in 
South Vietnam. Admiral Maxwell Taylor and presidential advisor Walter Rostow visited 
Vietnam in the fall o f 1961 and judged the situation as serious. Diem was increasingly 
losing support and the morale among the South Vietnamese was dismal. They concluded 
that more American aid, including the deployment o f eight-thousand American ground 
troops, might turn the tide in Vietnam. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy rejected the idea of 
sending American troops but, at the same time, refused a negotiated settlement. 
Negotiations over Vietnam would obviously evoke a  storm o f protest from the 
Republicans and hawks within the Democratic Party. Given this domestic situation, the 
president favored a middle course o f providing more financial assistance and advisors to 
South Vietnam.433
With these measures, Kennedy took the first steps along an increasingly slippery 
road in Vietnam. As de Gaulle had predicted, Washington soon discovered that American 
assistance to Saigon was not sufficient to subdue the insurgents. Diem’s autocratic rule 
facilitated the appeal of the Viet Cong. Kennedy, however, continued his support of Diem
'*K Nixon, Memoirs, p .236.
40 Herring, Longest War, pp. 80-84; Gibbons, US. Government, pp. 72-84,96-99; American dollars 
further built up the ARVN, Green Berets and U.S. pilots instructed South Vietnamese military and also
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and in November 1961, affirmed that the United States would not tolerate Communist 
aggression in South Vietnam.4S*By the end o f 1962, the number o f America military 
advisors in South Vietnam had increased from 3,200 to 11,500 with more than one 
hundred killed or wounded. Kennedy held fast on his approach o f limited response, 
though victory in South Vietnam was remote. The Viet Cong modified their strategy to 
respond better to superior American-South Vietnamese weaponry and Diem himself 
became a growing obstacle to American success. To make things worse for Kennedy the 
American media increasingly focused on the failures o f the South Vietnamese leader and 
whose behavior gave them ample opportunity for criticism.435
American voices of dissent: Chester Bowles, John Kenneth G albraith, Mike 
Mansfield, and George Ball
The press was not the first to question the American policy in Vietnam. Some o f 
Kennedy's advisors came to similar conclusions as had de Gaulle and Macmillan urging a 
rethinking of the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam. Chester Bowles, John Kenneth 
Galbraith, Mike Mansfield, and George Ball moved beyond the paradigm of containment 
and falling dominoes. They provided a realistic assessment o f the strategic importance of 
South Vietnam for the United States and regarded the current American policy there as 
being futile and misguided. All four urged an American disengagement and supported the 
political solution o f neutralizing Vietnam.
participated in raids against the VC. Lastly, strategic hamlets and economic programs for Vietnamese 
peasants was aimed to turn the tide m the country-side; Berman, Planning a  Tragedyr pp. 20-23.
434 Herring, Longest War, p. 83: Giglio, Kennedy, p. 243.
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As early as February 1961, then Undersecretary o f State Chester Bowles 
suggested neutrality as a  possible solution for all o f Southeast Asia. 435A nonaligned 
Southeast Asia would allow the United States to move beyond the rigid confines o f the 
SEATO treaty by enlisting broader international support for Washington’s policy in 
Vietnam and preventing Ho Chi Minh from interfering in South Vietnamese affairs.437 
The proposal to neutralize Vietnam fell on deaf ears. Some members o f the State 
Department even indicated that Bowles’ proposition played into the hands o f the 
Communists.438
After the Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam o f October 1961, Bowles again 
introduced his idea o f neutralization. According to Bowles, a deployment of U.S. ground 
troops would only result in “a full-blown war o f unpredictable dimensions.” The White 
House responded negatively to Bowles’ suggestions.439 Soon Bowles found himself 
removed from the inner-circle o f Kennedy’s advisors through his “promotion” as special 
presidential representative for Asian, African, and Latin American affairs.440 In this new 
capacity, Bowles continuously kept a close eye on Vietnam and, during 1962, disagreed 
even more vociferously with the administration’s policy. Bowles was convinced that Ho 
Chi Minh was primarily driven by nationalistic goals and that his version of Communism
435 Gibbons, U.S, Government, pp. 15-17, 39-42; Herring, Longest War, pp. 87-92; Giglio, Kennedy, pp. 
246-247.
436 Giglio, Kenneefy, pp. 88-89.
437 Chester Bowles, Promises To Keep: My Years in Pabiic Life. 1941-1969. (New York, 1971); pp. 407- 
408; Southeast Asian neutrality should be guaranteed by the U.S., Britain, France^ the Soviet Union, India, 
and Japan. By engaging the Soviets the U.S. could utilize the Chinese-Soviet rift to its advantage. 
Obviously Moscow was not keen to accept Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia.
431 Ibid. p. 408.
439 Ibid.. p. 409; Bassett and Pelz; Failed Searchfor Victory, pp. 237-238.
440 Giglio, The Presidency o f Kennedy, pp. 93-94; Bowles publicly criticized the Kennedy decision to give 
a green light to the Cuban expedition, that Ted to the debacle at the Bay ofPigs. His “treason” drew heavy 
fire from Robert Kennedy and Dean Rusk and Bowles was replaced by George Ball.
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was as independent from Moscow as that o f Marshal Tito’s in Yugoslavia, Bowles
pointed, out that Vietnam had struggled for centuries against the Chinese, and Ho now
cleverly used the Sino-Soviet antagonism to get weapons from both sides but did not
welcome any direct Chinese interference in his country.441 Bowles urged his superiors to
appreciate the complexity o f the Vietnam situation and reassess U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Bowles wrote to Kennedy in May 1962 after another visit to Southeast Asia:
If there ever was a need for an ‘ngonizing reappraisal’, it is here and now. This 
reappraisal must look far beyond counterguerrilla tactics and fortified townships 
to the political factors which in the long run prove decisive. American history is 
replete with tragedies bom of our failure to relate our military efforts to 
political objectives.442
In order to restore peace, South Vietnam had to become truly independent, prosper 
economically, and respect the cultural, political, and religious differences of its peoples.443 
American support o f South Vietnamese self-determination would make the U.S. presence 
in that country not only permissible but assured the nations of Asia that the United States 
entertained no hegemonic ambitions in the area. This approach might facilitate an 
understanding with the Soviet Union on securing the neutrality o f Southeast Asia, while 
also precluding any intervention in the region by the PRC.444
This time the White House and Rusk responded favorably to Bowles’ proposal. 
Bowles refined his ideas for a “Peace Charter for Southeast Asia” in the summer o f 1962.
4*t Bowles, Promises to Keept pp. 409-410; Bowles attacked Rusk's strategy m particular. It was silly to try 
and teach the Communists a lesson when Communism varied horn country to country -  a point Rusk 
obviously missed. Hence Rusk prevented a more effective approach m dealing individually with the Soviet 
Union, the PRC, and North Vietnam.
IbtcL. p. 410.
*° Ibid.. pp. 410-411; Bowles maintained that his suggestions for Vietnam was actually the implementation 
of a policy first envisioned by Franklin Roosevelt and that the promise of hue independence clearly had 
not lost any o f its appeal m Southeast Asia almost twenty years later.
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He concluded that fighting must cease immediately and that the entice region should then
be neutralized under United Nations’ supervision, including the withdrawal o f all foreign
forces. Neutrality and territorial sovereignty should be guaranteed the United States,
Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan and perhaps Japan, who
were also to provide further economic and political aid to Southeast Asia.445Bowles’
proposal reflected the basic British and French point o f view and they might have
endorsed i t  But the Charter was soon dismissed by the State Department, which judged
his initiative as being “unrealistic, impractical and premature.”446 Deeply disappointed,
Bowles commented:
Our present course of action within a rigid political and military framework dominated 
by Diem is very likely to fail, and for this failure we may eventually be called upon to 
pay a heavy price, both in Asia and here at home.447
Kennedy was unwilling to consider neutralization because it might lead to the 
unification o f Vietnam under a coalition government, which he equated with the loss o f 
South Vietnam to the Com m unists . Washington could not perceive that a neutralized and, 
perhaps socialist Vietnam might not affect the Cold War balance. Most importantly, 
Kennedy might have to face serious repercussions at home if  he agreed to a  negotiated 
settlement on Vietnam in adhering to the 1954 Geneva Agreement.
John Kenneth Galbraith, who succeeded Chester Bowies as ambassador to India 
in 1961, also regarded the growing American involvement in Vietnam as ineffective and
444 Bowles, Promises to Keep, p. 411.
445 Ibid. dp. 412-413.
446 Ibid. p. 414; the State Department argued that Hanoi had renounce and cease all aggression first before 
a political solution could be found Though Kennedy initially favored a  Bowles fact-finding tour to 
Southeast Asia, it was postponed (hie to the Cuban Missiles Crisis and then lack of interest.
447 Ibid. dp.  416-417.
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self-defeating. The Harvard economist was chosen to facilitate better U.S. relations with 
India and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. From Delhi Galbraith counseled Kennedy on 
economic questions, but the ambassador also expressed his views, sometimes on request 
by the president, on events in South Vietnam.44* Galbraith viewed Vietnam with profound 
concern and maintained that President Diem had alienated his people “to a far greater 
extent than we allow ourselves to know.” He argued that Washington's view was 
distorted because American policymakers only listened to the “ruler's account” and that 
o f the American officials committed to Diem.449
Galbraith experienced conditions first hand during a visit to South Vietnam in 
November 1961. Although Saigon appeared lively and bustling to Galbraith, it was a city 
“in a modified state o f siege.” American personnel were constantly accompanied by well 
armed bodyguards and most of United States Operations Mission (USOM) members were 
stuck in Saigon proper. The military briefings disclosed an intriguing numbers game to 
the economics professor. About 15,000 opposition forces controlled many areas around 
Saigon, facing 250,000 ARVN troops. Even more astonishing was the claim by an 
American officer that the Vietcong had suffered 17,000 casualties in 1961. When 
questioned, the U.S. advisors could not account for these discrepancies. To Galbraith, the
448 John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Accotmt o f the Kennedy Years. (Boston, 
1969), pp. xiv-xv; Kennedy desired the friendship with India as a counter-balance to Communist  Ch ina but 
was not very successful in gaining a closer relationship with Nehru and the state visit ofNehra was a 
“disaster” as Kennedy put it.
*” IbfcL. p. 154; Galbraith maintained that this was not the first time that the U.S. snnpfy went by the rulers 
account and he feared that in South Vietnam this “old mistake” resulted m “one more government which, 
on present form, no one will support.”
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military briefing appeared clearly “as a clue to the state o f things.”*30 Kennedy should use
caution in interpreting the military’s statistics from Vietnam.
Politically, South Vietnam was “certainly a can o f snakes” and the major cause
was President Diem. Galbraith maintained  that the Vietnamese leader was far more
concerned with preventing a coup against him than protecting his people from the
Vietcong. The incompetence o f local administrators, in addition to the lack o f centralized
control over the ARVN and insufficient knowledge about the moves o f the opponent,
made the situation even worse.451
Like Bowles, Galbraith’s assessment was disregarded. Nevertheless, the
ambassador urged Kennedy to reconsider current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam:
We are increasingly replacing the French as the colonial military force and will 
increasingly arouse the resentments associated therewith. Moreover, while I don’t 
think the Russians are clever enough to fix it that way, we are surely playing their 
game. They couldn’t be more pleased than to have us spend our billions in these 
distant jungles where it does us no good and them no harm. Incidentally, who is the 
man in your administration who decides what countries are strategic? . . .  What 
strength do we gain from alliance with an incompetent government and a people who 
are so largely indifferent to their own salvation?. . .  But it is the political poison that 
is really at Issue. The Korean War killed us in the early 50’s; this involvement could 
kill us now.452
Galbraith recommended that Kennedy resist demands to commit American 
combat forces to Vietnam. Even a small deployment would lead to further engagement,
450 Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 260-262. Galbraith commented that the briefing was “geared to 
the mentality o f an idiot, or, more likely, a backwoods congressman.” The briefing officer excused the 
discrepancy m VC losses and ARVN forces by referring first to jungle conditions and then stated that 
several ARVN divisions might not have been actually there.
451 IbicL. pp. 266-268; Galbraith expressed his confidence m Ambassador Frederick Noltmg and 
complained that Noltmg had to learn about the recent Taylor-Maxwell mission through the radio and thus 
had no impact on the actual report to the president. Galbraith hoped that Kennedy would clarify the entire 
issue with the State Department.
452 Ibid.. p. 311; Galbraith was aware that he was “sadly out o f step with the Establishment’ but hoped that 
Kennedy was willing to listen to an outsider’s  advice.
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while many South Vietnamese would eventually go “back to their farms,” leaving the 
actual fighting to the Americans. Kennedy should also uphold civilian control in Saigon 
and most importantly “keep the door wide open for any kind o f political settlement.” If  
Hanoi was giving “any indication to settle, we should jump at the chance.”453 Galbraith 
acknowledged that a  negotiated solution for Vietnam might result in strong criticism by 
American conservatives and their press, but the alternative o f a  growing involvement was 
far more disconcerting.454 According to Galbraith, the only feasible solution to Vietnam 
was an international conference that enforced the Geneva Accords o f 1954. Otherwise the 
United States would find itself in a  “major, long drawn-out, indecisive military 
involvement.” Washington supported a weak, ineffectual government in Vietnam and was 
in danger o f replacing the French as “the colonial force and bleed as the French did”.455
Like Bowles, Galbraith was unable to convince the president toward seeking a 
political solution in South Vietnam. In response to the Galbraith memorandum the Joint 
Chiefs completely rejected the idea of negotiations because the United States had already 
made “a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in 
Southeast Asia.” A reversal of American policy would have “disastrous effects” not only 
in Southeast Asia, but for American credibility around the globe. The voices o f dissent
451 Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 311-312; Galbraith was also worried about too much influence of
the American military on decision over Vietnam. He referred to current differences o f opinion between
Ambassador Noltmg and General Paul Harkins over the best course for South Vietnam. Galbraith reminded 
Kennedy o f the challenge General Douglas MacArthur posed to President Truman in the Korean War.
454 Ibid.. p. 312; Galbraith also suggested that Kennedy look for a replacement for Diem.
455 Ibid.. pp. 342 344; Galbraith was also apprehensive that the present commitment to South Vietnam 
might lead to “a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war the Democrats as so often 
before have precipitated us.” Galbraith also pointed out that the Strategic Hamlet Program was doing more 
damage than good. He maintained that the Soviet Union actually had no intentions to become involved m 
Southeast Asia but that the growing American military involvement was driving Hanoi into the arm s of 
Beijing. American support of Diem also required reappraisal, Galbraith felt that the U S. would be better 
offwith another civilian leader.
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were not completely without impact, h i 1962 Kennedy authorized Averell Harriman to 
talk privately with the North Vietnamese foreign secretary during the Laos conference in 
Geneva, but Harriman received no positive feedback. Since North Vietnam was not 
interested in a negotiated settlement, Kennedy sided again with the majority view o f his 
advisors to pursue the military campaign against Communism in Vietnam.456
Another voice o f caution was that of Senator Mike Mansfield. As a member of 
both the House and subsequently the Senate, Mansfield established himself as an expert 
on Asia. In 1953, Mansfield and Kennedy were invited to meet fellow Catholic and 
promising leader Ngo Dinh Diem. Both Senators were impressed by the Vietnamese 
politician. Like Kennedy, Mansfield endorsed Eisenhower’s Indochina policy.457 The 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu dismayed Mansfield and he partly blamed the 
indecisiveness o f Eisenhower in providing additional support to the French as one of the 
reasons for their defeat.458
Mansfield drew a different conclusion from the French loss than most o f 
Washington’s policy-makers. He believed that freedom in Southeast Asia could only be 
preserved by the effort and determination of its peoples. The United States should not 
perpetuate colonialism by any power but support indigenous governments that truly 
represented their people. Any military alliance for Southeast Asia should be primarily
456 Gibbons, C/.SL Government, pp. I20-I2I.
457 Gregory Allen Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Studv in Rhetorical Adaptation. (East Lansing, Mich., 
1995), pp. 7-27. Mansfield made several trips to the region, increasing his understanding of local 
conditions.
4SS Congressional Record - Senate, July 8, 1954, pp. 9998-10000. Mansfield called for a  “reappraisal" of 
American foreign policy and charged that Eisenhower, both at Dien Bien Phu and the Conference table, 
had committed serious blunders, leading to a diplomatic humiliation. However, the French too had made 
serious mistakes, but American lack ofsupport left the French and Vietnamese resistance to the Viet Min ft 
“exposed, undercut, and ready for collapse.”
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composed o f Asian, not Western nations. Conflicts in Southeast Asia, Mansfield
m aintained, needed to be solved by the United Nations and not the United States.459
Mansfield’s assessment in 1954 defined the core o f the Senator’s view on
Southeast Asia for the next twenty years. He persistently abided by his own
recommendation o f 1954, the exception being his vote for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution ten
years later. In 1954, and later, Mansfield opposed American intervention in Southeast
Asia because it might lead to another major, even world wan
I was never in favor of intervention; and I am opposed to it now. I think it would be 
suicidal. I think the worst think that could happen to the United States would be to have 
our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the jungles there, for in case we 
think there would be no war in Indochina, but also war in Korea, and a third world war 
would commence in Asia, and no doubt would involve the countries of Europe.460
Until I960, Mansfield strongly supported Diem, whom he regarded as saviour of 
his country offering an Asian solution to the problems at hand. But the Senator 
increasingly disagreed with the American strategy in South Vietnam and conveyed his 
concerns to Kennedy in September 1961. Instead o f increasing military assistance or even 
deploying U.S. combat troops, Mansfield suggested that Washington win the goodwill o f 
the Vietnamese people. He argued that the difficulties in South Vietnam were a result o f 
the severe lack of morale o f its people, hence Washington needed to foster greater unity 
and purpose in the fight against Communism.46lUnlike Bowles and Galbraith, the Senator
459 Congressional Record—Senate, July 8,1954, pp. 10001-10002.
460 Ibid-p. 10007.
461 Gibbons, U.S. Government, p. 85; Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, p. 97; Olsen criticized Gibbons for 
accusing Mansfield o f applying “American values and practices in Vietnam”. Olsen defended Mansfield’s 
recommendation by stating that Diem had successfully used Western campaign methods earlier. As 
Frances FitzGerald’s insightful book on Vietnam, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in 
Vietnam,(New York, 1972), demonstrates Western ways may indeed backfire in a traditional Confuciaa
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was not yet ready to write South Vietnam off. However, the South Vietnamese had not 
only to prove their determination to stand up to the Communists, but also needed to do 
the actual fighting:
While Vietnam is very important, we cannot hope to substitute armed power for the kind 
of political, economic, and social changes that offer the best resistance to Communism. 
If die necessary reforms have not been forthcoming over the past seven years to stop 
communist subversion and rebellion, then I do not see how Americans combat troops 
can do it today. I wholeheartedly favor, if necessary and feasible, a substantial increase 
of American military and economic aid to Vietnam, but leave the responsibility of 
carrying the physical burden of meeting communist infiltration, subversion, and attack 
on the shoulders of the South Vietnamese, whose country it is and whose future is their 
chief responsibility.462
Mansfield was the original proponent o f “Vietnamization.” This was not 
America’s war to fight. In a commencement address at Michigan State in 1962 Mansfield 
deplored that Washington’s move toward a broader, more dangerous commitment in 
Vietnam. American ground troops might only lead to a prolonged and costly conflict. 
Mansfield maintained that the United States should employ the services o f the United 
Nations and also engage SEATO to find a diplomatic solution for Vietnam.463
With numerous reports o f progress in South Vietnam during 1962 reaching the 
United States, it was politically unwise for Mansfield and other Democratic skeptics of 
America’s Vietnam policy in Congress to mount any opposition to Kennedy’s course. 
Nevertheless, they maintained doubts about the constitutionality o f a growing 
involvement in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, Mansfield and his colleagues deferred any
society as Vietnam. While Mansfield displayed far greater empathy with Vietnam than many in 
Washington, he too represented the cultural gap between both civilizations.
462 Gibbons. KSL Government, pp. 84-85.
40 Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, pp. 99-100.
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action because they accepted the executive’s prime authority in foreign policy.46* 
Challenging the president on Vietnam would backfire politically and, given the crises 
over Berlin and Cuba, the great majority o f Americans probably would not understand, 
even less follow, the suggestions of a  handful o f senators.
ha late 1962, at Kennedy’s request, Mansfield visited Vietnam for the third time. 
In country, his doubts about actual progress against the Viet Cong and on Diem’s 
leadership ability were confirmed. On arrival he was briefed by Ambassador Frederick 
Noltmg, who depicted the situation as improving and maintained that the United States 
provided sufficient means to facilitate an ARVN victory against the Communists. But 
Mansfield was looking for other opinions as well, and found them in American reporters 
stationed in Saigon. The journalists gave Mansfield a far less optimistic briefing on the 
realities in South Vietnam explaining that victory was more illusive than ever.
Upon his return to Washington, Mansfield filed two reports; one for the public 
and a private one for the president. The public report criticized Diem’s leadership, but 
reaffirmed the American commitment to the country.466 The confidential assessment was 
much more pessimistic. Mansfield disagreed with official estimates that the rural 
Vietnamese could be won over within a year through a strategic hamlet program. It would
464 Gibbons, U.S. Government, pp. 126-130; The deference to executive authority by Congress was evident 
in the adoption o f the Cuba and Berlin resolutions m the fall of 1962, setting a precedent for the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution two years later. The 1962 resolutions authorized the president to do whatever he deemed 
necessary, including the use o f force, to prevent the spread o f Communism. Other Vietnam skeptics 
included Wayne Morse, AI Gore Sn, and William FuIIbright.
465 Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, pp. 106-107; Gibbons, CJ1S. Government, p. 131; Ambassador Noltmg
was dismayed by Mansfield’s contacts with American journalists. Noltmg was currently fighting a  cold war 
with the U.S. press, which was depicting events in South Vietnam far too negatively according to the 
ambassador’s assessment. See: Frederick Noltxng, From Trust to Tragedy: The PoIMcal Memoirs o f 
Frederick Nolting. Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s  Vietnam. (New York, 1988), pp. 85-89; David 
Halberstam. The Best and the Brightest. (New York. 1992), Twentieth Anniversary Edition, pp. 207-208.
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take additional American aid, responsive Vietnamese leadership, and years o f  patient
work to stifle Viet Cong support in the country-side. While Diem still possessed
leadership potential, his abilities were increasingly undermined by the influence o f his
power-hungry brother, Ngo Diem Nhu. Despite these difficulties, the senator saw a good
chance for success with Kennedy’s Vietnam program, provided the situation in Vietnam
did not change dramatically.
Mansfield adamantly opposed a larger American military commitment and argued
that the United States should continue its support but not go beyond the position of
helping the Vietnamese to help themselves:
To ignore that reality w ill not only be immensely costly in terms o f American lives 
and resources but also might draw us inexorably into some variation o f the unenviable 
position in Vietnam which was formerly occupied by the French. We are not, o f  course, 
a t that point a t this time. But the great increase in American commitment this year 
has tended to pint us in that general direction and we may w ell begin to slide rapidly 
toward it if  any o f the present remedies begin to falter in practice.4*6
Kennedy discussed the report with Mansfield, and while displeased with the senator’s
assessment, the president in fact shared the senator’s concerns. Yet, a diplomatic solution
as recommended by Mansfield was not an option. Neutralization of Vietnam would only
facilitate a Communist take-over. Moreover, another fact-finding mission by Roger
Hilsman and Mike Forrestal convinced Kennedy that his policy was effective.
In August of 1963 Mansfield tried one more time to warn the president against
further escalation in Vietnam. The senator was wary of the dangers of U.S. involvement
and believed that Kennedy was coming closer to a point of no return which might result
in a conflict o f at least Korean proportions. Like Bowles and Galbraith, Mansfield argued
466 Gibbons, U.SL Government; p. 133.
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that Washington needed to re-evaluate its vital security and global interests. He argued 
that the importance o f Vietnam had been overemphasized in the past, placing it at the 
core o f American foreign policymaking, while, in fact, it was only o f peripheral 
significance to the United States.4*7 Therefore, any unilateral engagement in South 
Vietnam was self-defeating and might only do more damage than good. Again, the 
senator’s concerns were not fully heeded by the president4**
Mansfield was shocked by Diem’s assassination and even more so when Kennedy 
suffered the same fate three weeks later. The death o f Diem and the growing American 
involvement in the quagmire o f Vietnam reinforced Mansfield’s conviction that the 
United States was pursuing a policy that was not only futile and costly, but damaging to 
the country’s essential interests. He remained a voice o f reason and caution during the 
following decade.
Undersecretary o f State, George Ball, was not an expert on Southeast Asia as he 
had focused for most of his life on foreign policy in Europe, particularly France. In 
Europe, he became a close friend o f Jean Monnet, the inspirational force behind European 
integration, and learned to appreciate the French point o f view on international politics 
which influenced Ball’s thinking on Vietnam.4*9 Ball was initially uncertain about 
Kennedy’s views on foreign policy. He soon appreciated the president’s intelligence and 
pragmatism but noted that Kennedy often lacked a long term vision o f a particular
467 Olsen, Mcmspeld and Vietnam, p. 115. Mansfield also criticized the narrow outlook: o f many American 
officials in Vietnam who lacked greater perspective.
461 Ibid. pp. 115-117; a unilateral engagement would over-extent American forces and hurt American 
prestige in other nations m Asia.
465 David L. DiLeo, George Ball. Vietnam, and the Rethinking o f Containment- (Chapel Hill, 1991), pp. 26- 
27; George BalL The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. (New York, 1983), pp. 99-102.
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policy.470ln  the fall o f 1961 Ball replaced Chester Bowles as Under Secretary of State and 
hence had to expand his field o f expertise. Vietnam was one o f the problems placed on 
Ball’s desk.471 As a result o f both the Korean War and the French debacle in Indochina 
Ball concluded that the United States should “rigorously avoid land wars in Asia.” He 
advised Kennedy along these lines on Laos and urged the president not to overcommit 
American forces in needless conflicts in Asia.472
In South Vietnam, according to Ball, the situation was both serious and hopeless. 
Ball was rather bewildered by his colleagues’ views on Vietnam because they lacked any 
profound historical knowledge about that country. Their estimates echoed what he had 
heard in France ten years earlier, a  better coordinated effort, additional money, and more 
troops, would eventually pay off.473 Ball was dismayed by the findings of the 1961 
Taylor-Rostow mission and completely disagreed with their recommendations. He 
expressed his concerns to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pointing out that 
committing combat forces would lead to a “protracted conflict more serious than Korea” 
for the United States. The French had learned the hard way about the toughness o f the 
Viet Cong, and unlike Korea, the task in Vietnam was not one o f simply repelling an 
invasion but defusing a revolutionary situation in which any Western involvement might 
be equated to some form of colonialism. McNamara did not share Ball’s point o f view 
and endorsed the Taylor-Rostow report.
470 Ball, Oral History Interview, April 12,1965, John F. Kennedy Library, pp. 22-23.
471 Bah, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 171-173,182-183.
471 IbicL. pp. 361-363.
m  Ibid- pp.  363-366.
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A few days later, McNamara changed his mind about troop deployments and
partly concurred with Ball’s position. To send U.S. forces without a  greater Vietnamese
effort was unwise, as American soldiers obviously “could not accomplish their mission in
the midst o f an apathetic or hostile population.”474 Ball conveyed his misgivings about the
American Vietnam strategy to Kennedy indicating that any deployment of U.S. combat
troops would be a  “tragic error.” Once troops were committed, the process could not be
reversed and might lead to a futile and costly wan
Within five years we’ll have three hundred thousand men in the paddies and Jungles and 
never find them again. That was the French experience. Vietnam is the worst possible 
terrain both from a physical and political point of view.475
Kennedy did not appreciate Ball’s argument, calling it “crazy.” The predicted escalation
was simply not “going to happen.” Perhaps the president was impressed by Ball’s
argument after all, since he decided against combat deployments a few days later.476
The rebuke by Kennedy signaled to Ball that his advice was neither heeded nor
desired, and he focused on policy matters where he could make his “influence effectively
felt” He probably remembered the fate o f his predecessor, Chester Bowles. While
harboring doubts in private, Ball remained loyal to the president in public. In an April
1962 speech Ball completely endorsed America’s course in Vietnam, calling a potential
loss of South Vietnam an event o f“tragic significance” for the West in Asia. He furthered
*** Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 366; McNamara, In  Retrospect, pp. 38-39; while McNamara did 
not mention Ball, he confessed that he, as other advisors, knew little about Vietnam and lacked experience 
to deal with crisis. As his own probings into the complexity ofVietnam showed, the United States were 
already facing a dilemma o f a no-win situation in 1961. Though McNamara rejected combat forces for the 
tune being, he did not rule out greater American intervention m the future. 
m  Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 366.
'r7s Gibbons, The American Government, pp. 88-92; Gibbons quotes William Bundy who stated that BalTs 
argument had some impact on the president; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 366-368; Ball was 
uncertain how to  interpret Kennedy's response; either the president simply could not imagine a worst case
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that failure to assist South. Vietnam would have severe repercussions around the world
and sa v e  only to further encourage Communist aggression:
How we act in Viet-Nam will have its impact on Communist actions in Europe, in Africa 
and in Latin America. Far from easing tensions, our unwillingness to meet our 
commitments in one tension area will simply encourage the Communists to bestir one in 
another.
The struggle in Vietnam could not be solved overnight and it would take years o f effort 
but it was a “task that we must stay until it is concluded.”477 When some o f the press 
interpreted the speech as an irrevocable commitment to Vietnam, the White House was 
enraged. Ball had gone from one extreme to the other.47*
Ball also played an important role in sanctioning the coup against Diem by 
endorsing two telegrams by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge recommending the 
replacement of Diem. Ball was certainly not the final authority to give a green light to the 
overthrow o f Diem but he as his superiors did share responsibility in American 
acquiescence to in the coup against the South. Vietnamese leader.479 The Vietnamese 
generals finally acted on November 1, 1963. Ball denied any responsibility for the 
military putsch and maintained that the August telegram had not triggered the overthrow 
of Diem. He regarded the events of early November as being an entirely Vietnamese 
operation.480 The facts proved otherwise. Nevertheless, BalTs account serves as an
scenario requiring combat troops or he actually shared some'ofBall’s concerns and was determined to 
prevent further escalation.
477 Gibbons, The American Government, p. 122.
■"* Ibid.. p. 123. The April 1962 speech m Detroit is to no surprise not mentioned m Ball’s memoirs and 
serves as additional proofto the personal dilemma o f many government officials who doubted privately the 
policy m Vietnam but out o f a  number o f reasons were unable to stand up to them beliefs in public.
479 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp.371-374; Ball after clearance with his superior gave a green 
light to Lodge to end American support to Diem unless the Vietnamese leader adopted a more Liberal
policy. A second request by Lodge to convey U.S. misgivings about Diem to Vietnamese generals opposed 
to them head o f state was also authorized by BalL 
w  Ibid. p. 374.
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important example of the way he and other officials tried to reconcile their profound 
concerns about developments in Vietnam during a time when “’dominoes” and 
“containment” dominated American thinking. Ball was much more outspoken against the 
American policy in Vietnam during the Johnson administration and more willing to 
confront that president than others. But, then too, he found it difficult to balance his 
personal convictions on Vietnam with his loyalty to the president Ball’s ambition to play 
an important role in American foreign politics further complicated his convictions.
The voices of dissent reinforced and reflected the concerns Kennedy heard from 
Paris and London. While the Europeans advice might be discarded because o f their 
colonial past or parochial views, the unwillingness o f Kennedy to consider the opinions 
o f skeptics within his own administration indicates that the president was troubled about 
any domestic fall out from Vietnam and trusted his immediate counsel that the American 
strategy in Vietnam would succeed.
Continuous Commitment to Vietnam
The coup against Diem was turning point in American policymaking on Vietnam. 
The U.S. decision to sanction the coup manifested the failure of previous efforts at 
improving the situation in Saigon. The Buddhist crisis o f summer  1963 revealed the 
bankruptcy o f the Diem regime and brought South Vietnam into the lime-light o f both the 
American and European media. Diem remained unyielding to demands o f religious 
freedom and claimed that Buddhist protest was sparked by the Viet Cong. In June, the 
self-immolation of a Buddhist monk in Saigon, and the subsequent suppression o f
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Buddhist rallies by Diem, aroused world opinion and unified opposition to Diem in South 
Vietnam.481
Kennedy warned Diem that the treatment o f the Buddhists was unacceptable and,
unless the situation improved, the United States would dissociate itself from Diem.
Kennedy authorized American personnel in Saigon to talk to dissident South Vietnamese
military leaders. Between late August and September 1963, American pressure mounted
on Diem to dispose o f his brother and adopt a program o f political reform.4GThough the
administration had second thoughts about a possible coup, the president and most of his
counsel remained determined not to pull out o f Vietnam since a withdrawal ultimately
would result in a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia. Kennedy publicly confirmed
his belief in the “domino theory” during a NBC television interview in September:
I think the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond 
the frontier, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an 
improved geographic position fora guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would give 
the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and 
the Communists.483
A week earlier, the president explained in a CBS interview that the Vietnamese were the 
“ones who have to win it or lose i t” Yet, he immediately contradicted this statement by
m  Herring, Longest War, pp. 95-97; see for example: Newsweek, June 24,1963, Fiery Protest: the 
magazine printed photos of the self-immolations and reported that if  Diem “wants to remain m power and 
unify his people against the tortuous struggle against the Communist Viet Cong, he needs the cooperation 
of the Buddhists”, p. 63. Time followed the events closely as well and made the protest its cover story hi 
August and strongly attacked Mine Nhu, the queen bee, because she recommended the complete crack­
down on the Buddhists. Her ridicule of the immolations as “Vietnamese barbecues” appalled Western 
observers.
4X1 Gibbons, US. Government, pp. 144-159; Herring, Longest War, pp. 97-99; Giglio, John F. Kennedy, pp. 
248-250; Berman, Planning a  Tragedy, pp. 24-27. In August 1963, undersecretary Roger Hifcman sent a 
telegram to new US. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge alluding that ifDiem remained “obdurate” the U.S. 
would consider his replacement. HQsman suggested that Lodge inform South Vietnamese military leaders 
o f the American point o f view and asked the ambassador to search for political alternatives to Diem.
413 Gibbons, U.S. Government, p. 163.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226
pointing out that it would be a “great mistake” for the United States to withdraw, and 
hinted that a change in “policy, and perhaps with personnel” might increase the chances 
o f success in South Vietnam, signaling to Diem that time was running out.4**
A fact finding mission by Taylor and McNamara indicated that further military 
progress had been made against the Viet Cong, but regarded Diem as the major obstacle 
in political reform.485 While Kennedy opposed a coup for the tune being, events in Saigon 
progressed precisely toward that end. The American ultimatum on Diem was interpreted 
as a sign o f support for Vietnamese military leaders to go ahead with their plans to oust 
Diem. Neither Washington, the embassy, nor the CIA team in Saigon made any moves to 
thwart such action.486 On November I, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu were 
overthrown in a military coup and killed the next day. Kennedy was dismayed and deeply 
shocked when he heard about Diem’s murder although he was fully aware o f a planned 
coup.487 “To bear any burden, pay any price” had come to a tragic first conclusion in 
South Vietnam. Only three weeks later Kennedy too paid the ultimate price.
Why did John F. Kennedy disregard the advice o f both foreign leaders and 
members o f his administration, as well as his own assessment o f the challenges in 
Vietnam o f almost a  decade earlier? First of all, there is Kennedy’s view that by backing
*** Giglio, Kennedy, p .25I.
4.5 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 75-SI; Taylor and McNamara recommended withotdmg 
American aid from Diem unless he complied with US. demands.
4.6 Gibbons, U.R. Government, pp. 188-191,197; Washington cabled to Lodge that it would not actively 
endorse a  coup but the ambassador should convey to potential new leaders that the U.S. would not interfere 
and clearly continue its economic and financial assistance to a new government m Saigon. In October, JFK 
learned that a coup was imminent, but he was more concerned about political repercussion for the U.S. in 
case o f failure.
4X7 McNamara, In  Retrospect, pp. 85-85; Giglio, Kennedy, pp.252-253; Gibbons, CLSL Government, pp. 
200-202; for a  detailed account on the coup against Diem see also: Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History. 
The First Complete Account ofVIetnam at War. (New York. 1983), pp. 304-311.
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Diem he was helping a government that offered a real alternative to Communism and, 
with American assistance, would succeed in the process of nation-building.43* Robert 
Kennedy later admitted that this faith in both Diem and the American ability to build a 
viable government in South Vietnam was misguided. The younger Kennedy 
acknowledged his initial support o f the policy in Vietnam during his brothers presidency. 
But shortly before his own death in 1968, he wrote that it was perhaps “never reaEy 
possible to bring all the people o f South Vietnam under the rule o f the successive 
governments we supported.”*89
Second, Kennedy’s own campaign proposal to stand firm against Communism 
might have trapped him in the growing Vietnam quagmire. He had accused the 
Eisenhower administration of not doing enough to contain Communism. Kennedy 
pointed to the Toss o f China’ as American failure to prevent Communist victory leading 
to even more dangers in the global struggle to secure freedom. As president, Kennedy 
was unwilling to risk similar domestic criticism and refused to disengage from South 
Vietnam. In addition, the neutralization o f Laos made it necessary in the eyes of the 
administration to hold firm in South Vietnam to prevent further Communist successes in 
Southeast Asia. Although Kennedy was determined to hold South Vietnam, he 
persistently rejected a major commitment o f U.S. ground troops.490
Finally, Kennedy’s Vietnam policy was affected by an inability to completely and 
realistically assess the situation in Saigon. As Robert McNamara pointed out, the
■*** Bassett and Pelz; Failed Search fo r Victory, p. 250; see also: Schlesmger, A Thousand Days, p. 982.
■*”  Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World. (New York, 1967), pp. 162-163.
450 seer Bassett and Pelz, Faded Searchfor Victory, pp.250-252; Gfglio, Presidency o f John F. Kennedy, 
pp. 253-254; Dean Rusk, As I  Saw ft, p. 430; Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 648-649-
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administration was seldomly satisfied with, information, received from Vietnam which led
to frequent fact-finding mission and consultations with senior officials in Saigon. Even
these missions resulted in an overly optimistic assessment on the progress made in South
*
Vietnam. Part o f the blame rested with the South Vietnamese who gave inaccurate 
information to the Americans, hoping that their reports depicted what the U.S. 
government wished to hear. On the American side, military commanders and many 
politicians alike misunderstood the nature of the conflict by viewing it solely in terms o f 
the Cold War, the containment o f Communism, and the resulting global commitments o f 
the United States.491
The luxury of hindsight and the views o f those critical to the American 
engagement in Vietnam during 1961 to 1963 offered alternative approaches, particularly 
negotiation with the Viet Cong, or even Hanoi. But throughout his presidency Kennedy 
rejected both negotiations and a reduced commitment because he believed that American 
assistance could actually tip the balance in favor o f the W est Political pressure at home 
made it nearly impossible to abandon South Vietnam.492
Public opinion polls and the media generally supported the president’s view. 
Soviet gains in space technology, the alleged missile gap, and Communist activities in the 
Third World created a sentiment affirming the global American commitment to resist 
Communist aggression. Up to the second half o f the I960’s, most Americans favored an 
interventionist role by the United States although the great majority was rather
491 McNamara. In Retrospect, pp. 43-48.
491 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: See Friends and the World Thev Made. (New York, 
1986), p. 640; Kennedy told an advisor in the fall o f1963 that if  he tried to “pull out completely now from
Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy Redscare on our hands." see also Herring, Longest War,
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uninformed about the war in Vietnam.495 With few exceptions, the media also regarded
Vietnam in the context of the larger Cold War struggle against Communism. Most
journalists condoned the coup against Diem and focused on the general relief expressed
by most Vietnamese over the “fell o f the House o f Ngo.”494 Journalists revealed that
pressure from W ashington, despite official disclaimer of any responsibility, “had
effectively encouraged the overthrow of the Diem regime.” The overall tenor of the press
reaction to the coup was not shock about the death o f Diem, but rather whether
Communism could be defeated in Vietnam:
In the last analysis, though, the success or failure of U.S. policy toward South Viet Nam 
will have to be judged on pragmatic grounds. The aim of that policy is to speed a 
successful end to the war against the Communists. To achieve that, the U.S. is now 
clearly committed to back General Minh with even more money, and if necessary even 
more American lives. If it works, if Minh does manage better than Diem, if the U.S. is 
thereby enabled to pull out of Vietnam sooner, then the policy will be a triumph. But 
these are a lot of ifs. And if they turn sour, the outcome could affect the cold war balance 
and U.S. political life for a long while to come.495
Senator Mansfield and a number o f journalists believed that Kennedy was 
preparing to change course in Vietnam, or was at least doubtful about current strategy, 
and that he might have accepted a negotiated settlement after the 1964 presidential 
elections.496 Information coming from Saigon and the critical assessments of De Gaulle, 
Macmillan, and various American advisors might have caused considerable doubt about
pp. 106-107; Herring maintains that Kennedy accepted the “assumption that a non-Communist Vietnam 
was vital to American global interest.”
4*J Benjamin L Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans* 
Foreign Policy Preferences. (Chicago, 1992), pp. 226-227; John E. Mueller, “Trends m Popular Support 
for the Wars m Korea and Vietnam,”- tn: Allen R. Wilcox (ed.) Public Opinion and Political Attitudes (New 
York, 1974), pp. 26-28.
^Newsweek, November I I , 1963,pp. 27-31.
491 TimSy November 8,1963, pp. 21-22.
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the American commitment to South Vietnam. Kennedy, however, made no effort to 
modify American policy. He never seriously considered a withdrawal from South 
Vietnam, but continued to pursue the avowed objective o f training the South Vietnamese 
to defend themselves against Communist aggression. Dean Rusk summarized Kennedy’s 
position:
We took for granted that the United States had a treaty commitment to South Vietnam 
and that South Vietnam’s security was important to the security of the United States. We 
also took for granted that if we failed “ to take steps to meet the common danger,” our 
network of collective security treaties throughout the world might erode through a 
judgment made by the Communists that these treaties were a bluff. At no time did we 
say to ourselves, “We will put in X number of men but no more. If the other side 
continues to escalate, then we’ll just pull out.” At no time did we think that the 
American people would not support an effort to prevent Southeast Asia from going
Communist.497
II. Lvndon B. Johnson
Vietnam undoubtedly was a troubling issue for Kennedy, but the conflict was far 
from consuming all o f Kennedy’s attention. The struggle in Southeast Asia, while 
unexpected and clearly unwanted, would become the overriding concern for Lyndon 
Johnson. He was less interested than Kennedy in the intricacies o f foreign policymaking.
496 Bassett and Pelz, Failed Search fo r Victory, p. 251; Giglio, Presidency o f John F. Kennedy, pp. 244- 
249; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 984-986; Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, p. 117; Halberstam, Best 
and Brightest, pp. 209,299-301.
497 Rusk, As I  Saw It, p. 434,442. Rusk maintains that JFK had no intentions to end the commitment to 
South. Vietnam and that Kennedy was determined to stand up to Communism m that country.
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Johnson’s (beam was the “Great Society” that guaranteed civil rights, social security,
welfare, health care, and education to ail Americans.498
Johnson’s experience in foreign policy was rather limited but, like Kennedy, he
firmly believed that American could not give in to Communist aggression. He argued that
the United States had to remain vigilant and faithful to its commitments. Otherwise, the
free world might experience another “Munich” by caving in to dictators. Johnson
maintained that Third World countries, aided by American tutelage and assistance, could
learn to appreciate the benefits o f Western democracy and become partners in the conflict
against Communist totaIitarianism.499To Johnson’s dismay, the South Vietnamese proved
unwilling to fully accept Western democracy and way of life because they had their own
long tradition and history which they cherished over the American imposed model.
More important for Washington was domestic pressure not to surrender another
country to Communist rule. Kennedy feared that a withdrawal from Vietnam would lead
to “another Joe McCarthy Redscare” but Johnson’s dilemma was even more profound.
He deeply wanted to achieve domestic reform but could not afford losing South Vietnam:
I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the 
woman I really loved - the Great Society - in order to get involved with that bitch of war 
on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home. All my programs. 
All my hopes to feed the hungry and shelter the homeless. All my dreams to provide 
education and medical care to the browns and blacks and the lame and the poor. But if I 
left that war and let the Communist take over South Vietnam then I would be seen as a
4S* For Lyndon Johnson’s background see: Doris Kearns, Lvndon Johnson and the American Dream. (New 
York, 1976); Johnson authorized Keams, a  former White House mtem, to write his biography and granted 
numerous, often very personal interviews. Kearns’ hook is a both a historical and psychoanalytical 
explanation o f Johnson’s life and while the analysis o f Johnson’s motivations is insightful and revealing 
her approach seems also too biased and simplistic hi other instances. As a  good comparison between JFK 
and LBJ see also: Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence o f  Personality noon Politics. (New York, 
196S); fbrthe Johnson presidency, LBJ’s own account is a  valuable source: Lyndon Barnes Johnson, The 
Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency. 1963-1969. (New York, 1971).
499 Wicker, JFK and LBJt pp. 195-197.
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coward and my nation seen as an appeaser, and we would both find it impossible to 
accomplish anything for anybody around the globe.500
Johnson quickly despised the conflict in Vietnam, but trapped himself with his 
commitment to pursue his slain predecessor’s policies. Instead o f securing domestic 
harmony, his decision to escalate the war in Vietnam divided the country to a degree not 
experienced since the Civil War. One of the casualties was Johnson’s own career. In 
March 1968, he announced that he would not run for reelection and declared a bombing 
halt on North Vietnam. 50lBy then, Kennedy’s limited commitment o f more than 16,000 
advisors to South Vietnam had grown into a large scale war with more than half a  million 
U.S. troops deployed and thousands killed or injured. Despite the massive fire-power of 
the United States, no end o f the fighting was in sight.
The Background: LBJ
Bom to the hill-country of southwestern Texas, in 1908, as the oldest o f five 
children, Johnson came from a very different background than the affluent and nine-years 
younger Kennedy. O f lower middle class background, Johnson was encouraged by his 
mother to attend Southwest Texas State Teachers College. There he quickly enjoyed 
college politics. In 1928, he headed for nine months a predominantly Mexican-American 
elementary school in Cotulla, Texas, and finished college in 1930. For a short time he 
taught highschool in Houston, but jumped at the first chance to enter politics, hi 1931, he 
left for Washington as a  congressional aide for Representative Richard Kleberg and ably 
used this position to study the intricacies of Congress. Four years later he became Texas’ 
director o f the National Youth Administration in 1935. In 1937, Johnson was elected to
500 quoted m: Kamow, Vietnam, p. 320.
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the House o f Representatives and, after an unsuccessful first attempt in 1941, he was 
finally  elected to the Senate in 1949.502 Following Pearl Harbor, Johnson served for a year 
in the Navy, earning a  Silver Star, before being called back to Washington by Franklin 
Roosevelt.
As Senator, Johnson rapidly rose through, the ranks. He was elected party whip in 
1951, minority leader in 1953 and majority leader in 1955. In the Senate, Johnson proved 
his talent as a consummate politician, earning him national recognition as one o f the most 
effective and powerful leaders in the Senate’s history. Johnson was instrumental in 
bringing down Senator Joseph McCarthy and he was also the driving force behind the 
passage o f the civil rights bills o f 1957 and I960. He generally supported the Eisenhower 
administration in foreign policy issues, but opposed American air-strikes to help the 
French at Dienbienphu in 1954. Overall, Johnson prodded his Democratic senators to 
pursue a  responsible and constructive course during the Eisenhower years503.
Johnson’s status and achievements made him a potential candidate for the 
presidency in I960.504 But Johnson started late in the presidential race and eventually 
settled for number two - becoming vice-president, with the election o f John F. Kennedy. 
Johnson hoped that he could play a substantial role as vice-president, yet was never fully 
part of the Kennedy inner circle.505 Johnson attended both Cabinet and National Security
501 Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 435.
501 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson* pp. 48-93.
501 Wicker, JFK and LBJ, p. 154-155 and Kearns, Lyndon Johnson* p. 144.
“ * Keams, Lyndon Johnson, pp. 102-158; Blum, Years o f Discord* p.I40.
505 Tom. Wicker* JFK and LBJ, p. 153; Robert Dallek. Flawed Gfantr Lvnrfnn Johnson and His Tunes. 
I96I-I973. (New York, 1998), p. 12; George Ball recounted Johnson deplored his lack o f influence as 
vice-president. See: Oral History Interview with George Ball, July 8,1971, for the Lyndon Johnson 
Library, Part I* p. 2.
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Council meetings and represented his country abroad. Hence, he was well informed about 
foreign policy issues, such as Vietnam, which he had visited in 196L506
Early Decisions: November 1963-March 1964
The first business o f the Johnson administration dealing with the aftermath of 
Dallas, was to assure a smooth transition and bring Kennedy's domestic program to 
fruition. Johnson kept the entire Kennedy cabinet and many o f Kennedy's advisors, 
assuring the country that he would continue his predecessor's course. In foreign policy 
issues, he relied heavily on the advice o f Kennedy's men.307 Vietnam, like most foreign 
policy issues dropped in the background for the time being - o f foremost importance was 
Kennedy’s domestic agenda, which was approved in the following months by Congress.
Soon Vietnam required Johnson’s attention. At the end o f 1963, North Vietnam 
intensified its infiltration into the South, also deploying regular military units. The 
National Liberation Front (NFL) stepped up its political and military operations and 
received better arms and equipment from the North.508 Johnson was unwilling to let South 
Vietnam fall to the Communist North. He felt obligated to continue Kennedy’s policy and 
stand firm against Communist aggression because it was America's duty as leader of the 
free world. But he was also concerned about his image at home.509
506 Oral History Interview with Dean Rusk. September2 6 ,I969,LBJL,p. 1; LBJ had an officer of the State 
Department serving on his staff, who provided hfm with duly report from Saigon.
507 Ball, Oral History, July 8 ,197I,LBJL,p.I0.
308 Frank E. Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam: Lvndon Johnson’s Wars. (College Station, Texas, 1997), pp. 
15-16.
509 Herring Longest War, pp. I08-110; Kearns, Lyndon Johnson, pp.251-253 and McNamara, In 
Retrospect, p. 102; Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 42; LBJ vowed to devote every hour to achieving 
Kennedy's goats. For Vietnam that meant “seeing thing through.”
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Within days o f assuming office, Johnson had to make his first decision on 
Vietnam. On November 24, 1963, Johnson met with Secretaries of State and Defense, 
Rusk and McNamara, as well as Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, to discuss the situation 
in Vietnam and received mixed answers. The president made it abundantly clear that he 
was determined to win in South Vietnam and would not allow that country to become 
another China. He demanded that his generals and officials get the job done, and give him 
breathing space for his domestic program.*10 While he expected positive results, Johnson 
had no intentions to go beyond the current American role in Vietnam.
The discussion resulted with the approval o f Johnson’s first National Security 
Action Memoranda on Vietnam (NSAM 273) on November 26, 1963. It stated that the 
central objective of the United States in South Vietnam was “to assist the people and 
Government o f that country to win their contest against the externally directed and 
supported Communist conspiracy”.5"  Johnson was aware that Diem’s assassination had 
not solved the domestic problems in South Vietnam and that the new government lacked 
in competency. Despite these odds, McNamara and the president hoped to turn the tide, 
ending the American commitment by 1965.512 NSAM 273 also proposed covert 
operations, already suggested in May 1963, in which South Vietnam was to perform “hit- 
and-run” attacks against  North Vietnam, with secret American military assistance (Oplan 
34-A).5B The Memorandum was clearly not a change o f previous American policy. It
510 Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 99-100.
511 Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 43; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 102-103.
sc Johnson, Vantaze Point. pp. 45-46: The Senator Gravel Edition. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense
Department History o f United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. VoL m , (Boston,), p. 18; American 
officials were expected to achieve better communication with them Sooth. Vietnamese counterparts 
allowing for a  more effective approach against the Communist insurgents. 
sa Gibbons, HSL Government^  p. 210, 212.
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promised continuous support for the new South Vietnamese government, led by General 
Minh, but at the same tune, reaffirmed that the war could only be won by the South 
Vietnamese themselves, assuming that there was no major change hi the political 
situation in Saigon.514
But McNamara’s visit to Vietnam in December 1963 was dismaying. Unless 
prevalent trends were reversed, South Vietnam might quickly become neutralized or, 
even worse, taken over by the Communists.515 McNamara recommended a greater role o f 
U.S. advisors in Saigon’s decision making.516 The bad news from Vietnam worried some 
members o f Congress, critical o f further American involvement in Vietnam. Senator 
Richard Russell (D.- GA), Chairman o f the Armed Services Committee, and long-time 
friend and mentor o f Johnson, suggested that the president reach an understanding with 
Saigon allowing for a quick American withdrawal from the country, without losing face 
in world opinion.517
More direct was Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield, who urged the president 
in January o f 1964 to re-examine the U.S. policy in Vietnam. Mansfield felt that the 
United States was close to the “point o f no return” in Southeast Asia heading toward 
escalation. In  Vietnam America again displayed a tendency already evident during the 
Korean War “to bite off more than we were prepared to chew.”51* The administration had 
to assess whether it was truly in the interest o f the United States to continue its
The Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 19-20. 
sts McNamara, In  Retrospect, pp. 104-105.
SIS The Pentagon Papers, VoL m , pp. 31-32; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp.I05-I06; the Mmh government
was according to McNamara, the mam culprit since it did nothing facilitate Saigon victory. ARVN strategic 
operations and deployments proved unsuccessful.
517 Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 102.
S1S Letter by Mike Mansfield to the President, January 6,1964, LBJL.
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involvement and pay for it “with blood and treasure,” only to discover later that the initial
commitment was short-sighted. The solution o f the conflict was ultimately a Vietnamese
responsibility and Johnson should work for a peaceful settlement.119
When Johnson asked his leading cabinet members for advice, they strongly
recommended against a political settlement or neutralization, since it would only be the
first step for an ultimate Communist victory and emphasized that the United States had
extended security interests in the region.520 Mansfield, however, lobbied for neutralization
in the Senate. He asserted that American national interest did not require that the United
States take on prime responsibility for Vietnam sacrificing “a vast number of American
lives”. Americans were in Vietnam solely to help “improve the Vietnamese
military "^T he conflict in Vietnam was essentially a matter among Vietnamese and
could only be solved by them, and it should never become an American wan
Indeed, we might ask ourselves: Do we ourselves, in terms o f our national interest 
as seen in the juxtaposition to the cost o f American lives and resources. . .  prefer 
another Vietnamese type o f involvement o r a  Korean type o f involvement in these 
and other countries and elsewhere in southeast Asia? . . .  Are we to regard 
lightly the American causalities which would certainly be involved?522
Even more critical o f the administration’s Vietnam policy was Senator Wayne 
Morse (D - Oregon), who urged Johnson to immediately withdraw from Southeast Asia. 
The American role in Vietnam since the 1950’s had not been justified and would not 
stand the test o f history.523 Morse also found support in Senators Allen J. Ellender (D.-La)
5,9 Mansfield letter to Johnson, January 6,1964, LBJL.
535 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 107; Gibbons, The ITS. Government and the Vietnam War, pp. 216-217.
521 Congressional Record - Semite, February 19,1964, p. 3114.
522 IHd.. February 19,1964, p. 3115; Mansfield, like de Gaulle could not completely guarantee that 
neutralization might work but it was still the far better alternative; see: IbitL.  pp. 3277-78.
53 Ibid. March 4. 1964, pp.4359,4831.
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and Ernest Gruening (D.- Alaska). The administration was shocked, as well as angered,
by the senators’ comments. It felt betrayed by the Democratic majority leader and was
concerned by the possible reaction to Mansfield’s comments in Saigon. A public debate
over Vietnam could give the impression that the United States was wary o f the conflict
leading to the collapse o f the Saigon government.524
But Johnson also was not willing to make Vietnam an American War. McNamara
testified to the House Armed Services Committee that continuous U.S. training and
supplies would be efficient to allow the ARVN to succeed against the Communist
insurgents. He added:
I don’t believe that w e as a  nation should assume the primary responsibility 
for the war in South Vietnam. It is a counter-guerrilla war, it is a  war that can be 
only won by the Vietnamese themselves. O ur responsibility is not to substitute 
ourselves for the Vietnamese, but to tram them to carry on the operations 
that they themselves are capable o f .525
Increased turmoil and violence in South Vietnam quickly proved that American support 
was insufficient to turn the tide against the insurgents. Johnson reached another cross in 
the road and once more intensified his country’s commitment to South Vietnam.526
NSAM 288: Prevent the fall o f South Vietnam at all cost
As a result o f the deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam the Joint Chiefs 
proposed a change in policy, requiring considerable expansion in the American effort.
Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, pp. 130-131.
525 Pentagon Papers, VoL HI, p. 36.
526 Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam, p. 17; Pentagon Papers, Vol, E , pp. 38-44; Herring, Longest War, pp.
I LI-113. Gen. Mmh was overthrown by Gen. Khanh ut January 1964. The next month the VC initiated a
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The new policy, as adopted in NSAM 288, not only called for an larger commitment, but 
redefined the American objectives in Vietnam. A Communist victory in South Vietnam 
had to be prevented at all cost, otherwise, the rest o f Southeast Asia and even the Pacific 
ran  might fall under Communist dominance.527 South Vietnamese military forces must be 
further augmented and the United States needed greater control over the Saigon 
leadership. The Joint Chiefs o f Staff also favored direct action against North Vietnam. 
Johnson opposed escalation targeting North Vietnam since it might lead to increased 
guerrilla activity against the South, which the Khanh government was too weak to repel. 
Even worse, American escalation might result in direct Chinese or Soviet intervention. 
But the president approved o f the extension of covert operations to block North 
Vietnamese infiltration and conducting retaliatory raids against the North (Operation Plan 
34A).528
NSAM 288 presented a major step toward American escalation. But Johnson still 
refused to deploy U.S. troops. 1964 was afterall an election year and while most 
Americans accepted the current policy it was uncertain how they would react to another 
war in Asia. By accepting the position that Vietnam had to be held at all costs Johnson 
had moved closer to the “point o f no return.” In April 1964 Johnson sounded out 
sentiments o f Congress on possible expansion o f the American role in Vietnam. He 
informed congressional leaders about the new policy in a National Security Council
new offensive, attacking joint ARVN-US units. A bomb m a Saigon movie theatre killed three Americans, 
leaving 5 %  wounded.
527 Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 50-51.
** Ibid. p. 57: Lvndon Johnson. Pontage Pomt. pp. 66^7; McNamara,/nPetraspect, p. LI9.
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meeting.529 Johnson faced only one opposing voice in Senator Morse who favored a 
negotiated settlement under United Nations supervision.530 Another NSC meeting found 
even greater consensus in condemning European unwillingness to back America’s 
Vietnam policy. Although, the Europeans provided some symbolic aid it seemed that they 
“really do not give a damn about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.”531
The debate and decisions o f spring 1964 evidenced that Johnson was determined 
to drawn the line in South Vietnam in the Cold War against Communism. On the other 
hand, Johnson did not want another Korean War possibly involving China, or the Soviet 
Union. It was also unclear whether the United States would find appreciable support 
among its allies if  the conflict escalated. Consequently, Johnson endorsed a middle 
course hoping that American aid and guidance would be sufficient to enable a South 
Vietnamese victory. As Johnson put it: “American boys should not do the fighting that 
Asian boys should do for themselves.”532But the challenge was whether the “Asian boys” 
could do the fighting well enough to attain American objectives.533 One option was no 
longer seriously discussed by most o f Johnson’s advisors -  withdrawing from Vietnam.
529 National Security Meeting No. 526, April 3,1964, LBJL, pp. 3-4; McNamara presented the gloomy 
facts on Vietnam and discussed alternatives, excluding negotiations. Currently, the administration rejected 
direct attack ofNorth Vietnam but might be forced to do so if  a  stepped-up program o f assistance to Saigon 
failed.
38 Ibid. p . 6; even Mansfield supported the continuation o f limited US role. Johnson dismissed de Gaulle's 
plan of neutralization as too vague. The notes o f the meeting do not indicate that congressional leaders 
were informed on current covert operations.
31 National Security Meeting No. 532, May 15,1964, LBJL, p. 1,4-5. Congressman Jensen expressed 
explicitly what Rusk phrased diplomatically. While Germany, France, Great Britain, and Australia 
provided some aid, the US shouldered most o f the burden. McNamara affirmed that combat troops would 
play not part o f the US role in South Vietnam.
32 Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 68; see also: Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, pp. 26/27.
33 Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam* p. 20; for the time being, Johnson settled on a middle course o f 
gradually increasing pressure against North Vietnam without committing American troops. But it was also 
clear that instead o f reducing American “advisors”' their number would have to increase.
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They accepted the assumption that Vietnam was vital to American foreign policy, that a
Communist victory would have the feared trigger effect on the entire region.
During the critical spring o f 1964, Johnson lacked incisive advice to reexamine
his Vietnam policy. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs not only condoned actions adopted
but argued for an intensified commitment. Undersecretary o f State George Ball was the
only voice m the administration questioning the domino theory and he counseled against
further escalation. To Ball, the problem lay not so much in Johnson, who was anxious to
avoid an irrevocable commitment, but in the feet that he inherited and listened to
Kennedy’s advisors who failed to critically reassess the conflict in Vietnam.534 Ball
admitted that it might have been difficult for Johnson to disengage within months after
Kennedy’s death since it would appear that Johnson was rejecting Kennedy’s foreign
policy. Such a  move, undoubtedly, would lead to domestic repercussions and accusations
of Johnson being soft on Communism by handing over South Vietnam.535 Nevertheless,
to Ball, a change in American policy was feasible and could be made at any time, even if
the stakes were high:
I never subscribed myself to the belief that we were ever a t a  point where w e 
couldn’t  turn around. What concerned me then [i.e. late 1963] as it did much 
more intensely even later was that the more forces committed, the more w e w ere 
com mitted to Vietnam, the more grandiloquent our verbal encouragement o f  the South 
Vietnamese w as, the more costly was any disengagement.536
According to Ball, Johnson’s concern on his domestic agenda and his lack of 
experience in Asian politics prevented the president to critically appraise all the aspects
Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 374-375.
35 Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 14.
36 Ibid, dp.  13-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
of the America’s Vietnam policy. Consequently, Johnson was pulled along by events in
Vietnam, instead o f formulating a long-term strategy of his own, leaving the president
without much, room to maneuver. Johnson listened to Ball’s opinions challenging the
administration’s view on Vietnam. But Johnson did not heed Ball’s advice but used him
as a devil’s advocate against the war-hawks.537 The obligation to continue on the Kennedy
course, along with pressure from the hawkish Republicans, limited his view and options
toward the unfolding events in Vietnam. Johnson admitted his dilemma in his memoirs:
Certainly I wanted peace. I wanted it every day of every month I was in 
the White House. All through 1964 and after, I hoped and prayed the men 
in Hanoi would sit down and negotiate. But I made it clear from the day I 
took office that I was not a “peace at any price” man. We would remain strong, 
prepared at all times to defend ourselves and our friends.53*
Success in Vietnam became even more illusive during late spring and early 
summer o f 1964. The United States had to expand its efforts to save South Vietnam. 
Johnson also needed congressional support for an up-graded commitment. His advisors 
concurred. In May 1964, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary o f State for East Asian 
affairs, prepared a  first draft for a congressional resolution which authorized the 
president, upon request by South Vietnam or Laos, to use all measures, including the 
deployment o f armed forces, for their defense against Communist aggression.539 Johnson
537 Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 20; see also: Rusk, Oral History Interview, July 28,1969, 
LBJL, p. 36.
a* Johnson, Vantage Pointr p. 68.
339 Frederick Dutton prepared two studies elaborating the advantages of a congressional resolution. 
Accordingly, congressional backing would further convey American determination to Hanoi and Beijing. 
A resolution would also preclude domestic repercussions at home, and silence Senate opponents. The 
downside was that Vietnam would come to the forefront o f public opinion, but m the long run a  resolution 
would force the large number of undecided congressmen to  endorse the administration. See; Memorandum 
to McGearge Bundy, June 1 ,1964, LBJL, pp. 1-3; an± Rusk, Oral History, September26,1969, LBJL, p. 
II: Rusk made the same point about potential consequences a t home if  the president foiled to secure 
congressional support
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was not yet willing to make such a fundamental decision. He was also concerned about 
his critics in Congress and decided to wait for the time being.540 But he sounded out 
congressional opinion in a series of meetings with key senators reviewing American 
policy in Vietnam. The president assured the senators that he had no intention of 
escalating the war, but that congressional support was needed to demonstrate to Hanoi the 
American determination to prevent a  take-over o f South Vietnam and Laos.541
Uncertainty about the future course in Vietnam continued to plague the 
administration during early summer 1964. The presidential campaign was intensifying 
and Johnson wanted to prevent Vietnam from becoming a major issue. Yet he had to 
convey the image o f effectively handling the Communist threat in Southeast Asia and 
avoid Republican criticism. Republican candidate Barry Goldwater o f Arizona strongly 
opposed Johnson’s domestic program, which he denounced as far too “liberal.” He 
attacked every aspect o f Johnson’s Great Society as “state paternalism.” To Goldwater, 
“collectivism and the welfare state” were the greatest threat at home, while Communism 
was the “foremost enemy around the world.”542 While the federal government should only 
have a  minimal role m domestic politics, the United States definitely needed to adopt a 
more aggressive position with foreign policy.543
The United States, according to Goldwater, could not afford to lose the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union. Only victory over Communism would allow an acceptable peace
5,0 McNamara, In  Retrospect, p. 120; Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam,, pp. 133-134.
541 William C. Berman, William Fnllbnght And The Vietnam Wan The Dissent o f a  Political Realist.
(Kent, Ohio, 1988), pp.19-20; Larry Berman, Planning A Tragedy, p. 32.
542 Peter Iverson, Barry Goldwater: Native Arnrnnan. (Norman, Oklahoma, 1997), pp. 92-96.
541 Ibid.. pp. 109-110; Blum, Years o f Discord, pp. 156-157; DalTek, Flawed Giant, p. 131; Goldwater 
rejected federal aid to education, suggested that social security should be made voluntary, and opposed 
civil rights legislation.
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with the Soviet Union. The United States had to become superior to the Soviet Union, 
politically, economically and militarily. Moreover, America needed to pursue an 
offensive strategy in the fight against Communism and encourage its allies to do the 
same. Peoples around the globe should join together in defeating the Communists and the 
United States needed to support their efforts, if  necessary by military means. In Southeast 
Asia, South Koreans and Vietnamese ought to cooperate with Taiwanese to liberate the 
entire region. To Goldwater, bombing North Vietnam would demonstrate the American 
resolve. He summed up his atdtude in his acceptance speech as Republican presidential 
candidate: “Extremism in the defense o f liberty is no vice, and . . .  moderation in the 
pursuit o f justice is no virtue.”544 Richard Nixon, in a less extreme language, generally 
concurred that Johnson was not doing enough in Vietnam. He believed that JohnsonTs 
policy o f restraint would not succeed and more had to be done to defeat Communist 
aggression in Asia.545While many Americans in 1964 showed little interest in Vietnam, 
the Republicans were ready to make the conflict a campaign issue.
Anxious that Vietnam might undermine his domestic goals, Johnson asked his 
good friend Senator Russell for advice. Russell described Vietnam as a “damn worse 
mess.” The Senator had been apprehensive about American commitment to Vietnam 
since 1954 and he feared that the conflict might lead to a  war with China. When Johnson 
asked how important Vietnam really was for the United States, Russell responded that it 
was worth “a damn bit” with the exception o f the psychological impact a withdrawal 
might have. Russell and Johnson agreed that the United States was bound by the SEATO
*** Iverson, Goldwater, pp. I09-113; Blnm, Years o f Discord, p. 158; Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 131.
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treaty to defend South Vietnam. Johnson was ambiguous about the view o f his advisors 
yet he did not have any choice but see things through. He was worried that he would be 
forced to send U.S. soldiers and face American public opposition to a war it could not 
comprehend.546
Russell believed it was a mistake to get further involved because the United States
was already “in the quicksand up to our very necks.” Johnson suggested that the senator
recommend an American withdrawal in Congress aimed at preempting criticism from the
Goldwater camp. Unfortunately, Russell was not willing to comply since he was not
persuaded by either choice - withdrawal or escalation. Johnson repeated his concerns over
the future course in Vietnam to his National Security advisor, McGeorge Bundy:
I don’t think it’s worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. And it’s 
just the biggest damn mess.. .  What the hell is Vietnam worth to me—
What is it worth to this country? 547
By June 1964, Johnson preferred to hold the line. Most of his counsel favored the 
idea o f a three step approach: increased pressure on Hanoi, followed by an urgent 
warning to Ho Chi Minh to end his support o f the VC, and if  Ho did not comply, the 
bombing North Vietnam.548 Again, Johnson put escalation on hold, based on his own 
doubts and campaign considerations.549 At the same time, he was busy to find European
*** Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 256-258; Nixon visited Asia m early 1964 and found America’s Asian allies 
complaining about the lack o f U.S. determination against the Communists.
*** Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 144-145. 
w  Ibid-p. 145.
** Pentagon Papers, VoL ID, pp. 64-65; George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 377; McNamara, 
In Retrospect, p. 12.1; Herring, Longest War, p. 174.
*** Pentagon Papers, VoL III, 72-76; McNamara, fn  Retrospect, pp. 121-123. Hanoi was not intimidated 
and remained confident that combined NFL and North Vietnamese forces would be victorious, even if this 
meant direct confrontation with the tLS.; see: Herring Longest War, pp. 118-119.
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support for American actions in Vietnam but failed to overcome British and French 
reservations.
August 1964: Tonkin G ulf and the Congressional Resolution
On August 2, 1964 and again two days later American destroyers Maddox and 
Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.550 President Johnson 
decided not to retaliate but send a firm note o f protest to Hanoi that threatened grave 
consequences in case o f another unprovoked assault. He also ordered continued patrols in 
the Tonkin Gulf.551 After the second attack on American vessels the president authorized 
the launch of naval aircrafts to bomb a number o f North Vietnamese coastal 
installations.552 The North Vietnamese attacks enraged Americans and gave President 
Johnson the congressional carte blanche to increase the US involvement, eventually 
leading to the deployment o f combat troops and the Americanization of the war.
On August 4, 1964 President Johnson informed congressional leaders about the 
second assault in the Tonkin Gulf, and asked for a resolution that would sanction 
retaliatory bombing o f North Vietnamese military targets. The resolution was presented
550 McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 129-131; Herring, Longest War, p. 119; Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam, 
pp. 20-22; the Tonkin Golf Incident has been widely covered m historiography. The second attack is now 
very much m doubt and at the tune being there existed already serious questions whether the American 
ships ever came under fire. The first incident on the Maddox at least within 12 miles of the North 
Vietnamese coast line also raises numerous questions because its patrol followed another Oplan 34A 
mission, attacking North Vietnamese on their soiL
551 McNamara, In  Retrospect, pp. 13I-I32; Vandiver, Shadows o f Vietnam, pp. 22-23; Johnson, Vantage 
Point, pp. 112-113; McNamara and Rusk briefed the Senate on the event and explained why Johnson did 
not retaliate.
552 McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 132-135; George Ball, Oral History, July 8 ,197IJLBJL, pp. 22-23; Lloyd
C. Gardner. Pay Any Pricer Lvndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam, fChicago. 1995), pp. 137-138.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
247
to the House o f Representatives the next day and passed unanimously on August 7. The 
Senate debate took several hours and the resolution was adopted with only two votes 
dissenting (Sen. Gruenmg and Morse) and ten Senators abstaining. The Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution gave the president the right to take all necessary measures to repel any armed 
attack on US forces, and in addition, far reaching powers “to take all necessary steps, 
including the use o f armed force, to assist any member or protocol state o f the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom”553.
Although the resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority, the debate in 
the Senate reflected valid concerns about the increasing American commitment in 
Vietnam. Some speakers fully endorsed a hardening position towards and, if  necessary, 
attacks on North Vietnam, yet the great number o f debaters worried about the 
administration’s Vietnam policy and the broad powers given to the president by this 
congressional resolution.554 The somber mood o f the debate foreshadowed the dispute the 
United States would face during the next eight years. While many senators lamented the 
lack of European support to America’s Vietnam policy, in August 1964 they raised the 
same issues as European observers.555
Senators Nelson, Brewster, Cooper, Gore, Church, Bartlett, and Russell viewed 
the situation as a  dangerous turning point toward the dangerous road o f a full U.S.
555 Congressional Record - Senate, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, August 6,1964, p. 18414. 
ss* For Gruening’s dissent see: Congressional Record -  Senate, pp. 18413-18416; Gruenmg blamed U-S. 
escalation for North Vietnamese attacks on the Maddox. The U.S. policy was a grave mistake from the 
beginning and he urged his colleagues to pressure for American disengagement, concluding that “ail 
Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy ”
555 Congressional Record -Senate, August 6,1964, p. 18399-18400; Fullbright and Mansfield both 
defended the resolution because ofNorth Vietnamese aggression. Putting their misgivings on America's 
policy aside for the time being, the accused Hanoi o f repeated aggression. Mansfield, though, hoped that a 
peaceful solution could still be found by employing the United Nations.
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military com m itm ent.556 The concern was undoubtedly shared by de Gaulle and the
British. But unlike, the Europeans the Senators felt compelled to respond to the attack on
American vessels. American honor was at stake which at least for the time being justified
a  limited military response.557Senator Frank Church (D- Idaho) expressed the dilemma o f
many o f his colleagues. He believed that America’s Vietnam policy was fundamentally
flawed and lacked a realistic assessment o f  American national interest, but he had to
support the Congressional Resolution and give Johnson the powers he asked for.
Congress shared the responsibility for the current situation, because it had willingly
funded the policy in Southeast Asia and thereby acquiesced to decisions made by
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Church concluded:
We must accept the consequences of our own actions. We must now face 
the fact that the difficulties in which we find ourselves are our responsibility, 
in having chosen to pursue of action which exposed us to such hazards.”8
The overall tenor revealed that many senators rejected any action that went beyond 
limited retaliatory strikes. Although aware o f the powers given to Johnson, the 
overwhelming number o f Senators debating the resolution did not want a  wider war and 
hoped that Johnson received this message by displaying caution and restrain.559
The Road to Escalation: September 1964 to February 1965
556 Congressional Record-Senate, August 6,1964, pp. 18403,18406-18410. They were also critical of the 
initial Eisenhower decision to get involved in Vietnam m the first place.
5ST Senators EUender (D-La.) and McGovern (D-SJD.) did raise the question whether American ships 
should have been deployed that close to North Vietnam. They also wondered if  this deployment was 
connected to South Vietnamese raids against the North, see: Congressional Record -  Senate, August 6, p. 
18403,18408.
551 Congressional Record-Senate, August6, 1964, p. I84I5.
559 Ibid-dp. 18415-18416.
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Johnson used restraint until his victory at the polls. Washington was trying to 
prevent any incident that could be used by Hanoi to escalate the war. For the time being, 
De Soto patrols were put on hold and 34A operations were suspended.560 In several 
campaign speeches Johnson restated that he had no intentions to escalate the Vietnam 
conflict and presented himself as the candidate for peace, attacking the belligerent stand 
o f Barry Goldwater. In Saigon events were further unraveling. On August 7, General 
Khanh. announced a state of emergency, resulting in press censorship and restriction o f 
civil liberties and devised a  new constitution giving him almost unlimited powers. These 
measures resulted into widespread demonstrations during the second half o f August. For 
weeks the government was in turmoil, and coup rumors, street protests, and efforts to find 
a some kind of compromise paralyzed the Saigon regime.561 Ambassador Maxwell 
Taylor discerned two choices for the United States: continue the passive course as advisor 
or assume a more active role to carry the counterinsurgency program to success. The first 
option was unacceptable because it would eventually force the United States to abandon 
South Vietnam.562
Since early September 1964 Johnson’s advisors also discussed systematic air- 
strikes against North Vietnam, its supply lines, and deployment U.S. ground troops to 
South Vietnam563 The military brass, with exception of Army Chief o f Staff General 
Harold K. Johnson and Admiral Grant Sharp, were in favor o f air attacks on North 
Vietnamese targets, with the goal to break Hanoi’s will to fight, and prepared a list of
560 Pentagon Papers, Vol. Ill, p. 84; Herring, Longest War, p. 123.
561 Pentagon Papers, VoL III, pp. 85-87.
562 Ibid.. p. 87; Young, Vietnam: Wars, p. 126; Herring, Longest War, p. 124.
563 Gardner,P ay Any Price, pp. I40-I4I.
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more than ninety select targets in the North.564 President Johnson was reluctant to escalate 
and rejected air-strikes for the time being. Again, he asked his cabinet whether Vietnam 
was truly worth all the effort; yet his advisors and the Joint Chiefs insisted that the United 
States could not afford to lose South Vietnam. Johnson finally approved the 
recommendation allowing for retaliation in the form of extensive air-strikes, if  North 
Vietnamese or Viet Cong assaulted U.S. forces or South Vietnam.355 This was another 
step toward all out war.
George Ball tried to avert impeding disaster. Dominoes and containment simply 
did not apply to Vietnam. He argued that American policy makers were solely concerned 
with “how” they could succeed in Vietnam, but never asked “why” they were engaged in 
Vietnam in the first place, and why they persisted pursuing a war that they were less and 
less likely to win. Ball fully agreed with Charles de Gaulle’s assessment, with whom he 
discussed Vietnam during a visit in June 1964 in an effort to win France’s support for 
Johnson’s policy.556 Deeply worried about the consequences of “tit-for-tat” escalation, 
Ball sent in October 1964 a sixty-seven page memorandum to Rusk and McNamara 
describing the dangers o f a further expanded American engagement. Ball noted that the 
political structure in South Vietnam was increasingly disintegrating and that he could not
544 Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 238-239; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 151-153,156; McNamara also 
harbored doubts whether bombing might work and he was surprised to learn that Gen. Johnson shared 
these concerns since the Chiefs did not mention it. Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief for the Pacific, 
judged the situation m Saigon as so volatile that a  review of American policy was necessary, indicating that 
disengagement should be considered.
565 Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. I20-I2I; McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 155; George Ball, Oral History,
July 8,1971, LBJL, p. 26; Ball stressed that the president never pushed for escalation, that he got dragged 
along, avoiding to make a final decision. Dean Rusk also doubted that bombing could succeed given the 
particular situation o f the predominantly agricultural North Vietnam. Korea had demonstrated that despite 
extensive bombing the enemy was still able to supply an army of half a million men. See: Dean Rusk, Oral 
History, September26,1969, LBJL, pp. 22-23
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foresee the formation o f any government that could unify its people, or mobilize its 
military, to successfully defeat the insurgents. Based on the situation in South Vietnam, 
the United States had four policy alternatives: continue along current lines, take foil 
responsibility for the war, aerial attacks on North Vietnam, or a political settlem ent567 
BaH obviously preferred negotiation with the goal to guarantee the viability o f South 
Vietnam allowing for an American disengagement His assessment closely resembled the 
analysis of Britain’s Robert Thompson and o f de Gaulle. According to Ball, the 
administration had to realize that Vietnam was unlike Korea in 1950. Despite infiltration 
from the North, many countries regarded the conflict as a  civil war, which did not require 
nor justify intervention by any foreign power.568 A deeper American involvement in 
Vietnam could lead to serious repercussions within the international community. The 
Western allies already expressed concerns about Washington’s commitment to their own 
security:
Our allies believed that we were ‘engaged in a  fruitless struggle in South Vietnam’ and 
feared that if  we became too deeply involved ‘in a  w ar on the land mass o f Asia’, we 
would lose interest in their problems. What we had most to fear was ‘a general loss o f  
confidence in American judgm ent that could result if  we pursued a  course which many 
regarded as neither prudent nor necessary’.569
Most disturbing to Ball was the possibility o f U.S. military actions against North 
Vietnam. He rejected the notion that bombing would not lead to further escalation, but 
insisted that the United States eventually had to make the next step and deploy ground
566 Ball, ThePast Has Another Pattern; pp. 376-379; BflhGeo/geBiofl, p. 159; see above: Chap. 2 on 
Ball's discussion with, de Gaulle.
567 BaH, The Past Has Another Pattern,, pp. 380-381.
568 IbicL. p. 381.
569 Ibid.. p. 382.
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troops, and with it, increasingly lose any initiative in  the war.^Once the United States
was on the “tiger’s back” it could no longer choose when to get off and this ride could
lead to a major conflict involving China and possible the Soviet Union:
Nobody was prepared to concede that any particular step would require any 
further step. This was kind of a standard assumption which I kept repeating 
again and again was a false assumption. .  .You go forward with this further step, 
and you wili substantially have lost control. Finally you’re going to find 
the war is running you, and we’re not running the war.571
The next years proved Ball correct both on Vietnam and allied reaction to 
America’s escalation of the conflict. But he, like the Europeans, failed to impress his 
superiors. Rusk and McNamara were shocked and dismissed the political solution 
promoted by Ball. To them, negotiations without guarantees to South Vietnamese 
independence would have the same result as unconditional withdrawal, leading to a 
Communist victory in South Vietnam and the potential fall o f Cambodia and Indonesia. 
Both believed that negotiations at this time would be seen as a sign o f weakness. Hanoi 
had to first realize American determination by stopping Its infiltration into the South and 
Its giving support to the Viet Cong.572 Neither Hanoi nor the Viet Cong were willing to 
cease their struggle. As long as they refused to do so Washington was also not willing to 
retreat. Despite continuously bad news from South Vietnam, most o f Johnson’s counsel 
could simply not perceive the possibility that the United States might foil in Vietnam. Yet
570 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 382-383; He reminded Johnson that his predecessors had
committed themselves to Vietnam sorely to help the Vietnamese defend themselves and not to fight a 
conflict the Vietnamese might not even want. 
m  George Ball, Oral History, July 8,1971, LBJL, pp. 30-31.
572 Ibid.. op .  29-30: Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 383; McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 156-158. 
Interestingly, Rusk did not comment on the Ball memorandum both m the Oral History interview or his 
memoirs.
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by making every American response contingent on North Vietnamese/ NLF action 
Washington placed itself in the defensive further limiting its freedom of action.
On November I, 1964 the Viet Cong attacked the American base at Bien Hoa, 
near Saigon, killing four Americans and destroying five B-57 bombers. The Joint Chiefs 
recommended immediate air-strikes against the North, but Johnson decided against it. 
Yet, pressure on the administration to approve additional military action continued. On 
the same day McNamara met with Earle “Bus” Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who expressed the deep concerns o f his colleagues, suggesting that the situation in 
South Vietnam required intensified military operations including air-strikes over both 
North and South Vietnam. Wheeler pointed out that if the president decided against 
further action it would be better for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam.573 
Wheeler placed his finger at the core o f the issue. Either the United States employ its 
military might without restriction and fight for complete victory in Vietnam or decide to 
call it quits. Limited military reaction would simply not succeed. De Gaulle made the 
same point when he told Ball that unless the United States were willing to take the war all 
the way to North Vietnam and even China, negotiations were the only feasible solution.
Johnson, still uncertain what to do, ordered the creation of a working group 
headed by Assistant Secretary o f State William Bundy to assess policy options. The 
group admitted that the conflict did not fit the traditional framework of Communist 
aggression but was to a large degree a domestic struggle. Hence, U.S. military assistance 
might not prevent the fall o f South Vietnam.574 Despite this assessment, the Bundy group
573 Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 121; McNamara, In  Retrospect, p. 159.
m  See for the complete memorandum: Pentagon Paper?, VoL HL, pp. 657-666.
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upheld the domino theory. The fall of South. Vietnam could “unravel the whole Pacific
and South Asian defense structures”.575 The group also worried about the impact
American failure in Vietnam would have abroad.576But as long as the United States
maintained its image o f a  strong, determined nation, the fallout from a  debacle in
Vietnam might be acceptable to American friends and allies. In Europe, Great Britain and
Germany sympathized with American policy whereas with France “we are damned either
way we go.”577American prestige in Europe depended on the U.S. conduct in Vietnam:
[0 ]u r key European allies probably would now understand our applying an 
additional measure o f  force to avoid letting the ship sink; but they could become 
seriously concerned i f  w e get ourselves involved in major conflict that 
degraded our ability to  defend Europe and produced anything less than an 
early and completely satisfactory outcome.578
The Bundy group was correct but failed to follow its own analysis in its 
recommendation what Washington should do next The committee favored the 
combination of military pressure and negotiation and sought a compromise between hard­
liners and critics of further escalation. The report illustrated the self-imposed quagmire of 
Washington. South Vietnam could not fall, but all out war to defend its independence was 
a dismal alternative as well. Nobody was satisfied with the group’s recommendations. 
The Joint Chiefs preferred the foil use American military might to gain a victory on the 
battlefield.579 Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland wanted to give Saigon more 
time to re-organize, but hoped to use the threat o f bombing North Vietnam to make Hanoi 
more amenable to a settlement. George Ball rejected the entire argument as another
575 Pentagon Paper, VoL III, p. 658
Ibid.
S7T IbicL. p. 659.
Ibid.
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example o f wishful thinking and “bureaucratic casuistry” that turned logic upside down 
and completely disregarded the realities in South Vietnam.580 President Johnson was 
deeply frustrated with both the developments m Saigon and the multitude of opinions and 
advice from his staff. He was anxious about the consequences o f stepped up military 
operations and felt his landslide victory against Goldwater did not give him the mandate 
for all out war in Vietnam.581
Nevertheless, Johnson inched step by step further toward escalation. On 
December I, 1964 he accepted a two phased program. Phase I insisted that the Saigon 
government finally solve its internal quarrels and adopt a program of reform before 
considering further military operations. Phase II authorized the U.S. Saigon mission to 
develop jointly with the South Vietnamese plans for reprisal operations. Despite the 
admonitions o f Ambassador Taylor, the leaders in Saigon did not comply and the 
question o f air-strikes was back in the debate. Yet, for the time being, the president only 
agreed to continue the Oplan 34A mission and ordered armed reconnaissance flights over 
Laos, operation Barrel Roll, to strike at North Vietnamese infiltration routes, with both 
measures aimed at increasing the pressure on Hanoi.582 Once more, Washington moved 
closer to an “endless entanglement,” as de Gaulle had told Kennedy, in the hope that each 
step would turn the tide.
In Congress, a few voices o f concern about the dangers o f escalation could also be 
heard. Most outspoken was Senator Mansfield, who sent a memorandum to the president
579 Pentagon Papers, p. 270.
580 McNamara, [n Retrospect, p. 162; BaH, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 388-389.
m  Dailefc, Flawed Giant, p. 241.
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ia early December 1964 warning of the dangers o f further military action. The United 
States was in a similar position to that o f France in the early 1950’s, when South Vietnam 
was without a truly legitimate government, held together only by foreign support, ha 
addition, the m ilitary situation was turning worse and Mansfield feared that the fighting 
would spill beyond the borders o f South Vietnam.583 He recommended negotiation 
involving both China and European mediation. If  the administration rejected this course, 
it would face a long term commitment to South Vietnam, possibly a larger Asian war. 
Such commitment must be explained to the American public “in no uncertain terms” so 
that the nation was fully aware o f what might lay ahead.5®* Mansfield made quite clear 
that he was against any attacks on North Vietnam, a  sentiment that was shared by the 
majority of his colleagues. According to a poll by the Associated Press, only seven out of 
eighty-three senators favored the deployment o f American ground forces and bombings 
of North Vietnam, while a considerable number o f senators preferred a political 
settlement585 Again, this disparity between the official line on the importance o f the 
Vietnam and the unwillingness to sacrifice American lives to defend that Southeast Asian 
country is intriguing. But it is also a reflection o f American democracy in general. The 
commitment to a  global role had to be defended at home. Another Korea-like war was not 
what many senators and American citizens aspired to.
Mansfield’s recommendations were discarded by Johnson’s counsel, which 
increasingly favored attacking North Vietnam using the full might o f American power to
552 McNamara, Ire Retrospect, pp. 163-164; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 389; Pentagon Papers, 
Vol HI, pp. 248-253.
5C Olsen, Mansfield and Vietnam, p. 137.
5** IbfcL. pp. 137-138; Berman, Futtbright and the Vietnam War, p. 33.
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force a change in Communist policy. They were joined by conservative voices who
demanded a greater military effort in Vietnam. Criticism evoked Johnson’s fear that a
Democratic president could not survive failure in Vietnam, since it was the general belief
at the time that Democrats were “soft on Communism abroad.” Moreover, Johnson
worried that his “Great Society” would be derailed by congressional attacks on his
performance in Vietnam. He felt that giving up in Vietnam would make things even
worse domesticaIly.5S6He addressed the situation in Vietnam publicly in his State o f the
Union address in January 1965, pointing out that America had pledged its support to
South Vietnam ten years ago and was not willing to break that promise. Ultimately,
America desired peace in Southeast Asia but it could only be achieved “when aggressors
leave their neighbors in peace”.587
McNamara and McGeorge Bundy were determined not to fail in Vietnam. They
favored the military option outlined in a memorandum submitted to the president in
January 1965, which argued for sustained reprisals against the North. They were folly
aware o f the consequences o f their suggestions but believed that the current policy would
not lead to success and thus advised the president to approve increasing American
military operations:
Both o f us [i.e. McNamara, Bundy] understand the very grave questions presented 
by any decision o f this sort. We both recognize that the ultim ate responsibility is 
not ours. Both o f us have supported your unwillingness, in earlier months, to move 
out the middle course. W e both agree that every effort should still be made to 
improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the authorities in South Vietnam 
as best as we can. B ut w e are both convinced that none o f this is enough, and the time 
has come for harder choices.58*
5S5 Berman, Fullbright and the Vietnam War, p. 33.
516 Dallefc, Flawed Giant, p. 244; Keams, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, pp. 258-259. 
5IT Public Papers of the President - Lyndon B. Johnson, January4,1965, p. 3.
81 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 168; Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 122-123.
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Not every cabinet member agreed with these recommendations. Rusk opposed any
military action that would expand the war into North Vietnam and his concerns were duly
noted by McNamara and Bundy. While Rusk firmly stood behind the American
commitment to South Vietnam, he believed the United States should continue the present
course advising the South Vietnamese to help themselves.
[ believed we should persevere w ith our policy o f advising and assisting the 
South Vietnamese and playing for breaks, rather than risking a  major escalation 
i f  one could be avoided. At this stage, in late 1964, the stakes were high enough 
th a t we couldn’t simply withdraw, but neither did I want us to go all out fighting 
a  guerrilla w ar. Unless the South Vietnamese themselves could carry the m ajor 
burden, I didn’t  see how we could succeed.589
McNamara and Bundy won the debate. Following a Viet Cong attack on an 
American airbase near Pleiku and a U.S. helicopter base at Camp Holloway on February 
6, 1965, Johnson decided to escalate. On February 8, Johnson endorsed a  strategy o f 
reprisals against North Vietnam and indicated his willingness to send a substantial 
number o f American ground forces to secure American bases in South Vietnam.590 
Another Viet Cong attack in Qui Nhon two days later that killed twenty-three Americans 
further strengthened Johnson’s determination. He authorized an expanded bombing 
campaign o f North Vietnamese targets, operation Rolling Thunder.m On February 26, 
1965, Johnson approved sending two Marine Battalions to Vietnam. They landed near 
Da Nang on March 8. On April 1 ,1965 Johnson authorized the deployment o f two more
m  Rusk, A s I  Saw It, p. 447.
590 547th NSC Meeting, February 8 ,1965, LBJL,. pp. 2-3.
591 Pentagon Papers, VoL HI. pp.271-272.
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battalions, increasing the level o f U.S. troops to more than 33,000 men. He also expanded 
their mission from base security to active combat.392
The subsequent escalation of America’s war in Vietnam has been told and 
analyzed in minute detail by historians. Despite the growing number of American troops, 
Washington did not win the war. Domestic and European skeptics who warned against 
escalation were proved correct although nobody relished in the fact. Vietnam was an 
unnecessary war that extracted a far too high price from all combatants. Johnson 
indirectly admitted the failure of his Vietnam policy in March 1968 and withdrew from 
public service. Certainly, he was not the only one to blame for quagmire in Vietnam but 
he was responsible for escalating the war.
The conflict might have been avoided long before Marines set foot on Asian soil 
in March 1965. De Gaulle’s insistence on retaining Indochina in 1945 led to the Fust 
Indochina War. Truman’s fear of losing France to the Communist Party, reinforced by 
pleas for American help by French Prime Minister Paul Ramadier, resulted in growing 
American aid to the French straggle in Indochina. Mao Zedong’s victory in China in 
1949 and the Korean War brought Southeast Asia to the forefront of American policy­
making in Asia. Thence, containment, falling dom inoes., and national security defined the 
American foreign policy paradigm from Truman to Johnson. Eisenhower took the next 
step by solidifying U.S. commitment to Diem’s Vietnam in 1954. Kennedy inherited this 
commitment and, against his better judgement, not only reaffirm ed  but expanded 
America’s role in Vietnam. His concern about losing his political mandate at home 
prevented any profound reassessment o f the situation in Vietnam and its actual
592 Pentagon Papers, VoL HI, pp. 389-392.
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importance for the United States and the Free World. Neither he nor Johnson heeded the 
voices of dissent among their advisors. Also, they did not acknowledge British, French, 
and German concerns about America’s Vietnam policy. We must again ask why?
The answer is complex. First, the ideological paradigm of containment confined 
American policy makers. With the acceptance o f the status quo in Europe, Cold War 
“proxy wars” were fought in the Third World. South Vietnam became another battle-line, 
as had West Germany and South Korea, where the United States was determined to not 
allow further Communist encroachment. Second, ideological thinking not only affected 
American policymakers but pervaded American public opinion, partly as a result of 
public relations campaigns by American leaders. Cold War rhetoric o f “Free World 
against Communist” oppression was convincing and catching. Third, the combination of 
Cold War ideology and the belief that South Vietnam was the domino that could not fall 
petrified American bureaucracy. Officials in Washington and Saigon provided 
information they thought Washington wanted to hear.593 Last, there was what C. Vann 
Woodward described as a “commitment to American pride” rooted in a  “legend o f 
invincibility ” Based on America’s historical experience of victorious wars, defeat by a 
far less powerful enemy was unthinkable.59* The consequences of these various factors 
were tragic for both Americans and the Vietnamese.
In the context o f U.S.- European relations, the “Vietnam question” had profound 
repercussions. The United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic o f Germany
m  Daniel Ellsfaerg, “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine,” Public Policy, Spring 1992, p. 218. 
Accordingly, the “machine” dictated most policy decisions on Vietnam. Kennedy and Johnson could not 
overcome the rigidity and self-interest o f the bureaucracy. Galbraith, McNamara, and Ball made the same 
point by pointing to the difficulties o f acquiring objectives analysis on Vietnam-
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increasingly became disillusioned about Washington because of Vietnam. Washington 
felt the same way because its European allies were either reluctant or outrightly refused to 
support America’s policy. What was needed and did result from the “Vietnam question” 
was a  genuine re-assessment of the transatlantic alliance. The Vietnam conflict revealed 
not only the respective foreign policy paradigms o f the four allies but also the inherent 
limitations in their policy-making On the one hand, the European view on Vietnam, 
though realistic, appeared parochial and self-centered to Washington. On the other hand, 
the American experience during the twentieth century until Vietnam demonstrated that 
the United States had the military might and resources in overcoming any obstacle. 
Whenever American might was employed, victory ensued. South Korea, albeit a bitter 
struggle, was secured for the West. In Latin America the Monroe Doctrine had become 
reality. Johnson’s reaction to turmoil in the Dominican Republican proved the point. U.S. 
marines prevented a “leftist putsch” in April o f 1965.595
If  the Marines had successfully turned the tide in the Dominican Republic, why 
could they not do the same in Vietnam? The conflict in Vietnam went beyond any 
previous American experience. Regardless o f reports from American officials in country, 
every fact-finding mission by high-ranking members of both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations brought back news o f further deterioration. In light o f the self-imposed 
restrictions, neither Kennedy nor Johnson considered negotiations or even disengagement 
a valid option but allowed the United States to become enmeshed in the quagmire o f
594 C. Vann Woodward, The Barden of Southern History. (Baton Rouge and London, 1993),Third revised 
edition, p. 219.
595 On U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic see: Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Giobaiistn: American 
Foreign Policy since 1938. (New York. I991),SbcthRevisedEdition,pp.2I8-22I.
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V ietnam As painful as the Vietnam experience was, it provided opportunity. Once the 
clouds over the conflict had cleared, Washington and its European allies - though step by 
step - redefined their mutual relations by learning to better listen and respect each others 
point of view. Cooperation and consultation proved to become the key to successful U.S. 
relations with its principal partners in Europe. Washington learned that advice horn less 
powerful friends should be considered and mutual concerns openly discussed to prevent 
further “Vietnams.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
263
Failures can be retrieved and harmony restored. It is the question o f 
learning the lessons, not shirking the role.
Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, 1970
Conclusion
On March 31, 1968 Lyndon B. Johnson announced to an astounded national 
audience that he had ordered the cessation o f American bombing raids against North 
Vietnam. The president was also willing to enter into peace talks and hoped that Hanoi 
would respond favorably. Johnson’s concluding statement was even more unexpected; he 
refused to either seek or accept the nomination o f the Democratic Party for another term 
as President. Therefore, it was clear that America’s war in Vietnam had entered a  new 
phase in which the United States still maintained the hope of saving South Vietnam but 
finally decided to negotiate directly with Hanoi.596
While the Vietnam conflict continued, Johnson’s decision to pursue negotiations 
marked a turning point in trans-Atlantic relations. The president’s revised approach 
indirectly admitted the validity o f French and British criticism of Washington’s 
traditional Vietnam policy. Nonetheless, Johnson and his advisors arrived at the same 
conclusion in spite o f European counsel. The fateful Tet offensive o f early 1968, though 
militarily a debacle for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, revealed to Washington that 
the war in Vietnam could not be won unless the United States further escalated its efforts. 
Facing intense domestic pressure, Johnson reasoned that he could not surpass the current 
level o f American engagement.
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The Europeans received the news o f the American de-escalation in Vietnam with 
relief Johnsons’s decision signaled a major step toward ending a conflict that none o f the 
Europeans had wanted. Prime Minister Harold Wilson was surprised by Johnson’s 
resignation but pleased that Washington once more called upon the United Kingdom for 
help in securing peace in Vietnam. An official British statement “warmly welcomed” 
Johnson’s proposals for Vietnam. Within hours Wilson’s foreign secretary Michael 
Stewart approached the Soviets and urged Moscow to work with London in facilitating 
negotiations concerning Vietnam.597 Parliamentary debate on the “dramatic change” in 
America’s Vietnam policy revealed an almost gleeful satisfaction on the part o f the 
British that Washington had finally agreed with the British Vietnam policy. Both Labour 
and Tory MPs entreated the Wilson government to initiate another British diplomatic 
effort aimed at both the Soviets and the United Nations Secretary General, hoping for a 
truce and eventual peaceful settlement in Vtetnam.598The British expected to play a vital 
role in the restoration o f peace in Southeast Asia.
French President Charles de Gaulle was also elated that Johnson had finally 
accepted the realities m Vietnam and sought a negotiated settlement. After eight years o f 
advising that negotiations were the only solution for Vietnam, de Gaulle, like his British
Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the Presidency 1963-1969. (New York, 
1971), p.435; George Herring, America’s Longest Wan The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975. 
Second Edrdon, (New York, 1986), pp. 206-213.
597 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government. 1964-1970. (London, 1971), pp. 519-520; Johnson called on 
Britain and the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairmen to “do all they can” to move to “genuine peace in 
south-east Asia.” Wilson worried whether Johnson’s resigiation might induce Hanoi just to play the 
waiting game in search o f better concession from another president. See also: The Times, April 2,1968, p. 
I on the Stewart talks with the Soviet ambassador to the UK.
** Times, April 2,1968, “Vietnam: new doors opening.” p. 5; Conservative MPs Eldon Griffith, and Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home reminded the Labour government that Hanoi had to do its part and renounce 
aggression.
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counterparts, felt vindicated. He called Johnson's decision to halt the bombing o f North 
Vietnam “tm premier pas dans Fa direction de la paix” and commended Johnson for this 
act o f reason and political courage.S99De Gaulle and his foreign secretary Couve de 
Murville were not only relieved by American concessions to their point o f view vis-a-vis 
Vietnam, but believed that Johnson had removed a major obstacle in Franco-American 
relations. O f course, they maintained that had the Americans listened closer to French 
advice, peace negotiations might Iiave commenced years earlier.400
Johnson’s statement met with approval in West Germany as well. Bonn once 
more demonstrated its loyalty to Washington by emphasizing that the United States had 
proved its willingness to initiate negotiations and hence it was up to Hanoi to accept to 
Johnson’s offer. Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger expressed his respect for Johnson's 
decision and his appreciation o f the president's desire for peace. Kiesinger hoped that the 
American initiative would improve chances for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The 
chancellor felt that any talks should first aim at ending hostilities, and then hopefully 
arriving at a just and durable peace in Southeast Asia. Kiesinger stressed that further 
progress depended greatly on positive reactions from Hanoi. The German media gave 
Johnson’s speech mixed reviews. Regret over Johnson’s resignation was met with 
questions about whether the American president was truly sincere in his decision against
599 Le Monde, April 4,1968, p. I.
600 Maurice Couve de Murville, AussenpoIftOc. 1958-1969. translated into German by Hermann Kusterer, 
(Munich, 1973), pp. II5-II7.
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seeking another term in office. AH questioned the chances o f the American initiative 
succeeding to end war in Vietnam.601
While Johnson’s concessions on Vietnam were a first step toward removing the 
contentious Vietnam issue as a major obstacle in U.S .-European relations, the election o f 
Richard Nixon signaled a  fresh beginning in the trans-Atlantic relationship to America’s 
European allies. Better than Johnson, Nixon understood that the United States needed the 
support and backing o f its European allies. Hence, it was important to sound out 
European opinions before making major American foreign policy decisions. Shortly after 
his inauguration Nixon traveled to Europe to demonstrate that he was not “obsessed with 
Vietnam” and to prove to his domestic audience that he commanded respect abroad.602 
During his first stop at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Nixon expressed a desire to 
“listen and leam,” and successfully pursued the same strategy subsequently in London. 
Wilson was obviously impressed that the new president was sincerely interested in 
considering the British point o f view on Vietnam as well as other issues. Nixon pleased 
his host and both leaders regarded their encounter as a significant step forward in 
improving Anglo-American relations.603
Nixon’s encounter with de Gaulle was even more beneficial. Nixon believed that 
de Gaulle’s cooperation “would be vital for ending the Vietnam War.” The American
601 Le Monde, April 3,1968, p. 8; Stem , April 14,1968, p. 17, “Der ungeliebte Kaiser von Amerika”; 
Commentator  Wolf Schneider acknowledges LBJ’s far-reaching achievements in domestic politics but 
squarely blames Johnson for escalating civil strife m Vietnam to a  full-blown bloody war. Hence, LBJ 
sincerely damaged the international standing o f the United States.
601 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon. (New York, 1990), p. 370.
601 Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 619-621; Wilson points out that the visit already began positively
when Nixon expressed his hope for better Anglo-American relations. Wilson was particularly impressed by
Nixon willingness to listen and the PM certainly liked to hear Nixon’s appreciation o f the Commonwealth.
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leader also hoped for French assistance in establishing a  dialogue between Washington
and the People’s Republic o f China. The French undoubtedly interpreted Nixon’s visit as
initiating a  new phase in French-American relations and marking a distinct departure
hrom the policy of the Johnson administration. Nixon acknowledged a new equality in
the trans-Atlantic partnership and accepted that America’s preponderance over its
European allies and their policies had considerably lessened.604 Concerning the Vietnam
question, Nixon proved as interested in negotiations with Hanoi as de Gaulle.
While America’s European allies appreciated the increased attention from the
Nixon administration it was clear to them that American motives were based primarily on
U.S. self-interest. Regardless o f these concerns, Nixon’s readiness to consider the
European point o f view marked an appreciable step toward a  mutualistic approach in
European-American relations. From the U.S. point o f view, restoring good relations with
the Europeans would benefit America’s global position and have a positive impact on
domestic opinion. Nixon best summarized his agenda:
I felt that the European trip had accomplished all the goals we set for it. It showed the 
NATO leaders that a new and interested administration which respected their views had 
come to power m Washington. It served warning on the Soviets that they could no longer 
take for granted - nor advantage of - Western disunity. And the TV and press coverage 
had a positive impact at home, instilling however briefly, some much needed pride in our 
sagging national morale.605
There is no doubt that Nixon was not only well prepared but certainly eager to demonstrate his respect o f 
Britain in order to restore confidence m the U.S. administration; see: Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 370-371.
“ * Murville, AussenpolUik, pp. 126-128; Nixon, Memoirs, pp.370-373.
605 Nixon, Memoirs^ p. 375.
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By adopting a pragmatic foreign policy, Nixon succeeded in improving trans- 
Atlantic relations.606 Although Nixon’s approach resembled traditional European 
policymaking far more than that o f previous administrations and was easier for the 
Europeans to understand, the new situation was only a  partial “victory” for America’s 
allies. In adopting the role of honest listener, Nixon worked toward preventing further 
European criticism of American foreign policy. He was folly aware o f the damage an 
independent European stand could elicit and had already generated for Washington. 
While the new American president pursued U.S. foreign policy-making in the traditional 
European strategy of national interest, it was precisely this neo-realist approach that 
prevented any collective and effective European response to America’s Vietnam policy. 
The European sentiment o f vindication following Johnson’s offer to conduct peace 
negotiations with Hanoi only temporarily obscured serious shortcomings in policies 
adopted by London, Paris, and Bonn. Neither European country had been able to 
significantly influence Washington’s Vietnam policy from 1961 onward. American 
domestic opposition and the shock o f the Tet-Offensive forced Washington to rethink its 
strategy in Southeast Asia. In the final analysis, London, Paris, and Bonn had little impact 
on Johnson’s decision to seek negotiations with Hanoi.
The trans-Atlantic debate over Vietnam exemplified the global ramifications of 
U.S. policy-making. The Vietnam question revealed inherent tensions among the trans- 
Atlantic allies but also manifested the mutual dependence existing among the members of
406 Peter Bender, Die “Neue Ostpolitjk" und ihre Fofeenr Vom Mauerbau bis zur Wiedervereinignng.
Fourth Edition, (Munich, 1996), p. 156; Bender emphasizes Nixon’s expertise in foreign policy and also 
credits National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, a German emigre, with perceiving politics m terms of
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the trans-Atlantic alliance. London and Paris had ample experience in Asia and were both 
trying to convey the lessons o f their past shortcomings to Washington. Certainly this 
“history lesson” was guided by British and French self-interest aimed at enhancing then: 
role in global politics. West Germany also pursued its own national agenda. Unlike 
Britain and France, Germany had to deal with the legacy o f its military aggression in 
Europe and hoped to overcome some of the consequences o f total defeat through German 
unification. Regardless o f their past, the three European powers had to acknowledge their 
status as secondary powers in the international scene and admit the necessity o f 
cooperation with the United States. Through its own painful experience in Vietnam the 
United States realized its global limitations as well as the importance o f undertaking 
multilateral as opposed to unilateral actions in the future.
Historian C. Vann Woodward’s reflections on America’s war in Vietnam provide 
important insights into American as well as European thinking. Woodward maintained 
that America’s experience since the country’s independence led U.S. foreign 
policymakers to the belief that they would always succeed regardless o f any obstacles 
America might face. Britain, France, and Germany subscribed to similar concepts. As any 
nation, they valued their role and contribution in global politics. Woodward argued that 
based on the legend o f “national innocence,” America simply could not be blamed for 
“imperialism” in Vietnam. America’s record differed from that o f the “colonialist” 
Europeans.607 The conflict in Vietnam painfully shattered the positive image many
Realpolitik. Murville also stresses that Nixon was well trained in foreign policy as Vice-president during 
the Eisenhower admmistration- see: Murville, Aussenpolitik, pp. 126-127.
607 C. Vann Woodward, The Burden o f Sonthem History. (Baton Rouge and London, 1993), Third Revised 
Edition, pp. 221-222. Woodward discussed America's Vietnam experience as part o f the “irony o f southern
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Americans had o f their country. Woodward addressed a pertinent predicament Americans 
have had to face ever since the Vietnam War. How could American ideals be reconciled 
with the real challenges the nation faced globally? America’s image and identity was 
undermined by the tragedy o f Vietnam that divided the country in a degree only second to 
the Civil War.
The trans-Atlantic debate over the “Vietnam question” revealed once again the 
profound relevance o f national pride and identity among all four allies. The historic and 
cultural legacy o f each country and their respective foreign policy decisions were not easy 
to dismiss. The viability o f the trans-Atlantic alliance depended upon a better 
understanding o f the heritage and past differences among its members.
The process o f how the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany 
responded to and interacted on the Vietnam question reflects the on-going task o f 
balancing a nation’s perceived interest with the challenges imposed by global forces. The 
United Kingdom has realized that it needs both a solid grounding in Europe and also 
maintain the “special relations” with the United States. In 1973, Britain finally joined the 
European Community. France, after de Gaulle, has accepted that grandeur is limited by 
larger European and global realities. The “Chunnel” is the most visible example o f how 
far Anglo-French relations have improved during the last thirty years. The Federal 
Republic o f Germany, perhaps, has learned the most from its failures dining the 1960’s. 
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik ended a  defensive West German foreign policy that 
merely hoped for unification while denying the realities o f a  divided Europe. He chose
history.” While he leaves no doubt that the South fell short fir dealing with its own past, the defeat o f the 
South ht the Civil War as well as its legacy provided a paradigm, to reassess also generally accepted view
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Soviet Union were far beyond German influence, Brandt’s approach set the comer-stone 
on which Germany unification was finally achieved. Nixon’s new approach in trans- 
Atlantic relations evidenced that the U.S. learned some important lessons from the failure 
o f America’s Vietnam policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administration. Nixon set 
the path followed by his successors in acknowledging that the United States needed its 
trans-Atlantic allies. The Europeans, though economically strong, also realized that they 
could not succeed in meeting global challenges without the support and friendship of the 
United States. The Vietnam experience, while causing friction with the alliance, taught 
the Western powers an extremely important lesson: the alliance’s continuance and 
validity depended on the support of all members, and each member, to varying degrees, 
was dependent on the well-being o f the trans-Atlantic alliance. As Robert Thompson 
stated “failures can be retrieved and harmony restored.” The basis of harmony was, and 
is, an honest dialogue.
that prevailed among American leadership during the Vietnam War.
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